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THE PARTICULARLY DUBIOUS CASE OF
HANS V. LOUISIANA: AN ESSAY ON LAW,
RACE, HISTORY, AND "FEDERAL COURTS"
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR.*
In a number of striking decisions the Rehnquist Court has limited
the powers of Congress and substantially insulated the states from
federal authority. In doing so, it has repeatedly and explicitly
based its jurisprudence on Hans v. Louisiana, an 1890 decision in
which the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred
citizens from suing their own states in the federal courts for money
due on the states' bonds. Hans asserted that the Eleventh
Amendment, despite its narrow language, was intended to
recognize a broad principle of state sovereign immunity which
prohibited suits against states absent their consent.
Whether or not the Rehnquist Court's decisions are wise or
desirable in the early twenty-first century, the Court's reliance on
Hans is neither. Although Hans invoked the history of the
Eleventh Amendment's drafting and ratification, its reasoning and
conclusion do not reflect the intent of the amendment's framers
but the purposes of the post-Reconstruction settlement. That
informal but well understood agreement among white Americans,
driven in part by racism, allowed the South a special and limited
independence in imposing white rule and repudiating its state
debts in exchange for national reconciliation and unity. Thus, as a
matter of history, Hans gave voice not to the intent of the 1790s
but to the compromise of the 1890s.
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Considered in the light of its own history, then, Hans, properly
merits no authority as a constitutional precedent for three
interrelated reasons. First, it was a decision of expedience, not of
principle. An examination of the Court's jurisdictional decisions
in the late nineteenth century shows that Hans was typical of the
pervasive jurisdictional instrumentalism that marked the Court's
work across the board as well as in cases construing the Eleventh
Amendment itself Second, as an instrument of the post-
Reconstruction settlement and an integral part of the Court's
general abandonment of southern blacks, Hans was both the
product and tool of a pervasive racism among white Americans,
North as well as South. Third, and legally pivotal, Hans was
premised on early nineteenth-century procedural assumptions that
the Court had already rejected and, decisively, on antebellum
jurisdictional and constitutional assumptions that the Fourteenth
Amendment had repudiated. Thus, Hans was a decision of mere
temporary expedience, an instrument of racism and betrayal, and
the product of an outmoded and rejected constitutional
jurisprudence. As such, it has no claim to enduring authority as a
constitutional precedent.
Four of the Justices on the Rehnquist Court who have repeatedly
relied on Hans to expand the Eleventh Amendment should agree
that those grounds are sufficient to require its repudiation. Only
three years ago, in a case involving the Establishment Clause, they
maintained that a constitutional doctrine "born of bigotry" should
be "buried." So, now, should Hans be buried.
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INTRODUCTION
What is called the "law of federal courts" has been established
through a process that filters, purifies, redesigns, and largely erases
decisive historical phenomena-social conflict, politics, racism,
sexism, and, of course, change itself. Examples abound. The well-
known case of Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,1 for one,
centered on a fascinating and even lurid episode in American history
that involved not only corporations, government, unions, power, and
money but also fear, race, gender, the outbreak of world war, and the
frightening specter of rape and rampant interracial sexual
1. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The case involved a suit by railroad interests attacking the
constitutionality of a rule of the Texas Railroad Commission that required white
conductors aboard all Pullman sleeping cars, each of which was staffed by a black porter.
Id. at 497-98. Both the conductors and porters intervened, the former supporting the rule
and the latter attacking it. Id. at 498. With World War II looming, the Court found it
advisable to postpone decision on such a potentially explosive domestic issue. See id. at
501-02.
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encounters.2 The purification process, however, transformed the case
into an authority for an abstruse "doctrine of abstention."3  As a
matter of "law," Pullman now stands for the proposition that federal
courts will not decide a case which contains an unsettled issue of state
law when resolution of the state-law issue by a state court could
obviate the need to decide a question of federal constitutional law.
Between the original historical episode and the subsequent legal
doctrine it does seem that something of significance has been lost.
On one level, of course, this purification process makes perfect
sense and is essential in developing a system of law based on
rationalized sets of general rules and principles. On another level,
however, the process creates an insidious problem. Purifying life and
sterilizing the past can strip decisions of their animating purposes and
underlying values, thus denying the authentic meanings and practical
truths they embody. If purification and abstraction create "rules" and
"principles" necessary for general propositions of "law," they also
make the resulting rules and principles peculiarly vulnerable to
distortion, transformation, and manipulation.
The unfortunate and dangerous side of the purification process is
apparent in the Supreme Court's recent reanimation of Hans v.
Louisiana,4 an 1890 decision that has become one of the launching
pads for the Court's new activist jurisprudence.' Since the mid-1980s,
a bare five-Justice majority on the Rehnquist Court has worked to
reshape American law and overturn much of the constitutional
jurisprudence of the past century.6  The dominant majority has
2. W. J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH 113-17 (Vintage Books 1991) (1941);
Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of Federal Courts
Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1038-41
(1994).
3. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
4. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
5. E.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 300-19
(2002) (tracing recent expansion of federal judicial power); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond
Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing in Seminole Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REV. 407, 418-24
(1999) (finding that the Rehnquist Court has limited Congress's power under Article I);
Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 158 (2001) (arguing that the principal characteristic of the Rehnquist Court is its
commitment to "judicial sovereignty").
6. The Court's new jurisprudence has produced a massive literature. See generally
Symposium, Federalism after Alden, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631 (2000) (addressing federalism
questions raised by the Rehnquist Court); Symposium, Shifting the Balance of Power?
The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115
(2001) (examining the shift in the balance of power between the federal government and
the states); The Supreme Court's Federalism: Real or Imagined?, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
1930 [Vol. 81
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sought, on one line of advance, to expand the institutional power of
the Supreme Court and to enhance substantially the independence
and sovereign immunity of the states.7 It has sought, on another line
of advance, to handicap or eliminate many different classes of tort,
civil rights, and public law claimants and to constrict the powers of
both Congress and the lower federal courts.8 To help justify its
ambitious project, the Rehnquist majority has repeatedly invoked a
fundamental constitutional "presupposition" that it attributes to
Hans.9 That presupposition, "first observed over a century ago in
POL. & Soc. SCI. 9 (Frank Goodman ed., 2001) (examining various aspects of the Court's
federalism revival).
7. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 76 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-68 (1995); see also sources
cited supra notes 5-6 (discussing the Court's new activist jurisprudence) and sources cited
infra note 9 (summarizing the Court's recent use of Hans to constrict the powers of
Congress).
8. E.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1998) (restricting
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86
(1996) (imposing due process limits on punitive damages); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (applying the standing doctrine to limit the ability of Congress
and private citizens to enforce environmental protection statutes).
9. Into the 1980s the Court was still limiting Hans. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989) (holding that Congress could abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it legislated under the Commerce Clause); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the
Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (upholding a FELA suit against a state
railroad on the alternative ground that the statute was within the congressional Commerce
Clause power and hence could not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment). Under the
leadership of Justice William Brennan, four Justices urged that Hans be even more
severely circumscribed or overruled. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 233 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting with Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.) (stating "I would
accept respondent Muth's invitation to overrule Hans"); Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways
& Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 520 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting with Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.) (terming the doctrine of Hans "pernicious" and arguing that
it should be limited or overruled).
At the same time, however, by the 1980s other Justices were beginning to use
Hans to expand the significance of the Eleventh Amendment and the scope of state
sovereign immunity. E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985)
(denying that a congressional statute abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity since it
lacked unequivocal language indicating the intent of Congress to do so); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123 (1984) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibited a federal injunction against the state hospital to remedy a
violation of state law). By the late 1980s their efforts grew bolder. In 1987 Welch
overruled Parden in part (insofar as Parden was inconsistent with Atascadero and found
congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity on the basis of statutory
language that was less than clear and unequivocal), and nine years later Seminole Tribe
overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. and held that Congress could not abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it acted under the Commerce Clause power. In
1991, Justice Antonin Scalia summarized the expansive and untethered new jurisprudence
that the Court's five-Justice majority attributed to Hans. Since Hans, Scalia explained,
1932 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Hans v. Louisiana," Chief Justice Rehnquist declared in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida" in 1996, holds that "each State is a sovereign entity
in our federal system ... and . .. ' "[i]t is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
consent."' .... The following year the same five Justices cited Hans
for the sweeping proposition that the Eleventh Amendment
symbolizes a "broader concept of immunity" that is "implicit in the
Constitution" and that transcends the amendment's text, an immunity
that substantially insulates the states from federal power."2
In justifying its conclusions in both Hans and Seminole Tribe the
Court grounded its reasoning on "history," and that reliance properly
directs our attention to the past and raises several distinct, if
intertwined, questions. Some are relatively more "legal": What
reasoning did Hans employ? How did it interpret relevant
precedents? How sound were its conclusions? Others are relatively
more "historical": What did the Justices actually do in Hans? Why
did they do it? How did Hans relate to the Court's other
contemporaneous, though doctrinally distinct, decisions? What were
its consequences? Answering those questions, especially the
We have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it
says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms:
that the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact; that the
judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty, (citations omitted],
and that a State will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has
consented to suit, either expressly or in the "plan of the convention."
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
Beginning with Seminole Tribe in 1996, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
joined Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas in using
Hans as a dominant constitutional precedent and extending its reach substantially, thereby
enlarging the sovereign immunity of the states and limiting the power of both Congress
and the federal courts. E.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82 (2000)
(narrowing congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting
under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999)
(holding that Congress cannot abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity and subject
states to suit in their own courts when acting under its Article I powers); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999) (narrowing
congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when acting under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,
270 (1997) (limiting, on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the doctrine of Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908), and the power of federal courts to enjoin actions of state officials).
During this recent period, the majority's expansive use of Hans was consistently opposed
by a four-Justice minority made up of Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer.
10. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
11. Id. at 54 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton))) (emphasis omitted by the Court).
12. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 267-68.
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relatively historical ones, inevitably leaves many issues open. The
answers cannot tell us, for example, whether the substantive policies
that the Rehnquist majority seeks to serve through its use of Hans are
wise or desirable in the early twenty-first century. The answers do,
however, tell us one thing. With surprising clarity, they demonstrate
that there is no sound reason why we should accord Hans itself the
slightest weight as a generative constitutional precedent or accept it
as a legitimate basis on which either to judge the scope of state
sovereign immunity or to limit the powers of the federal
government. 3
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I introduces the
Court's decision in Hans,4 and Part II reviews a number of serious
criticisms that scholars have directed at the case. 5 The next three
parts explore Hans in its historical context, identifying the decision as
a characteristic product of the late nineteenth-century Supreme Court
and the distinctive political and social forces that dominated that era.
Part III demonstrates that the late nineteenth-century Court followed
a practice of flexible and self-conscious instrumentalism in shaping its
jurisdictional decisions and that Hans was a typical product of that
practice. 6 The decision was a device of judicial expedience, not a
product of constitutional principle. Part IV identifies the substantive
social policy that directed the Court's jurisdictional instrumentalism
when it decided Hans.7 That policy was to accept and legitimate an
informal but comprehensive and well-understood national settlement
in which the North in general and the Supreme Court in particular-
animated in significant part by racist pressures and motives-
abandoned the goals of Reconstruction, indulged the South in a
special independence, and acquiesced in the region's efforts both to
repudiate its bonds and to establish oppressive, white supremacist
13. The doctrine of stare decisis does not counsel otherwise. If the Rehnquist Court
were merely applying Hans within established parameters, then stare decisis might lend it
support. During the past decade, however, the Court has actively reshaped the law,
expanded state immunities, and circumscribed the constitutional powers of the federal
government. In its campaign it has invoked Hans and its "presupposition" to help justify
its innovations. Thus, the Rehnquist Court has already moved far beyond stare decisis.
That fact compounds the need to reexamine the past in an effort to understand more fully
the true historical origins and the authentic constitutional significance of Hans. For an
argument that stare decisis should not prevent the Court from overruling Hans, see
Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v.
Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1260, 1262-64 (1990).
14. Infra notes 20-41.
15. Infra notes 42-95.
16. Infra notes 96-186.
17. Infra notes 187-512.
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regimes. The nation has long since repudiated such racist motives
and policies. Part V examines the "legal" reasoning employed in
Hans and shows that the opinion was rooted in pre-Civil War
common-law ideas that the Court had already abandoned and, more
fundamentally, in an implicit rejection of the Fourteenth
Amendment.18 Together, the three parts argue that Hans should
carry no generative authority in American constitutional law because
it was the product of unprincipled expedience, a vicious and long-
since repudiated racism, and a refusal to accept the constitutional
principles embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article
concludes with some brief remarks about the role of historical inquiry
in the evaluation of legal rules and principles. 9
I. HANS
Handed down in 1890, Hans v. Louisiana" was one of the
Court's last major decisions in a wobbling line of post-Reconstruction
cases involving repudiated southern state bonds. Beginning in the
mid-1870s, for a variety of political and economic reasons, many of
the white Democratic governments that came to power in the South
with the end of Reconstruction began to repudiate or "readjust" their
bonds.21 At the same time, unevenly but unmistakably, the Supreme
Court began moving from protecting government bondholders under
the Contract Clause to protecting repudiating states through the
Eleventh Amendment.2 2  By the mid-1880s, the Court was ruling
commonly that the amendment barred the federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction over suits involving repudiated southern state
bonds.23
As the legal tide turned against the bondholders, their lawyers
tried one of the last remaining legal theories that seemed to remain
open. Article III of the Constitution extended the federal judicial
18. Infra notes 513-86.
19. Infra notes 587-98.
20. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
21. C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 18/7-1913, at 86-106
(1951).
22. See generally BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1938) (examining the history of the Contract Clause).
23. Between the early nineteenth century and the end of Reconstruction the Court
consistently construed the Eleventh Amendment with extreme narrowness, but after 1877
it began using the amendment to dismiss bondholder suits that sought to force Southern
States to honor their debt obligations. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 106-49 (1972); JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL




power to all cases arising under federal law, irrespective of the status
of the parties, and in 1875 Congress granted the lower federal courts
jurisdiction to hear such suits. 24 The Eleventh Amendment provided
that the federal judicial power was not to be construed to reach suits
against a state brought by "Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State. '2  Thus, the bondholders reasoned,
two interrelated arguments were open. One was that Article III and
the general "federal question" statute conferred jurisdiction on the
lower federal courts to hear "federal question" suits against any
party, including states. The other was that the Eleventh Amendment
was limited to suits brought by noncitizens and aliens and thus did not
preclude federal judicial power over suits brought against a state by
one of the state's own citizens.26
Accordingly, in 1884 bondholders arranged for a citizen of
Louisiana to bring suit against the State of Louisiana in a local federal
court to recover interest due on the state's bonds. They argued both
of their theories together: that the State's repudiation of its bonds
violated the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution and
hence presented a "federal question" within the meaning of Article
III and the general federal question statute;27 and that the Eleventh
Amendment did not preclude the suit because it was brought by one
of the state's own citizens. The State answered simply, pleading that
the federal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit because a
plaintiff "cannot sue the state without its permission."2s
On March 3, 1890 the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Hans v. Louisiana. Justice Joseph P. Bradley
wrote for eight Justices, while Justice John M. Harlan concurred
separately.2 9 Accepting the questionable proposition that the case did
24. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
26. For appellant's argument, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1890); for the
Court's characterization, see id. at 9-10.
27. Plaintiff relied on a provision of the state's constitution, adopted in 1874, which
declared that the bonds created "a valid contract" between the state and its bondholders
and that "the State shall by no means and in nowise impair" the bonds. Id. at 2. He
further pleaded the fact that in 1879 the State had changed its constitution, purportedly
voiding the provisions of both its prior constitution and its bonds. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Justice Bradley wrote into law the views he had expressed in dissent five years
earlier in the Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 330 (1885) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan compressed his thoughts into a single brief paragraph, concurring in the
judgment but disagreeing with "many things" in the majority opinion, including its claim
that Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), had been wrongly decided. Hans,
134 U.S. at 21 (Harlan, J., concurring).
20031 1935
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present a federal question, 3° Bradley ruled that the Eleventh
Amendment and the sovereign immunity of the states deprived the
federal courts of jurisdiction. He affirmed the lower court's judgment
dismissing the suit.31
Justice Bradley easily disposed of the plaintiff's contentions. The
"federal question" argument fell quickly. The Court's recent state
bond cases had addressed similar challenges based on similar claims
of federal law, he explained, and they established that such claims
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 32  Turning to the
citizenship argument, Bradley acknowledged that plaintiff did not
come within any of the specific categories itemized in the Eleventh
Amendment. He declared, however, that the amendment's text was
not dispositive. The amendment, Bradley explained, had been
adopted and ratified to overturn the Court's 1793 decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia,33 which had allowed a noncitizen to sue a state.
Chisholm, Bradley asserted, had created "a shock of surprise" that
echoed throughout the country because it contradicted a generally
accepted assumption, rooted in the common law and honored by
implication in the Constitution, that states were immune from all suits
by individuals.34 Thus, shifting the issue away from the amendment's
specific language, Bradley sought authoritative guidance in "the
manner in which [Chisholm] was received by the country, the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the light of history and the
reason of the thing. '35 On those grounds, he concluded that Chisholm
was wrongly decided because the Constitution had not been intended
"to create new and unheard of remedies." 36  The Eleventh
30. Cautiously, the Court stated that the question presented was based "upon a
suggestion that the case is one that arises under the Constitution or laws of the United
States." Hans, 134 U.S. at 9. Plaintiff's claim was based on the bonds, not on the
Constitution itself. The test for determining a "federal question," however, was uncertain
and changing in the late nineteenth century. See infra text accompanying notes 513-21.
See generally James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal
Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1942) (tracing the history of federal question
jurisdiction); Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question Removal, 71
IOWA L. REV. 717 (1986) (examining the history of federal question removal jurisdiction);
Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-
Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987) (noting that the boundaries of federal question jurisdiction have
remained unclear).
31. The lower court's judgment was reported at 24 F. 55 (C.C.E.D. La. 1885).
32. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
33. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 479 (1793).
34. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11.
35. Id. at 18.
36. Id. at 12.
1936 [Vol. 81
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Amendment was intended to reassert the general principle, widely
accepted at the time of the Constitution's ratification, that the states
enjoyed sovereign immunity against all suits by individuals, regardless
of their citizenship. While the amendment's language was directed
specifically at Chisholm, Bradley declared, its true meaning was that
the Constitution recognized a much broader doctrine of state
sovereign immunity. 37 That broader immunity barred suits by citizens
as well as by noncitizens.
Hans represented both a determined and a sweeping effort by
the Court. It was determined because the Court ignored alternative
and readily available ways to decide the case. The Court could have
denied plaintiff's claim on a variety of legitimate grounds, including
the obvious one that the claim was based on state law and thus did
not present a proper "federal question" within the jurisdiction of the
lower court.38 Or, of course, it could have accepted the claim, given
effect to the amendment's explicit language, and ruled in favor of
plaintiff. Instead, it did neither. In Hans, the Court wished not only
to rule in favor of the State but to do so on broad and irreversible
grounds. Determined to extinguish the southern state bond
litigations with a stroke, it sought to achieve that goal by creating a
constitutional "principle" that would banish such suits with finality.
The Court's effort, consequently, was also sweeping. Its opinion in
Hans transformed the Eleventh Amendment from a specific,
ordinary, and written part of the Constitution into a paratextual
loophole that allowed Bradley to infuse into the supreme law a
"principle" of state sovereign immunity that was textually
unmentioned and therefore amorphous, highly elastic, and
manipulable at will.
Although Hans was, as we will see, a readily understandable
product of the late nineteenth century, its rationale created
potentially serious problems for American law. Its nontextual and
37. Id. at 10-19.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 513-21. Such a ruling would, for example, have
followed the Court's two-year-old decision in Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 588-89
(1888), which held that, in a suit originally filed in federal court (as opposed to a suit
removed to federal court), federal question jurisdiction depended on the presence of a
claim based on some federal law element that appeared in plaintiff's properly pleaded
complaint. In Hans, plaintiff's claim was based on state law, and the federal constitutional
issue under the Contract Clause arose only by way of reply to the State's anticipated
defense that it properly refused to pay on the bonds because of a supervening provision of
state law. See Collins, supra note 30, at 730-34. But see Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of
Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 396, 448-50 & n.280
(1987) (suggesting the existence of an implied cause of action directly under the Contract
Clause).
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infinitely plastic "principle" conferred on the Court a powerful tool
for expanding the immunity of the states and shrinking the powers of
the federal government. It is revealing, as we will also see, that the
Hans Court itself quickly minimized the significance of that
amorphous principle and that, for almost a century, successive Courts
kept its elastic potential under tight control. 9 Indeed, in 1953, when
Henry M. Hart, Jr., and Herbert Wechsler published The Federal
Courts and the Federal System, the casebook that long stood as the
classic and almost unquestioned authority on "the law of federal
courts," the authors did not reprint Hans or even include a reference
to the decision in their table of cases.4" It was only the later Burger
Court and then, far more vigorously and aggressively, the Rehnquist
Court that seized on the potential in Hans's elastic paratextual
principle and transformed the decision into an ever more expansive
justification for limiting federal power and carving out ever larger
realms of state immunity.4 It is that recent and ideologically driven
39. The Court did follow Hans on occasion and on relatively narrow issues. It
extended state sovereign immunity to suits brought in federal admiralty courts, Ex parte
New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921), and to suits brought by foreign countries, Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934). The latter case had the honor of being the last
southern state bond suit to reach the Court. On more critical and far-reaching issues,
however, the Court cabined Hans strictly. E.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit for an injunction against state
officials prohibiting them from enforcing state law); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621,
643 (1892) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit brought against a
state by the United States); see infra notes 149-84 and accompanying text.
40. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953). The index indicates that only ten pages were devoted to
the general topic of "Sovereign Immunity: Eleventh Amendment, effect of." Id. at 1439.
41. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999), the five Rehnquist Justices explicitly
embraced, and turned to powerful effect, the amorphous paratextual idea of state
sovereign immunity that Hans introduced. "[Tihe sovereign immunity of the States
neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment," they
explained. Id. at 713.
Rather .... the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution,
and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into
the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the
plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.
Id.; accord Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751-53 (2002)
(noting that the Convention "did not disturb states' immunity from private suits").
Sovereign immunity, the Rehnquist Justices maintained, is essential to maintain
the "dignity" of the states, Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 760; Alden, 527 U.S. at 715, a
purpose as subjective as it is illimitable. Pre-Reconstruction Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence was quite different. "We must ascribe the [Eleventh] amendment, then,"
Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1821, "to some other cause than the dignity of a State."
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821). One could, of course, argue as
easily and sensibly-if not more plausibly-that the "dignity" of the United States
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use of the case that makes it imperative to understand the essential
illegitimacy of Hans and its amorphous "principle" of state sovereign
immunity.
II. THE DUBIOUS NATURE OF HANS
Historians and legal scholars have long criticized Hans, and their
arguments are familiar and widely accepted.42 Until little more than a
decade ago, moreover, the Supreme Court itself had repeatedly
limited the case and subordinated its elastic sovereign immunity
doctrine to the requirements of evolving national policy and the
mandate of other constitutional provisions.43  Holding aside
subsequent doctrinal developments, however, and taking Hans on its
own terms, scholars have adduced a good many grounds for doubting
its reasoning and conclusions."
A. Considerations of Law: Text, Reason, and Precedent
As a matter of legal analysis, Hans is intrinsically dubious. First,
there is the awkward matter of the text itself.45 The words of the
Eleventh Amendment quite obviously do not support the meaning
that Hans attributed to them. Indeed, under the guidance of Hans
and its "presupposition," the Court's interpretation of the
amendment has strayed so far from its actual words that the text has
quite literally become a matter of no significance. In Seminole Tribe
the Rehnquist Court candidly dismissed the text as a possible
constraint on the amendment's meaning: An argument relying on the
government required that states submit to the jurisdiction of the national courts when they
were sued on claims authorized by national law.
More broadly, the Rehnquist Justices have used the amorphous idea of sovereign
immunity created in Hans to enhance their efforts to restrict congressional power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, an amendment that came after the Eleventh
Amendment and was intended to trump whatever state sovereignty existed. The elasticity
and subjectivity of the Court's Section 5 doctrine, like its sovereign immunity doctrine, is
apparent. The textual basis on which the Rehnquist Justices have relied in creating a
variety of judge-made constraints to negate congressional enactments under Section 5 is
the word "appropriate." E.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999) (holding that "[tihe legislation must nonetheless be
'appropriate' under Sec. 5").
42. Infra Parts II.A, II.B.
43. Infra Part III.B.
44. Infra Parts tI.A, II.B.
45. The text of the Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see supra notes 32-37 and
accompanying text.
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text and seeking to limit the amendment's reach, the Chief Justice
announced, was a mere "straw man.
46
Such a result suggests the misguided nature of the Court's
approach in Hans. Unlike, for example, the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses-provisions that embody broad and fundamental
principles-the Eleventh Amendment contains language that is
narrow, specific, and relatively easily understood. No textual basis or
interpretive difficulty justifies construing the amendment utterly
without regard-let alone contrary-to its explicit terms 7.4  The
Court's textually untethered approach has understandably
encouraged arbitrary and result-oriented uses of the amendment.48
Indeed, although the Rehnquist Court has dismissed the significance
of the amendment's actual text, it readily cites that text when its
specific words support the majority's preferred outcome.
Emphasizing that the amendment imposes a limit on federal judicial
power, for example, Seminole Tribe pointed out that the "text of the
Amendment itself is clear enough on this point.
49
A second reason why Hans seems dubious is that it conflicts with
the Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence that the Court had followed
until the end of Reconstruction. From the days of the early Republic
and John Marshall's opinions in Cohens v. Virginia" and Osborn v.
46. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996). The Court seems to have
recognized the implausible nature of its sovereign immunity decisions based on the
Eleventh Amendment and to have begun shifting toward an increased reliance on the
Tenth Amendment, a vaguer and, at least textually, less obviously inadequate
constitutional basis. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-15 (finding that the Tenth
Amendment removes doubt that the states are sovereign entities). The Tenth
Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
47. Two critics have emphasized the "plain meaning" of the amendment's text.
Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1342, 1346-49 (1989); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61,150 (1989).
48. See infra Part III.B.
49. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64. One of the most revealing illustrations of the role
that the text of the Eleventh Amendment plays for the Rehnquist majority occurred in
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527
U.S. 666 (1999). There, presented with a case that actually came within the express terms
of the amendment, Justice Scalia could not resist the opportunity to exploit the textual
language even though he readily acknowledged that, given the majority's paratextual
jurisprudence, "the following observation has no bearing upon our resolution of this case."
Id. at 689. Regardless of its doctrinal irrelevance, in other words, the text of the Eleventh
Amendment was worth citing when-but only when-it supported the position of the
Rehnquist majority.
50. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (holding that a state is not prohibited by the
Eleventh Amendment from bringing a suit against an individual).
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Bank of the United States,5 the Court held that the amendment only
applied to suits in which the state was formally named as a party.52 In
the years from 1798 to the Civil War the amendment was seldom even
cited, and the Court relied on it but once to dismiss a suit.53 Further,
throughout Reconstruction the Court continued to invoke and apply
Marshall's rule.54 In 1872, for example, Davis v. Gray55 cited Osborn
as authority for the established proposition:
Where the State is concerned, the State should be made a
party, if it could be done. That it cannot be done is a
sufficient reason for the omission to do it, and the court may
proceed to decree against the officers of the State in all
respects as if the State were a party to the record.56
Third, beyond text and precedent, the Court's opinion in Hans is
inadequate on its own terms. Although it invoked "the light of
history ' 57 to support its conclusions, the opinion not only failed to
consider the full historical record but failed to make any serious or
sustained historical inquiry at all.58 It did not bother to discuss the
historical evidence that contradicted its conclusions, and it neither
51. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (stating that the amendment only prevented suits in
which a state was named as a party); see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139
(1810) (holding, in a suit between private parties, that a State may be restrained by a
federal court from revoking a grant of land); United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
115, 139 (1809) (holding that a State cannot assert the Eleventh Amendment on behalf of
a private litigant when the State claims a substantial interest in the underlying dispute but
is not a party). For a different view of Hans, see generally Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our
Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485 (2001) (reviewing literature on Hans and
defending the doctrine of state sovereign immunity).
52. The long-established rule had been modified three years before Hans in another
major post-Reconstruction southern bond case, In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 487 (1887).
53. John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1968 (1983). The single case that relied on the
Eleventh Amendment was Ex parte Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627 (1833), an original
admiralty suit in the Supreme Court brought against a state by an alien.
54. See Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1876) (citing Osborn
approvingly); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 220 (1873) (reaffirming Osborn).
55. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1873).
56. Id. at 220 (citing Osborn).
57. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890).
58. See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 529-36 (1978) (recounting the background
of the Eleventh Amendment); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1422-41 (1975) (discussing the
historical view of Congress and the Eleventh Amendment); James E. Pfander, History and
State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1269, 1323-43 (1998) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment was intended as an
"explanation" of Article I1).
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examined the English common-law background of sovereign
immunity nor the major historical events and political controversies
of the 1790s that gave rise to the Eleventh Amendment. 9 It did not
cite a single work of historical scholarship. Aside from a few carefully
chosen and quite possibly misleading statements from Madison,
Hamilton, and Marshall,6" it relied almost exclusively on general
statements in prior Court opinions that had been handed down long
after the amendment's passage and, consequently, were of no value as
historical sources. As a matter of law, moreover, those opinions
provided little or no support for its holding. The brief, unbalanced,
59. The 1790s was a critical formative decade when the political system, party
structure, public policy, and democratic culture of the new nation were beginning to take
shape. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 229-369
(1992). The early actions of Congress were deeply influenced by that new and unsettled
context. Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789. Political
Compromise or Constitutional Interpretation?, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 13, 27-30 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992)
[hereinafter ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY].
Hans failed to consider the complex political, social, and economic forces that
dominated that decade, determined the purposes behind the Eleventh Amendment, and
secured its adoption. Hans, for example, gave no attention to the significance of major
controversies between the Federalists and Jeffersonians over international trade, policy
toward England and France, and the state debts that were owed in significant part to
Tories and British creditors. Nowak, supra note 58, at 1433-38. Nor did it consider the
relevance of other key issues between the parties involving paper currency, credit policy,
and the allocation of fiscal responsibility between states and the central government.
Pfander, supra note 58, at 1273-75, 1307.
With respect to the common law of sovereign immunity, the doctrine in Great
Britain protected the Monarch alone, prohibiting routine rights of action. It nonetheless
allowed certain "extraordinary" proceedings to address grievances against the Crown and
left all other government officials subject to suit. Gibbons, supra note 53, at 1895; Pfander,
supra note 58, at 1303. The Hans Court neither explored this law in detail nor explained
why and how the text of the Eleventh Amendment was intended to incorporate its
different parts.
60. Hans, for example, cited THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), where
Hamilton argued that sovereign immunity protected the states from suits by individuals.
Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-13. It did not, however, cite or discuss THE FEDERALIST NO. 22,
where Hamilton insisted on the need for a federal supreme court "paramount to the rest,
possessing a general superintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last
resort an [sic] uniform rule of civil justice." THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 108 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987). Nor did it cite THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, where
Hamilton declared that "in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of
privileges and immunities, to which the citizens of the union will be entitled, the national
judiciary ought to preside in all cases, in which one state or its citizens are opposed to
another state or its citizens." THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987). For additional background, see JACOBS, supra note 23, at
27-40; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466-92
(1987); Field, supra note 58, at 529-36; Nowak, supra note 58, at 1427-30. For a useful
summary of the legal-historical case against Hans, see ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL.,
FEDERAL COURTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1087-94 (1996).
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and superficial nature of the "history" in Hans strongly suggests that
its discussion, though ostensibly dispositive, was simply "law office
history" designed to rationalize a result reached on other, undisclosed
grounds.
Fourth, in the face of the Court's inadequate legal and historical
analysis, an extensive body of scholarship has developed over the
years challenging both the reasoning and result in Hans.61 A
substantial majority of scholars have concluded that Hans was
incorrectly decided.62 Probing deeply into the framing of the
Constitution, events surrounding the Court's decision in Chisholm,
and the drafting and ratification of the Eleventh Amendment in the
context of the politics of the 1790s, these scholars have concluded that
Hans's historical analysis is not merely superficial but highly
improbable.63 The "original intent" behind the amendment was much
different and far narrower than Hans held, and it was likely designed
only to prevent the federal courts from hearing suits against states
brought by private parties on state-created causes of action. In spite
of various disagreements, most of these scholars join in maintaining
that the Eleventh Amendment was intended neither to establish, nor
to reestablish, any inviolable state sovereign immunity and that it
does not, therefore, preclude federal jurisdiction over states in actions
based on "federal questions."'  This scholarship generally concludes,
in other words, that the text of the Eleventh Amendment is
61. For citations to the scholarly literature and leading judicial opinions criticizing
Hans, see Hill, supra note 51, at 487 nn.1-2 (listing scholars who believe sovereign
immunity has no sound basis in the law). For additional criticism of Hans, see generally
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly:
The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 51 (1990); William P.
Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1372 (1989). For a recent reconceptualization, see Caleb Nelson,
Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559
(2002).
62. E.g., "The academic verdict on Hans has been overwhelmingly negative." Hill,
supra note 51, at 517. The "great weight of scholarly commentary" agrees with what is
called the "diversity" interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, the view that the
amendment only limited federal judicial power over suits in which jurisdiction was based
on the nature of the parties. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 110 n.8 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting). Even Justices who favor a broad interpretation of Hans have
acknowledged that the historical materials show only that "the intentions of the framers
and Ratifiers [of the Eleventh Amendment] were ambiguous." Welch v. Tex. Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987).
63. See sources cited supra notes 53, 58-62.
64. See sources cited supra notes 53, 58 & 61.
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understandably specific and limited because the framers and ratifiers
intended to make a change in the law that was specific and limited.
B. Considerations of History: Reconstruction and Southern
Repudiationism
While scholars have found grave internal flaws in Bradley's
opinion, some who explored the decision's historical context have not
only questioned its reasoning but offered an explanation for the
Court's willingness to hand down such a dubious opinion." Their
argument is straightforward and can be summarized as follows. In
1890 Reconstruction had long since ended, and sectional
reconciliation was the order of the day. The Southern States had
returned to the Union and reasserted their power, and the North was
unwilling to try to force them to pay their debts. The Republican
Party was divided, based increasingly on an electoral majority outside
the South, and concerned with new economic issues rather than with
old sectional disputes. The North lacked the political will to force
Southern States to honor their debts, and the Court used Hans as a
way to avoid issuing judgments that would, as a practical matter,
likely be unenforceable.66
As a general matter, the historical argument seems persuasive.
Until the end of Reconstruction, at least, two legal principles relating
to government bonds had seemed clearly established. One was that
the Eleventh Amendment prohibited suits in the federal courts
against states only when the states were formally named as
defendants but not when such suits were brought against state officers
in their official capacities-that was the doctrine the Marshall Court
had established during the early years of the Republic.67 The other
established principle was that the federal courts would enforce the
rights of bondholders under the Contract Clause and take whatever
measures were necessary to prevent repudiation by government
entities.68 Between approximately 1860 and 1900, for example, the
65. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 110 n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting); JAMES W. ELY,
JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at 180 (1995); ORTH,
supra note 23, at 75-81,103-05; see also sources cited infra note 72 (arguing that the Court
invoked the Eleventh Amendment to allow states to avoid paying bondholders without
federal sanction).
66. See sources cited supra note 65 and sources cited infra note 74.
67. Leading cases included Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) and
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See generally ORTH,
supra note 23, at 30-46 (discussing the early interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment).
68. The position was based on Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), and New
Jersey v. Wilson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812), and regularly followed. For examples of
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Supreme Court alone heard about 350 such cases from more than
twenty states involving efforts by county and municipal governments
to repudiate between $100 and $150 million in bonds.69 Almost
uniformly, the bondholders won, even in the face of substantial
evidence that bonds had been issued without lawful authority,
secured as part of a corrupt or fraudulent scheme, or held by
individuals implicated in illegal or other culpable conduct.70
When Reconstruction began to crumble, however, the resulting
political realignments opened cracks in those principles. The Civil
War devastated the southern economy, and the abolition of slavery
destroyed a large part of the region's wealth and its basic system of
labor. Prewar bonds, often in substantial arrears as a result of the
war, and the large-scale issues floated by postwar Republican
governments imposed onerous financial burdens on many states of
the old Confederacy. Those burdens were not only heavy but galling,
the application of this position, see Washington University v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439
(1869), and Woodruff v. Trapnall, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 190 (1851). See WRIGHT, supra note
22, at 224-42 (discussing how the early Court used the Contract Clause to prevent states
from repudiating their debts); Gibbons, supra note 53, at 1974-76 (same).
69. The mid- and late-nineteenth-century bond cases were of great economic and
political importance and that fact frequently had an impact on the judges who decided
them. Charles Fairman captured some of their special quality in discussing the leading
case of Riggs v. Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1868), which held that a federal
court could issue writs of mandamus to local government officials to secure satisfaction of
a prior federal judgment concerning local bonds, notwithstanding the fact that a state
supreme court had enjoined the officials from levying taxes to pay the judgment.
One's eye may be arrested at the spectacle of [Justice Nathan] Clifford, sturdy
old Democrat, boldly advancing the national flag, while [Justice Samuel] Miller,
the Republican, would yield ground to the State courts. Occasionally
considerations present in a particular situation-especially economic
considerations-prove more compelling than the general tendency of a judge's
mode of thought. Municipal bond cases were a very special category.
6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888: PART ONE 964
(1971).
70. After an exhaustive review of the Court during Reconstruction, Charles Fairman
concluded as follows:
Preoccupation with the protection of bondholders caused a majority of the
Justices to be insensitive to all other considerations in these complex situations.
What is more, slovenly work concealed egregious deviations even from professed
principles. It would be unwarranted to say that at any rate the Court was
enforcing common honesty. So simple an explanation would ignore the
misrepresentation, fraud, and illegality that often procured a bond issue, and the
carelessness or the sharp discount that commonly attended a purchase.
Id. at 1101. See generally id. at 918-1116 (discussing the Court's treatment of municipal
bonds after 1870); CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME
COURT, 1862-1890, at 207-36 (1939) (considering Justice Miller's jurisprudence with
respect to municipal bonds); HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL
JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 365-70 (1982)
(describing the Court's treatment of municipal bonds from 1863 to 1870).
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for the bonds issued during Reconstruction stirred intense political
hostility as symbols of "Yankee domination," social radicalism, and
the alleged corruption that had characterized the era of "black rule."'"
The depression that wracked the mid-1870s compounded the region's
economic suffering. Thus, when the Democrats recaptured southern
state governments, many of them began repudiating their state bonds,
antebellum as well as Reconstruction issues.72 Adopting a variety of
tactics, nine southern states-Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia-eliminated or unilaterally reduced bonded obligations in an
amount that likely exceeded $150 million.73  Bondholders, not
surprisingly, began suing in the federal courts, seeking to compel the
Southern States to honor their obligations.
The Court was unwilling to abandon its general position
guaranteeing the worth of government bonds, but it was squeezed
between two overpowering realities. One was the determination of
many post-Reconstruction southern state governments to reassert
their power and repudiate their burdensome debts. The other was
the fact that the federal government and most Americans had turned
their backs on the goals and policies of Reconstruction. Sectional
"reconciliation" was the highest good, and the North was no longer
interested in attempting to force the South to honor its obligations.
In that context, federal judicial orders seeking to compel southern
states to pay their full debts would present grave enforceability
problems.
Thus, the Court's solution, many historians and legal scholars
concluded, was to qualify the protection that the federal courts
offered bondholders by invoking the Eleventh Amendment and
allowing the Southern States to repudiate without federal sanction.74
In a series of decisions between 1877 and 1890 the Court began
expanding the amendment's reach and holding that it deprived the
71. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
1877, at 382-88 (1988); WOODWARD, supra note 21, at 8-9, 86-98.
72. On the financial activities of the Reconstruction governments, see FONER, supra
note 71, at 383-88, 512-13, 539-42. See generally id. at 346-411, 512-563 (discussing
political and economic conflicts during Reconstruction); JAMES M. MCPHERSON,
ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1982) (discussing the social
and economic aspects of Reconstruction).
73. WOODWARD, supra note 21, at 86-87.
74. ORTH, supra note 23, at 75-81, 103-05; Fletcher, supra note 61, at 1033; Gibbons,
supra note 53, at 1889; Massey, supra note 47, at 61; Pfander, supra note 58, at 1269. For a
particularly thoughtful evaluation of this argument, adding important qualifications and
complexities, see generally Michael G. Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh
Amendment, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 212 (1988) (reviewing ORTH, supra note 23).
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federal courts of jurisdiction to hear suits seeking to collect on state
bonds.75 Adapting pragmatically to the post-Reconstruction context,
the Court followed a cautious and somewhat erratic course. It
seemed to support bondholders when it could frame enforceable
orders of relief, primarily in cases involving municipalities and
counties in the Midwest and West.76 Indeed, in the same year that it
decided Hans the Court also held that municipalities and counties did
not come within the protection of the Eleventh Amendment.
77
Conversely, when bondholders sought to collect on state bonds-
where repudiation was limited to states in the South-and where the
Court doubted its power to issue enforceable orders, it used the
Eleventh Amendment to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.78 In this
context, then, Hans appeared as the culmination and broadest
doctrinal rationalization of a series of state bond cases in which the
Court reshaped the law to placate southern repudiationists and avoid
rendering judgments that it feared it could not enforce. "The Hans
decision can best be understood," James W. Ely, Jr., concluded , "as
part of the Supreme Court's refusal, on claimed jurisdictional
grounds, to confront the widespread repudiation of bonds by
southern states.
79
Finally, beyond these specific historical reasons for doubting
Hans, there stands another and more general ground for skepticism-
the sheer implausibility of the claim that the Court, after ninety-two
years of confusion and error, somehow managed in the year 1890 to
hif upon the true "original intent" behind the Eleventh Amendment.
As a matter of historical explanation, how did it happen that the
scales of blindness suddenly fell from the judicial eyes in that
particular year? On the one hand, the Justices claimed neither to
75. See ORTH, supra note 23, at 50-89.
76. See, e.g., Amy v. The Supervisors, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 136 (1871) (holding that local
officials could be personally liable for damages resulting from their failure to obey a
federal writ of mandamus ordering them to levy a tax to pay on bonds); Supervisors v.
Rogers, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 175 (1869) (holding that a federal court could appoint a U.S.
Marshall to levy and collect a tax to enforce a federal writ to town officials to pay on local
bonds in Iowa). See generally 6 FAIRMAN, supra note 69, at 918-1116 (summarizing
results of Midwestern cases); ORTH, supra note 23, at 110-20 (same).
77. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890).
78. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886);
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883). See generally ORTH, supra note 23, at 58-89
(summarizing the Court's decisions on southern state bonds other than those of Virginia);
infra notes 131-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's line of Eleventh
Amendment cases between 1877 and 1908).
79. ELY, supra note 65, at 180. The thesis is developed fully and carefully in ORTH,
supra note 23, at 58-89.
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have unearthed any new historical sources nor to have discovered any
new historical scholarship capable of justifying their sweeping new
interpretation. On the other hand, their lives and their nation's fate
had been dominated for more than half a century by a series of
consuming ordeals driven by the issue of race-the increasingly
virulent conflict over slavery, the upheavals of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, and the collapse of Radical Republicanism and the
emergence of a virulently Democratic "solid" South. Such Justices
were in no position even to try to penetrate back through the mists of
a century of American history to identify the authentic "original
intent" that had animated the innumerable individuals who designed
and ratified the Eleventh Amendment. Given their failure to adduce
any new historical evidence, the magnitude and passion of the events
that shaped their lives, and the compelling practical considerations
that weighed so heavily on them in the post-Reconstruction era, the
claim to historical truth they made in Hans must seem, at best, a
contention of striking dubiety.
C. On the Importance of the Judicial "Vantage Point"
These legal and historical objections to Hans are familiar, and
my purpose is not to reexamine them. It is, rather, to add some
additional historical considerations to the discussion. Hans, I suggest,
is not merely a dubious decision but, rather, a particularly dubious
decision because there are other, and even more compelling,
historical reasons for doubting its soundness, legitimacy, and
authority.
The established historical critique of Hans-that it was a
response to the political realities of southern repudiation-attracted
the attention of the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe. There, Justice
David H. Souter, speaking in dissent for himself and Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, questioned Hans and its
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment on the basis of that
historical analysis."0 Responding harshly for the five-Justice majority
bloc, Chief Justice Rehnquist dismissed Souter's contentions out of
hand. Rehnquist did not, however, address the merits of the
historical argument but rather did what any competent criminal
lawyer would do when faced by a prosecutor with convincing
evidence of his client's guilt. He invoked an exclusionary rule.
Souter's "undocumented and highly speculative extralegal
80. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116-23 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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explanation of the decision in Hans," Rehnquist charged, "is a
disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication."81
Ironically, however, on the same page of the United States
Reports where the Chief Justice condemned Souter's approach, he
himself invoked the authority of the Court's historical "vantage
point" in Hans.82 That "vantage point," Rehnquist noted, was closer
in time to the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment than was the
"vantage point" of the dissenters in Seminole Tribe. Thus, Rehnquist
suggested, Hans's closer temporal "vantage point" made it a more
informed and reliable construction of the Eleventh Amendment than
that expressed by Souter and the dissenters in Seminole Tribe.
The Chief Justice's claim seems doubly flawed. Given the fact
that Hans and the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment occurred
almost a hundred years apart, his assumption about the value of
temporal propinquity seems, in this particular instance, rather
obviously inapt.83 More striking is the logical implication of the Chief
Justice's assumption. If his premise were well-founded, it would
mean that Marshall's original views in Cohens v. Virginia'4 and
Osborn v. Bank of the United States85 would be far more reliable
statements of the amendment's true meaning than the contrary
conclusions embraced in the Court's temporally far more distant
opinion in Hans.
In spite of the inapt assumption and faulty conclusion, the Chief
Justice's comment nevertheless suggests a profound truth. The
Court's "vantage point" in Hans is of the greatest salience. Indeed,
Hans's "vantage point" is its decisive characteristic. That "vantage
point," however, carries a significance far different from the one the
Chief Justice proposed. The far more compelling conclusion is that
81. Id. at 68-69.
82. Id. at 69.
83. The Chief Justice had previously noted the unreliable nature of
noncontemporaneous "historical" sources. Criticizing the Court's jurisprudence and the
views of Justice Hugo L. Black, he dismissed the significance of a letter written by Thomas
Jefferson, which stated that the Establishment Clause created a "wall of separation"
between church and state. Not only had Jefferson been in France when the Bill of Rights
was adopted, Rehnquist explained, but he had written the letter fourteen years after its
ratification. Jefferson's "short note," he declared, "would seem to any detached observer
as a less than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1984) (Rehnquist,
J, dissenting).
84. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (suggesting that the amendment applied only to
diversity cases).
85. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (stating that the amendment only prevented suits in
which a state was formally named as a party).
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the Court's particular "vantage point" in Hans is precisely what
makes its opinion there both legally dubious and morally suspect.
The failure to explore more fully the nature and significance of
that "vantage point" has obscured our understanding of Hans. Too
often, Eleventh Amendment scholarship has limited itself to doctrinal
analysis and, even more narrowly, to an analysis of doctrinally
defined "Eleventh Amendment issues."86 Hans, however, was not an
isolated product of the late nineteenth-century Court, nor was it
unrelated to the Court's other contemporaneous decisions. On the
contrary, it was an integral part of the Court's broader and quite
purposeful effort to reshape federal jurisdiction to serve its evolving
ideas of desirable national policy in a new, post-Reconstruction,
industrial age. Further, even when Eleventh Amendment scholarship
considered Hans's historical context, it generally limited its analysis to
factors that related directly to the specific legal issues that the Court's
Eleventh Amendment decisions addressed. While rightly stressing
the problem of southern repudiationism and the enforcement
difficulties that confronted the federal courts, this scholarship tended
to ignore the more decisive political and social factors that guided the
Court's uneven and highly pragmatic jurisdictional decisionmaking in
the late nineteenth century. 7 Most obviously, Eleventh Amendment
scholarship has minimized the transforming nature of the post-
Reconstruction settlement and the increasingly virulent and
politically domineering racism that shaped and impelled that
settlement.88 As a matter of historical dynamics, it was those forces,
86. "The doctrinal decontextualization involved in the conventional strategy of
studying a line of doctrine from its earliest expression through its most recent is thus
fundamentally misguided .... Such an approach too easily blinds us to the dynamics of
interdoctrinal connections...." Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089,1149 (2000).
87. Real-world concerns have often helped shape the Court's decisions and opinions,
even when the concerns were unrelated as a matter of legal doctrine to the questions
formally at issue in the cases. Foreign policy concerns, for example, played a significant
role in domestic racial desegregation cases during the cold war. MARY L. DUDZIAK,
COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 12-17,
99-108, 250-51, passim (2000).
88. Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SuP. Cr. REV. 303 passim. Professional
delicacy, the immense respect accorded judges (particularly those on the United States
Supreme Court), and an overpowering commitment to the ideal of judicial law as
"neutral," "objective," and "autonomous" seem to have influenced legal scholars in their
treatment of late nineteenth-century issues. One prominent and liberal scholar asserted
that in the late nineteenth century "the courts were not racist." WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
186 (1988). Another insisted that in addressing the legal problems of Reconstruction "the
Justices did not bow to racism." Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism:
Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 39, 41. In fairness, Nelson
1950 [Vol. 81
2003] HANS V. LOUISIANA 1951
far more than the problem of southern repudiationism as an isolated
issue, that drove the evolution of Eleventh Amendment doctrine and
ultimately inspired the Court's decision in Hans.89
acknowledges the general influence of racism, NELSON, supra, at 96-100, and Benedict
suggests that, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Fuller Court-unlike the
Waite Court-did reflect racist ideas and values. Benedict, supra, at 40, 78. Although he
too emphasizes the widespread racism of the period, Herman Belz, in effect, defends the
Court from charges of racism by arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to impose a "state action" requirement and held a limited view of the
amendment's reach. HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY AND FREEDMEN'S RIGHTS, 1861 TO 1866, at 173-74 (1976). Hence, he argues, the
Court's narrow interpretations in the 1870s and 1880s were explicable on doctrinal
grounds. Id.
The doctrinal argument of these scholars is sharply contested. Other scholars
have argued that the framers of the Civil War amendments intended them to change
substantially the nature of American federalism and to confer broad national powers on
Congress. See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986) (arguing that the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to provide national protection for the liberty of
all and to guarantee that the Bill of Rights applied to the states); Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 863 (1986) (arguing that Reconstruction amendments and statutes were intended
to give the federal government primary authority to enforce civil rights).
89. A fine article by Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., exemplifies the reluctance of many legal
scholars to deal with the influence of racism on the Supreme Court itself. Benno C.
Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder
v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401 (1983). Schmidt has written extensively on the
Court's late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century decisions involving race, and he
readily emphasizes the widespread and powerful racism that marked the period generally.
Id. at 1403-12. Yet in seeking to explain why the strong antidiscrimination principle stated
in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), did not bear fruit and why blacks were
excluded from southern juries and subjected, as a result, to massive abuses, he ultimately
seeks to protect the Court as an institution of law. "It cannot be that the Court was
indifferent to the consequences," he writes. Schmidt, supra, at 1413. Indeed, with respect
to the Court itself and its application of Strauder, he denies the role of racism and explains
the decision's "lost promise" as a result of the logic of formal doctrine. "The explanation
seems not to lie in any subsequent acts of repudiation by later Supreme Courts, nor in any
retreat into racism of the sort usually ascribed to the Court after Reconstruction. Rather,
the explanation for Strauder's lost promise lies in the decision itself." Id. at 1414. Thus,
Schmidt would explain historical events as a result of doctrinal imperfections.
The point of the present Article is not, of course, that the doctrine has no
importance, nor is it that the Court was filled only with rabid racists or that the Court
alone "caused" the failure of Reconstruction. The point is simply that the Justices shared
the racism of their age and that their racism was a substantial factor in explaining what
they did and why they did it. As an institution, in other words, the Court was in significant
part responsive to the extralegal motives of the Justices and to the powerful and pervasive
extralegal pressures that their society placed on them. See infra Part IV.
The same may be said, of course, with respect to issues of gender. There, too,
ingrained cultural assumptions-themselves biased, highly political, and substantively
inegalitarian-shaped the Court's jurisprudence far more than did the words and structure
of the Constitution or the statutes of the United States. See e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83
U.S. 130, 138 (1873) (holding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
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A broader and more complete historical analysis of the Court's
"vantage point" in Hans leads to the conclusion that the decision is
particularly dubious for three interrelated and compelling reasons
beyond those identified by most Eleventh Amendment scholarship.
First, in the late nineteenth century the Court repeatedly and
knowingly reshaped federal jurisdiction to serve its evolving views of
desirable national policy,9" and Hans was simply one more example of
that instrumentalist practice. Thus, like many of the Court's other
contemporaneous jurisdictional rulings,9 Hans was based ultimately
on neither principle nor "original intent" but on a calculated
judgment of passing expedience. As but one of a series of
instrumentalist decisions that molded federal jurisdiction to serve the
substantive policies the Court honored at the time, Hans-despite its
constitutional pretensions-has no valid claim to the authority of
principle.
Second, Hans was designed, in particular, to serve as one of the
final building blocks with which the Court legitimated the post-
Reconstruction settlement.92 That settlement embodied the nation's
well-understood acquiescence in the South's special, if limited,
independence, an independence that allowed the region's states to
repudiate their bonds and, far more importantly, to impose their own
Amendment did not prevent states from barring women from the practice of law); Aviam
Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States
Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249 (1987) (arguing that the Court from
1888 to 1921 manipulated legal doctrine to become "paternalistic patriarchs").
90. See infra Part Ill.
91. See infra Part III.
92. It is standard to say that courts do not look to legislative "motive" in evaluating
statutes. Such an approach, the Court has said, is subjective and disruptive. Bogan v.
Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998). Compare DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 106-07 (1990) (pointing
out that, despite the standard doctrine, courts can and do consider legislative motives in
exceptional cases). Holding aside the term "motive," however, courts regularly examine a
variety of sources to construe what they call legislative "intent" and "purpose." Indeed,
they look to "original intent" to interpret both statutes and constitutional provisions. The
Rehnquist Court, moreover, frequently cites evidence of historical practices as an aid in
reaching its legal conclusions. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of
the Rehnquist Court, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 195, 203-07
(Martin H. Belsky ed., 2002). Of course, even examining "purpose" and "intent," the
Justices disagree about what exactly they are looking for as well as how exactly to find it.
Compare, for example, the views of Justice Scalia, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (arguing the Court should
seek not "intent" but the "reasonable meaning" of the text), with Justice White, dissenting
in the same case, 491 U.S. at 45 (arguing that the Court should seek the actual historical
"intent" of Congress when it passed the act in question). Insofar as this Article seeks
merely a historical understanding of Hans's origin and significance, such "legal"
considerations are not relevant.
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systems of white racial supremacy. In effect, the North agreed that
Reconstruction had failed, that the South had "suffered enough," and
that the financial and racial residues of the disruptive era should, for
the most part, be swept aside. Southern States would be allowed to
cancel or "readjust" their bonded debt, and the rights of black
Americans-rights that the three Civil War amendments had made
matters of "national" authority-would be redefined as essentially
"local" and given over to state control. The "original intent" that
animated the Court in Hans was to help facilitate that overall
settlement.93 In terms of the values and principles embodied in the
Civil War amendments, Hans was an inherently tainted instrument of
the post-Reconstruction settlement, a handmaid of racial oppression
and constitutional betrayal.94
Third, in justifying its doctrinal innovations, Hans not only
abandoned the established doctrines that had limited the Eleventh
Amendment,95 but it also drew on other prewar ideas about federal
jurisdiction and the federal judicial power that conflicted with the
import and significance of the Fourteenth Amendment. It looked to
a rejected past for its understanding of both. Not surprisingly, then, it
93. See Eric Foner, The Strange Career of the Reconstruction Amendments, 108 YALE
L.J. 2003, 2008 (1999); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 115, 122-40 (1994). But see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 471-74 (1998) (arguing that the political and legal events during the
late nineteenth century did not constitute a constitutional "moment" that repudiated
Republican Reconstruction).
As a matter of formalist legal theory, of course, the judiciary has no "intent" of its
own and exists only to construe the meaning of authoritative rules and principles. As
Hamilton explained, courts "have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment."
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987). As
a matter of historical analysis, and sophisticated legal analysis as well, however, it is clear
that courts often-indeed, sometimes must-act on their own intentions and purposes,
however much those intentions and purposes may be variously limited and shaped by
institutional context, procedural posture, and substantive doctrine.
94. Judge Gibbons was one of the relatively few legal scholars writing about Hans and
the Eleventh Amendment who directly noted the relevance of race and class to the politics
that surrounded the Court's post-Reconstruction jurisprudence. He remained
circumspect, however, commenting only briefly that the politics of the 1880s were
complicated by the fact that "conservative Southern whites were far more interested in
disenfranchising blacks-as well as maintaining the old order of wealth and privilege-
than in resisting repudiation." Gibbons, supra note 53, at 1982; see id. at 1977. Some
historians have tended to be more direct. E.g., ORTH, supra note 23, at 53-57, 86-88
(suggesting a strong racial component to the general settlement that followed
Reconstruction, including the bond cases). The Court's decisions in the late nineteenth
century, wrote William M. Wiecek, stemmed from a "results-oriented pro-segregation
bias." WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 103 (1988).
95. See supra note 23 and supra text accompanying notes 50-56.
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was a decision that the Court itself-after legitimating the racial
bargain that sealed the post-Reconstruction settlement-quickly
began to qualify, limit, and avoid. Consequently, as a legal and
constitutional matter, Hans cannot command our allegiance.
In sum, Hans was a decision rooted pragmatically in a temporary
and passing age, an integral part of the nation's surrender to southern
intransigence and racial oppression, and a rejection of both
established Eleventh Amendment doctrine and the principles of the
new post-Civil War Constitution. Indeed, from a historical
viewpoint, Hans stands for a proposition that must be dismissed as
absurd. If Hans were taken at face value in light of the Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence that the Court had established prior to
1877, it would mean that the de facto result of the Civil War and its
three constitutional amendments was to broaden the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment, expand the immunities of the states, and limit
the powers of the federal government.
III. THE PARTICULARLY DUBIOUS NATURE OF HANS, I: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PRACTICE OF JURISDICTIONAL
INSTRUMENTALISM
If the Justices on the late nineteenth-century Supreme Court had
learned any institutional lesson, it was that federal jurisdiction was a
tool of national policy and that the Court had the power to mold that
jurisdiction to serve its ideas of proper national interests and values.
Hamilton had carefully explained the basic theory,96 and Chief Justice
Marshall had fully understood its import and taught its judicial
practice.97 The sectional struggles that erupted during the early
Republic confirmed its centrality. From the Federalist Judiciary Act
of 1801 and its quick repeal the following year by the new
Jeffersonian Congress,9" through the removal acts adopted to counter
96. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 80-82 (Alexander Hamilton).
97. Chief Justice Marshall's views on the use of federal jurisdiction to protect national
interests and values are exemplified by the following cases: Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (construing federal jurisdiction broadly to protect a
federal institution); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (asserting a broad
appellate jurisdiction for the Court over actions involving states); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (construing federal power broadly and protecting a federal
institution); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (upholding authority
of Court to review decisions of state courts); and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810) (construing the federal Contract Clause broadly and limiting state power).
98. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN
THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 96-107 (1971); JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION:
THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A
UNITED STATES 138-72 (2002).
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New England's opposition to the War of 1812 and South Carolina's
effort to nullify federal law in 1833, 9 to the bitter and extended
battles over enforcement of the fugitive slave laws in the 1840s and
1850s, 1° the policy-based character of federal jurisdiction and the
instrumentalist nature of its judicial shaping had become obvious.
For anyone who had missed the lesson, Reconstruction drove it home
with unmistakable clarity, as the Republican Congresses repeatedly
extended the jurisdiction of the national courts in a comprehensive
effort to use them as tools to enforce their Reconstruction policies. 10 1
By 1880 the Court had demonstrated that it fully understood both the
instrumental nature of federal jurisdiction and its institutional ability
to direct that jurisdiction toward its own selected purposes.0 2
99. In response to both events Congress moved to protect federal interests and ensure
the enforcement of federal law by enacting statutes that made any civil suit or criminal
prosecution brought against a federal officer in a state court removable to a court of the
United States. Law of Feb. 4,1815, ch. 31, § 8,3 Stat. 195, 198; Law of Mar. 2,1833, ch. 57,
§ 3, 4 Stat. 632, 633-34. During and after the Civil War, acting again to protect federal
interests and federal officials, Congress passed a series of new and broader removal acts.
See Law of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 2, 12 Stat. 755, 755-56, amended 14 Stat. 46 (1866), 14
Stat. 385 (1867). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 1147-50 (1953)
(summarizing statutes).
100. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) (chronicling the experiences of antislavery judges); Marc M.
Arkin, The Ghost at the Banquet: Slavery, Federalism, and Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing the use of federal habeas corpus in
controversies over alleged runaway slaves).
101. STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 124-
42 (1968); William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875,
13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 333-34 (1969).
102. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859) (upholding the supremacy of the
federal courts in reviewing state actions and applying controlling federal law), and Tarble's
Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872) (asserting the supremacy of federal law and federal
courts and denying state courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to federal
officials), illustrated the Court's acute awareness of the need to assert federal jurisdiction
to serve what it considered proper national purposes, while Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 582 (1859) (denying federal jurisdiction over cases involving divorce and child
support), and Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (denying
Supreme Court jurisdiction over issues of state law in appeals from state courts),
established the Court's willingness to deny or narrow federal jurisdiction when, in its view,
no significant national interests were at stake. See William M. Wiecek, Murdock v.
Memphis: Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act and Judicial Federalism, in ORIGINS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, supra note 59, at 223, 223-47. A series of cases in 1880
construing the civil rights removal statute further demonstrated that the Court understood
the discretion it had in both construing jurisdictional statutes and shaping them to serve
selected policies. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S.
257 (1880). In the four cases, the Court construed federal statutes deftly to ensure, as a
matter of formal doctrine, the legal supremacy of the federal government, and of the
Court itself, while minimizing the impact of that supremacy in the context of de facto
southern racial practices. The decisions allowed the states, absent further national
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A. Jurisdictional Instrumentalism in the Late Nineteenth Century
In the post-Reconstruction world of industrializing America, one
of the Court's most methodical and transparent efforts to adapt
federal jurisdiction to new social conditions came in its treatment of
diversity jurisdiction, still the most important basis of federal civil
jurisdiction.1"3 In the Judiciary Act of 1887-8814 Congress made a
number of changes in the jurisdiction of the lower courts, altering
provisions relating to general diversity jurisdiction, removal, and
venue as well as modifying two specialized diversity statutes, the
"separable controversy" act'015 and the "prejudice and local influence"
act. 106 It was noteworthy, though hardly surprising, that the Court
construed the various altered provisions-in spite of their different
terms and prior judicial constructions-in parallel. What'was
surprising, and particularly revealing, was the fact that within little
more than a decade the Court twice reversed its course in construing
them, using all of the various provisions together to contract federal
diversity jurisdiction, then to expand it, and finally, once again, to
contract it.107
In the first period, from 1887 to 1892, the Court was avowedly
reacting to the problem of overcrowded dockets and to what it fairly
considered the manifest intent of the new Judiciary Act to restrict the
political support and congressional and executive action seeking to enforce federal law
more vigorously, wide latitude to act informally and hence outside the scope of that
doctrinal supremacy.
For discussions of ways in which the Court has shaped federal jurisdiction, see
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207 (2001) (arguing
that the Supreme Court widens federal subject matter jurisdiction when necessary to
protect federal interests); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court,
Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme
Court has played a major role in shaping federal jurisdiction); Richard A. Matasar &
Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and
Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1291 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court can broaden the "adequate and
independent state grounds" doctrine to hear appeals from state courts involving federal
law issues).
103. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on
Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679,710-11 (1999).
104. Law of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 37, 24 Stat. 552, 552-55, amended and corrected, 25
Stat. 433 (1888).
105. Law of July 27, 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306, 306-07, amended, 14 Stat. 558 (1867).
106. Law of Mar. 2,1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558, 558-59.
107. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 262-91 (1992).
Studies of late nineteenth-century law often emphasize its "formalist" or "Langdellian"
nature. The instrumentalist and policy-based nature of much federal procedural law in the
period suggests the incomplete and misleading nature of such descriptions. Id. at 253-54.
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jurisdiction of the national courts.0 What was most striking about its
work in this period was not the consistency of its results but, rather,
the ruthlessness with which it achieved them. In 1890, for example, it
narrowed diversity jurisdiction in two cases where its reasoning
seemed highly suspect. In re Pennsylvania Co.'09 sharply restricted
jurisdiction under the "prejudice and local influence act" on grounds
that were, in part, arbitrary and unpersuasive." ° More troubling,
Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Austin' rejected impeccable
arguments that the Court should rule otherwise and restricted
diversity removal by accepting an unfair and abusive litigation tactic
that negated the very purpose of the jurisdiction and the statute."2
While Pennsylvania's reasoning appeared merely ad hoc and result
oriented, Austin's was manifestly obtuse and unjust. Together, the
cases demonstrated the Court's unbending determination, as of 1890,
to contract federal jurisdiction and reduce the federal docket.
The Court's result-oriented decisions in 1890 were particularly
arresting because only two years later the Justices abruptly reversed
course and began to expand diversity jurisdiction." 3 The change was
not the result of any technical or other formal "legal" consideration,
for Congress made no alteration in the relevant statutory provisions.
The Court, moreover, refused even to acknowledge, let alone explain,
its reversal of direction. Yet the change was undeniable. In a series
of decisions it began suddenly to expand diversity jurisdiction,
especially diversity removal, and to encourage the lower federal
courts to construe their jurisdiction expansively. 14 In the process it
baldly ignored Pennsylvania and effectively overruled Austin."5
108. Clearly designed to limit the jurisdiction of the national courts, the Judiciary Act
of 1887-88 was passed in significant part in response to pressures from the South. It was a
compromise measure, however, and it did not contract the jurisdiction of the national
courts nearly as much as southerners had demanded. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 77-96 (1928).
109. 137 U.S. 451 (1890).
110. PURCELL, supra note 107, at 132-33.
111. 135 U.S. 315 (1890).
112. PURCELL, supra note 107, at 95-96. Austin allowed plaintiffs to defeat
defendants' right to remove suits to federal court by accepting a "delayed upward
amendment tactic." Id. at 96. Plaintiffs would plead less than the required federal
jurisdictional minimum and then, after defendant's time to remove had passed, amend
their damages claims and seek amounts that exceeded the jurisdictional minimum. Austin
held that such delayed upward amendments did not restart defendants' time to remove.
Austin, 135 U.S. at 316-18.
113. PURCELL, supra note 107, at 266-72.
114. Id.; see, e.g., Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co. v. Davidson, 157 U.S. 201 (1895) (expanding
the ability of corporate defendants to remove suits to federal court while limiting the
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The Court reversed its position not for legal reasons but for
social reasons. Beginning in the early 1890s two developments
convinced the Justices that the federal courts had to be deployed in
new ways to serve new social policies. One was that increases in
industrial injuries were leading to multiplying numbers of tort suits
against national corporations seeking larger amounts in recovery
and-more important-that an aggressive new plaintiffs' personal
injury bar had developed shrewd and sometimes sharp litigation
tactics designed to defeat removal and ensure that tort plaintiffs could
litigate their claims in more hospitable state courts.'16 The other
development was the increasingly bitter social and political conflicts
that wracked the 1890s. The spread of the Farmers' Alliances and the
emergence of the Populist Party, the escalating militance of labor and
the massive strikes at Homestead and Pullman, and the onset of a
severe and extended depression combined to produce an escalating
social turmoil that magnified both the economic stakes and social
resonance of the increasingly fiercely contested personal injury suits
that workers were bringing against their corporate employers.'17
Suspicious of the new and largely immigrant industrial labor force,
uneasy about the emergence of an aggressive and professionally
suspect urban personal injury bar, and distressed by the acute sense of
social conflict that dominated the decade, the Court decided to
preserve social order and protect the new national economy by
countering plaintiffs' expanded uses of antiremoval tactics and
broadening the access of corporate defendants to the haven of the
federal courts.
18
The Court's actions after the turn of the century confirmed the
social purpose that guided its decisions in the 1890s. When the
depression ended and the decade's bitter conflicts subsided, the Court
districts where they could be sued); Hanrick v. Hanrick, 153 U.S. 192 (1894) (suggesting
expanded removal rights for corporate defendants under a special diversity statute).
115. The de facto overruling occurred in Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.,
169 U.S. 92 (1898).
116. PURCELL, supra note 107, at 112-13, 254. On late nineteenth-century tort
litigation, see RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN
NEW YORK CITY, 1870-1910 passim (1992); WILLIAM G. THOMAS, LAWYERING FOR THE
RAILROAD: BUSINESS, LAW, AND POWER IN THE NEW SOUTH 137-63 (1999); Frank
Munger, Social Change and Tort Litigation: Industrialization, Accidents, and Trial Courts
in Southern West Virginia, 1872-1940,36 BUFF. L. REV. 75 (1987).
117. PURCELL, supra note 107, at 107-1.7.
118. Id. at 107-17, 266-72. On the decade's social turmoil, see, e.g., THE PULLMAN
STRIKE AND THE CRISIS OF THE 1890s: ESSAYS ON LABOR AND POLITICS passim
(Richard Schneirov et al. eds., 1999) (discussing the Pullman strike of 1894 and the
political turmoil that marked the decade).
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abandoned its expansive approach and once again reversed direction.
In the first half dozen years of the new century, a period of increasing
economic prosperity and social optimism, it returned to its pre-
nineties course. Between 1900 and 1906, the Court not only limited
diversity jurisdiction substantially and in a variety of ways, but often
did so, once again, for unpersuasive doctrinal reasons."9
Were there any doubts about the nature of the Court's purposes
during the 1890s, its decisions in a doctrinally unrelated jurisdictional
area dispelled them. During the 1880s, the use of federal equity
receiverships to reorganize financially stricken companies had grown
increasingly common, and the hardships caused by the depression of
the 1890s accelerated their use. While two hundred companies went
through federal receivership in the 1880s, three hundred and fifty
sought such protection between 1891 and 1897.120 The fact that
companies were in receivership, however, did not prevent their
injured workers from bringing tort suits against them. In 1892, just as
the Court was initiating its effort to expand diversity removal
jurisdiction, it also altered the jurisdictional law of federal receivers.
In Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Cox121 the Court held that a suit
brought against a receiver appointed by a federal court was, by virtue
of the receiver's federal appointment, a suit that raised a federal
question. The decision meant that federal receivers could remove
tort suits brought against the companies they represented without
regard to diversity of citizenship by invoking federal question
jurisdiction. The availability of the latter jurisdiction, made possible
by the Cox rule, thus allowed receivers to negate the antiremoval
tactics that plaintiffs' attorneys used to destroy diversity jurisdiction.
If the Court's social purpose in Cox was not sufficiently obvious,
it was manifest with striking clarity two years later in Tennessee v.
Union & Planters' Bank.12 2 There, determined to restrain the growth
of federal question suits in order to offset the swelling diversity
docket, the Court announced an expanded "well-pleaded complaint"
rule.2 3 A federal question sufficient to confer original or removal
jurisdiction on the federal courts, Union & Planters' Bank held, had
119. PURCELL, supra note 107, at 272-91.
120. Albro Martin, Railroads and the Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional
Change, 34 J. ECON. HIST. 685,705 (1974).
121. 145 U.S. 593 (1892); see PURCELL, supra note 107, at 269-72.
122. 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
123. The Court had introduced a more limited well-pleaded complaint rule six years
earlier in Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888). It had continued, however, to allow
removal on the basis of defendant's pleadings until Union & Planters' Bank. See Collins,
supra note 30, at 724-30.
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to appear on the face of a technically proper complaint. Thus,
jurisdiction was to be determined solely on the basis of plaintiff's
initial pleading, and any federal-law defense or counterclaim was
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes. The new rule created a
potentially fatal problem for receivers. If an issue of federal law had
to appear on the face of plaintiff's "well-pleaded complaint" in order
to confer federal question jurisdiction, how could a federally
appointed receiver use federal question removal when plaintiff's
complaint merely pleaded the elements of a state-law tort claim?
Anticipating that difficulty and determined during the strife-torn
1890s to guarantee an ample federal question removal jurisdiction for
receivers, the Court in Union & Planters' Bank took care expressly to
preserve the Cox rule. When suing a federal receiver, it instructed, a
tort plaintiff had to plead the receiver's capacity to be sued, a capacity
that was conferred by his federal judicial appointment. 2 4 Hence, by
operation of law, a state-law tort claim against a federally appointed
receiver would necessarily contain a federal law element.
Notwithstanding its expanded "well-pleaded complaint" rule, then,
Union & Planters' Bank ensured that Cox would continue to allow
federal receivers to remove tort suits on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction. Throughout the remainder of the 1890s, federal
receivers used their right to remove under federal question
jurisdiction freely and frequently.'25
Then, at exactly the same time the Court began to reverse course
in its diversity decisions, it reversed direction in its federal
receivership decisions, too. In 1900, in Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur
& Evansville Railway Co.,'26 it suddenly held that the "bare fact" that
a federal court had appointed a receiver did not transform an
otherwise nonremovable state-law claim against the receiver into a
federal question. 2 Gableman thus terminated the automatic right of
federal receivers to remove ordinary tort suits as federal questions.
The upshot of the receivership decisions was clear. Federal
question jurisdiction, the well-pleaded complaint rule, and the law of
federal receivers involved legal doctrines that were wholly distinct
from, and logically unrelated to, the rules that controlled federal
diversity jurisdiction. Yet the Court construed those diverse doctrinal
elements in ways that achieved the same social results that it achieved
with its construction of the various diversity provisions. In each
124. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. at 463.
125. PURCELL, supra note 107, at 271.
126. 179 U.S. 335 (1900).
127. See id. at 340.
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doctrinal area the Court reversed directions twice, the reversals in
both areas coming at precisely the same time and achieving precisely
the same social results. The Court's decisions were directed by
extralegal concerns. As social conditions changed, so did the Court's
practical purposes; and, as its practical purposes changed, so too did
the law of federal jurisdiction.
Along a parallel line, the Court contemporaneously molded
general federal question jurisdiction in a similarly instrumentalist
manner. Initially, after Congress conferred the jurisdiction in 1875,
the Court construed it broadly, holding its requirements satisfied by
any federal element in a case, and satisfied further regardless of
whether the federal law issue was raised by plaintiff or defendant.128
Then, between 1888 and 1894 it changed course, narrowing the
jurisdiction with its "well-pleaded complaint" rule to offset the
growth in the diversity docket. By the early years of the twentieth
century, however, the Court had come to view federal question
jurisdiction as more important to national policy than diversity
because the former was more readily adapted to the Court's
expanding effort to ensure federal enforcement of the rights of
property and contract under the Fourteenth Amendment.'29 Thus, as
the Court narrowed diversity jurisdiction after 1900, it began to
expand federal question jurisdiction. It did so most strikingly in Ex
parte Young,3° where it limited the reach of the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule by creating a new cause of action directly under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Young transformed what had been
primarily a defense to a state enforcement action into an offensive
weapon, an independent claim that a party who would otherwise have
been a defendant in a state court enforcement proceeding could raise
in a ."well-pleaded complaint" and thereby gain access to a federal
court under its federal question jurisdiction.
128. S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. California, 118 U.S. 109, 110-13 (1886); Pac. R.R. Removal
Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1885); Collins, supra note 30, at 724-26, 729-30. The broad rule
originated in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 817-28 (1824).
129. In the 1890s the Supreme Court began to reconceive the role of the lower federal
courts, and in the decade after 1900 it restructured their jurisdiction accordingly. See infra
text accompanying notes 536-81.
130. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Young represented the culmination of a series of doctrinal
transformations that began in the late nineteenth century. See Woolhandler, supra note
38, at 441-44; infra Part V. See generally Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner-Diversity
Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263
(2000) (mapping out the development of diversity jurisdiction in the second half of the
nineteenth century).
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Thus, across a wide range of jurisdictional areas, the Court
worked to remold federal jurisdiction to serve its shifting policy goals.
In the late 1880s, it sought to curtail federal jurisdiction generally to
reduce an escalating caseload. In the 1890s it changed direction,
expanding diversity jurisdiction and subordinating federal question
jurisdiction to protect corporate defendants from aggressive new
litigation tactics and increasingly costly personal injury suits and to
secure orderly legal processes in a time of acute economic hardship
and social strife. Then, in the years after 1900, when the Court came
to see the greatest danger no longer coming from tort suits but from
government regulatory actions, it again reoriented federal
jurisdiction, subordinating diversity to a newly pivotal and expanding
federal question jurisdiction.
In all the different jurisdictional areas the Court's decisions
exhibited two defining characteristics. One was that the Justices
understood their power to shape federal jurisdiction and reorient the
work of the lower federal courts. The other was that the Justices
were ready and willing to take such action when they thought it
necessary to serve what they viewed as desirable national policies.
B. Jurisdictional Instrumentalism and the Eleventh Amendment
The diversity and federal question cases evidence the Court's
purposeful jurisdictional instrumentalism, and they strengthen the
proposition that similar instrumentalist calculations lay behind the
swerving sequence of decisions that led up to and then away from
Hans. Indeed, like its rulings on diversity jurisdiction, the Court's
Eleventh Amendment decisions veered back and forth from a narrow
construction to an expanding one and then back again to a narrow
one. Given the pervasive jurisdictional instrumentalism that marked
the Court's work, the massive transformation that remade the nation
in the decades around the turn of the century, and the changing
nature of the substantive legal issues that dominated American law
and politics, the Court's swerving line of Eleventh Amendment
decisions seems rather too obviously the result of shifting social
policies.
Although the Court zigzagged, and its doctrinal explanations
were inconsistent, 1 the pattern of its decisions in social and political
131. It seems fair to say that one of the few things almost universally agreed upon is
that the Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century were, as a matter of doctrine and logic, particularly erratic and inconsistent. "The
lack of a satisfactory rationale for the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the tension
between that doctrine and basic precepts of the American Constitution, account in large
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terms was-as in its diversity and federal question cases-quite clear.
From Osborn through Reconstruction the Court construed the
Eleventh Amendment narrowly. Then, from the end of
Reconstruction to Hans, it expanded the amendment's ambit and
held that it denied the federal courts jurisdiction in a number of
southern state bond cases. Then, it began to shrink the amendment.
As the southern state bond litigations faded in prominence and suits
challenging state regulation of business moved to center stage, the
Court sharply narrowed its scope. By the second decade of the
twentieth century the practical significance of the Eleventh
Amendment-outside the residual area of state bondholder suits-
had dwindled to little more than what it had been under Marshall's
view in Osborn.
As Reconstruction ended, the Court's new anxiety about
applying the traditional Osborn rule quickly became apparent. After
the last federal troops withdrew from the South and the southern
state bond cases began pressing onto the federal dockets, the Court
lurched toward a broader and more immediately expedient concept
of state sovereign immunity.'32 In Louisiana v. Jume133 in 1883, for
example, the Court held that a federal court could not order state
officials to take actions necessary to ensure that payments were made
on state bonds. Although the Court offered a variety of reasons for
its decision, none seemed compelling, or even particularly
part for the erratic course traversed by the Court between 1873 and 1908." JACOBS, supra
note 23, at 138. By the latter date, "the Court was in the not unusual position of having at
hand two sets of precedents supporting opposite results." Id. "By the early twentieth
century a complete set of contradictory precedents had accumulated." ORTH, supra note
23, at 10. "To say that [the Justices] vacillated understates the obvious." HAROLD J.
SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 93 (1999); accord Gibbons, supra note 53, at
1991-2003 (discussing the various positions of the Court on the Eleventh Amendment).
A relatively sympathetic critic of the Court could offer, at best, only a mixed
judgment. "Probably the best that can be said of the eleventh amendment cases from the
1877-1890 period is that they reveal a 'muddling through,' " Collins, supra note 74, at 243,
and that they were less "volatile" than the changes that occurred between 1890 and 1908,
id. at 241.
132. Compare, e.g., Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1873) (reaffirming Osborn
and traditional Eleventh Amendment doctrine), and Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92
U.S. 531 (1876) (same), with Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment barred a federal suit against a State and its officers on state bonds),
and Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446 (1883) (apparently
implicitly overruling Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1873), and holding that the
Eleventh Amendment barred a federal suit on repudiated railroad bonds against state
officials and a state-owned railway).
133. 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
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persuasive.134 More salient, the Court expressly acknowledged its
deep concern that any federal court order directing state officials to
ensure payment on southern state bonds would create grave
enforcement problems.135 "The remedy sought, in order to be
complete, would require the court to assume all the executive
authority of the State, so far as it related to the enforcement of this
law," Jumel explained, "and to supervise the conduct of all persons
charged with any official duty in respect to the levy, collection, and
disbursement of the tax in question until the bonds, principal and
interest, were paid in full."'136  While the Court sometimes upheld
federal jurisdiction in cases where there appeared to be no serious
enforcement problem,'37 it commonly found that actions challenging
southern repudiation efforts were beyond the authority of the
national courts.
138
Justice Joseph P. Bradley symbolized and helped effectuate the
Court's reorientation. In 1872 Bradley joined the Court's muscular
reaffirmation of the Osborn rule in Davis v. Gray, 39 and four years
later he wrote for the Court in Board of Liquidation v. McComb.4 '
There, reaffirming Osborn once again before the end of
Reconstruction, Bradley upheld the jurisdiction of the federal courts
to issue injunctions and mandamus to state officers to prevent them
from taking actions that would impair the value of their state's
bonds. 4' After the Compromise of 1877 brought Reconstruction to a
134. In dealing with county bonds from the Midwest, for example, the Court had
upheld the authority of federal courts to compel local officials by mandamus to collect
taxes to satisfy judgments arising from failure to pay on their bonds. Riggs v. Johnson
County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1868).
135. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 420-23 (1985); ORTH, supra note 23, at 65-71,
117-18.
136. Jumel, 107 U.S. at 727.
137. On several occasions the Court enforced the bonds of Virginia. In those cases
there was no significant enforcement problem because the Virginia bonds contained
provisions making their coupons receivable in payment of the state's taxes. Thus, ruling
for bondholders required the Court to do nothing but enjoin the State from prosecuting
bondholders who tendered coupons in payment of their taxes. There was no need to try to
compel state officials to take any other positive actions. See ORTH, supra note 23, at 58-
109.
138. See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) (refusing to enforce southern state
bonds); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886) (same); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108
U.S. 76 (1883) (same). But see, e.g., Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885)
(protecting taxpayers who tendered bond coupons on Virginia bonds in payment of state
taxes as per provisions of bonds).
139. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1873).
140. 92 U.S. 531 (1876).
141. Id. at 541.
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close, however, his view of the amendment began to shift. 42 By the
early 1880s Bradley was prepared to join the Court's opinion in Jumel
and other cases that expanded state immunities under the Eleventh
Amendment, and in 1885 he urged an even more expansive
interpretation of the amendment. 14 3  Perhaps most revealing, in
McGahey v. Virginia,' argued the day before Hans, Bradley called
expressly for efforts to "relieve the courts" from the burden of the
southern state bond litigations. They were the cause, he complained,
of "a controversy that has become a vexation and a regret.'
145
In Hans, Bradley announced the Court's solution to that
vexation. 146  His opinion reflected different values, different
reasoning, and different purposes than those that had animated his
opinion in McComb only fourteen years earlier. Much-essentially
the whole legal and political world-had changed in the interim. So,
too, had Bradley changed. "With respect to the Eleventh
Amendment Justice Bradley was caught in the act of moving," John
142. Bradley played a prominent role in effecting the Compromise. He was the
fifteenth and last member appointed to the Electoral Commission, the body of Senators,
Representatives, and Supreme Court Justices who decided on the validity of disputed
returns in the presidential election of 1876. Bradley sided with the other seven
Republicans on the commission in voting to recognize the Republican electors. The seven
Democrats on the commission voted to recognize the Democratic electors. See 7
CHARLES FAIRMAN, FIVE JUSTICES AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877, 123-
58, passim (Supp. 1988); on his changing constitutional views, see text accompanying notes
139-48, Part IV.C.4. In rethinking his position on sovereign immunity, Bradley was
influenced by the dissenting opinion of Justice Horace Gray in United States v. Lee, 106
U.S. 196, 223 (1882) (Gray, J., dissenting), which first blended sovereign immunity ideas
about the federal government with cases construing the Eleventh Amendment. See
Massey, supra note 47, at 137-41.
143. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. at 330 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
144. 135 U.S. 662 (1890).
145. Id. at 721. Although argued before Hans, the decision was not handed down until
two months after Hans.
146. It is noteworthy that the lower court opinion in Hans, Hans v. Louisiana, 24 F. 55
(C.C.E.D. La. 1885), acknowledged the practical policy reasons behind its decision to hold
plaintiff's suit barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 66-68. Ignoring those reasons
("It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of the reason or
expediency" involved in construing the amendment broadly, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1, 21 (1890)), Bradley strained to make his opinion appear principled and rooted in an
original intent. The contrast between the two opinions suggests that Bradley avoided
practical matters so completely because he wished to turn attention away from those
considerations and that he did so because they were, in truth, the real, if embarrassing,
factors that compelled his decision. Everything considered, his effort was unpersuasive.
See Gibbons, supra note 53, at 2000-01.
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V. Orth concluded. 47 "His views changed in response to the great
events leading to the end of Reconstruction. '" 14 8
As the Court reshaped the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment
during the dozen years from the end of Reconstruction to its decision
in Hans, it did so once again after 1890 when social and political
conditions changed and the issues the Court addressed shifted from
southern state bonds to state economic regulation. Bradley's opinion,
in fact, was itself ambiguous and left open the door for the Court's
subsequent recontraction of the amendment. At its end, Bradley
appended a cautionary paragraph. "To avoid misapprehension," he
explained, certain qualifications should be noted:
where property or rights are enjoyed under a grant or
contract made by a State, they cannot wantonly be invaded.
Whilst the State cannot be compelled by suit to perform its
contracts, any attempt on its part to violate property or
rights acquired under its contracts, may be judicially
resisted; and any law impairing the obligations of contracts
under which such property or rights are held is void and
powerless to affect their enjoyment.49
147. ORTH, supra note 23, at 79.
148. Id. It is noteworthy that a thoughtful critic of Professor Orth's interpretation does
not challenge the claim that Eleventh Amendment doctrine was erratic and shifting during
the late nineteenth century but only the claim that the Court's Eleventh Amendment
decisions were the direct result of the Compromise of 1877 and the resulting post-
Reconstruction political context. See Collins, supra note 74, at 212. Focusing on what he
calls "the doctrinal trenches" and emphasizing the inherent "strictures imposed by the
common-law model," id. at 244-45, Professor Collins concludes that
the best that can be said of the eleventh amendment cases from the 1877-1890
period is that they reveal a "muddling through"-an approach that was
reasonably faithful to the common-law tradition within which constitutional
rights were then enforced, yet one that struggled with the tensions between state
immunity and accountability that still plague the Court today.
Id. at 243. Indeed, he readily acknowledges the unsettled nature of the Court's
jurisprudence in the late nineteenth century, giving as one of his reasons for questioning
Orth's conclusions the fact that the subsequent period, from 1890 to 1908, was "somewhat
more volatile both in terms of doctrinal development and changes in Court personnel than
the [1877-1890 period] that preceded it." Id. at 241. Finally, Collins concludes
perceptively, if too vaguely and abstractly, that it is "possible that jurisdictional questions
of the late nineteenth century masked broader but unarticulated substantive questions
about the Court's role and state sovereignty in general-not just the problems of national
reconciliation after the [Civil] War." Id. at 244. That speculation is, in the most general
sense, quite right. The historical problem is to try to identify and explain the exact nature
of those "unarticulated substantive questions" as well as any other factors that helped
shape the particular way in which the Court "muddled through" at various times and on
various issues. There is, after all, a substantive pattern to the Court's decisions, and that
pattern does not appear in the Court's doctrine but in the results it reached.
149. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890). Bradley suggested the same point in
his dissent in the Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. at 335-36 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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The statement left the nature of the line between proper and
improper suits vague and flexible, 150 and the Court itself subsequently
exploited that fact. In Ex parte Young it was unusually candid. "That
there has been room for difference of opinion with regard to such
[Eleventh Amendment] limitations," it remarked, "the reported cases
in this court bear conclusive testimony.'
'1 51
In the decades around the turn of the century that "difference of
opinion" flowered in the fertile soil of rapid political and social
change. New times and new issues demanded a new jurisprudence,
and almost immediately the Court began, somewhat uncertainly and
haltingly, to limit the scope of state immunity.152 Between 1890 and
1908 it narrowed Hans and the Eleventh Amendment, or simply
avoided them, in a variety of ways.
First, on the very same day that it announced Hans, the Court
made it clear that the Eleventh Amendment was far more limited
than Bradley's opinion might have suggested. In a brief but highly
significant opinion, it held in Lincoln County v. Luning53 that
counties did not come within the bar of the Eleventh Amendment
and were thus subject to suit in the federal courts. Not surprisingly, it
was Justice David J. Brewer, the indefatigable advocate of an
expansive federal judicial power, who wrote for the Court.'54
Lincoln County was particularly revealing, for it demonstrated
that the Court saw its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as serving
only a narrow and specialized purpose and that it planned to keep the
amendment under tight judicial control. As a matter of constitutional
text, the Justices in Lincoln County enjoyed complete discretion to
include or exclude counties, whichever they thought best. On the one
150. For the Court's best efforts to identify the relevant line prior to Hans, see In re
Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 492, 499-508 (1887), Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 67-71 (1886),
and infra note 160 and text accompanying infra notes 174-76. For insightful discussions of
the developing legal issues, see CURRIE, supra note 135, at 416-28; David E. Engdahl,
Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,
6-32, 60-79 (1972); Woolhandler, supra note 38, at 396; Ann Woolhandler, The Common
Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 113-21, 126-27
(1997).
151. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123,142 (1908).
152. Once the post-Reconstruction settlement was in place, infra Part IV.D, the Court
turned to issues of industrialization and government economic regulation, and it expanded
the federal judicial power substantially to ensure national supervision in those areas. See
infra Part V.
153. 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
154. On Brewer, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 39-63 (2000).
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hand, the language of the Eleventh Amendment referred only to
"states" and not to their political subdivisions. Thus, on the facial
textual ground that a "county" was not a "state," the two entities
could easily be separated and placed in separate legal categories. On
the other hand, counties were created and empowered by states, and
hence they could readily be considered as merely components or
agents of state governments. A county, the Court noted specifically,
was "a corporation created by and with such powers as are given to it
by the State."'55 Thus, as a matter of constitutional language and
legal logic, the Justices were free to decide the issue however they
wished. Consequently, their decision to construe the Eleventh
Amendment narrowly was the result of judicial choice, and the fact
that the decision was unanimous demonstrated the depth of the
Court's commitment to holding the Eleventh Amendment to a
narrow and specific purpose. The goal in Lincoln County was quite
obviously to retain federal jurisdiction over suits brought against
counties and municipalities that sought to repudiate their bonds.'56
Indeed, the Court acknowledged as much. The federal courts had
regularly heard suits against counties on their bonds, it explained, and
that jurisdiction had proven necessary and beneficial. "[T]he records
of this court for the last thirty years are full of suits against counties,"
Brewer reasoned in Lincoln County, "and it would seem as though by
general consent the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in such suits had
become established." '157 Thus, Lincoln County was not merely an
example of judicial choice but one more example of the pervasive
instrumentalism that shaped the Court's jurisdictional decisions.
155. Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530. Similarly, the Court had long held that the
Contract Clause did not apply to contracts between states and their local political
subdivisions. WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 249. The rule thus suggested that the latter were
merely components of the former.
156. The Court defeated state efforts to protect local government units from federal
jurisdiction in bond cases. See Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248, 250-54 (1906) (upholding
federal judicial power to order county officials to levy taxes to fund bond obligations after
the State had abolished a town in the county which had allowed its bonds to go into
default); Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 531-34 (1893) (voiding state statute
requiring holders of county bonds to bring enforcement suits only in state courts).
157. Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530. Brewer did not explain why a relatively recent
"general consent" given only over "the last thirty years" was capable of conferring subject
matter jurisdiction on the federal courts or determining the meaning of a constitutional
provision adopted a century earlier. The latter failure was especially curious because, on
other occasions, Brewer maintained that the meaning of the Constitution had been
established at its adoption and that it was unchanging and eternal. See, e.g., South
Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) (explaining that the Constitution has
the same meaning now as it did at its adoption).
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Even more noticeably, the Court in Lincoln County went out of
its way to identify two additional limits that constrained the Eleventh
Amendment. One was the principle that municipalities and other
local government entities were to be considered analogous to
counties and hence equally beyond the amendment's protection. A
county, the Court explained, "is a part of the State only in that
remote sense in which any city, town, or other municipal corporation
may be said to be a part of the State." '158 Thus, Lincoln County made
a special point to emphasize that other classes of "local"
governmental entities were also excluded from the Eleventh
Amendment's immunity.
More striking, the Court made a special effort, wholly
unnecessary to its decision, to limit the apparent significance of its
opinion in In re Ayers,'59 a key Eleventh Amendment decision issued
only three years earlier. Another southern state bond case, Ayers had
seemed to broaden the Eleventh Amendment substantially.
1 60
Lincoln County, however, cited Osborn favorably and implied that
Ayers represented but a slight modification of the traditional doctrine
that the Eleventh Amendment applied only to cases in which a state
was formally a party of record. 161 Thus, together with the fact that the
plaintiff in Hans had literally sued the state itself, the Court's
language in Lincoln County strongly suggested that the narrow
Osborn rule might still be vibrant and generally controlling.
158. Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530.
159. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
160. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the
federal courts from enjoining Virginia's efforts to enforce a law that sought, in effect, to
deny bondholders the right to pay their state taxes with the coupons on their bonds, a right
prescribed in the terms of the bonds themselves. Id. at 492-93. Attempting to bring order
to the Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions, Ayers declared that state officials were
subject to suit in federal court only when they threatened or performed wrongful acts "for
which they are personally and individually liable." Id. at 500. Merely instituting a
prosecution or other enforcement proceeding in a state court, it explained, did not
constitute such a wrong. Id. at 500-02. Further, Ayers explained that only contracting
parties could be liable in actions on contracts and that any action involving a contract to
which a state was a party could be brought only against the state and, consequently, was
necessarily barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 502-03. The decision was
important because it seemed to mean that no action could ever be brought against states
on contracts, that state officials could be sued only when they performed actions that
constituted torts at common law, and that no state official could be sued merely for
attempting to enforce a state law through legal processes, regardless of the
constitutionality of the underlying law sought to be enforced.
161. Ayers, Lincoln County announced, held that federal jurisdiction "was limited only
in respect to those cases in which the State is a real, if not a [namedI defendant." Lincoln
County, 133 U.S. at 530.
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Lincoln County was thus both important and revealing. It was
important because it denied Eleventh Amendment protection to all
municipal, county, and other local government entities. It was
revealing because it showed the Court's intention to cabin the
amendment strictly. Lincoln County confirmed the Court's pervasive
jurisdictional instrumentalism and highlighted the fact that it designed
Hans to serve only a highly specific and sharply delimited purpose. In
1890 it was Lincoln County, not Hans, that was the more fundamental
and far-reaching decision.
Second, in developing Hans's theory that the Eleventh
Amendment stood for a principle of state sovereign immunity, the
Court began to identify and rely on what it considered an implicit
corollary-that states could "waive" their immunity and "consent" to
suit in a federal court.62 Such a "consent" theory, of course, was
inconsistent with the language of the Eleventh Amendment, which
provided flatly that "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit" within its scope. The
paratextual theory created in Hans, however, had established the
principle that the amendment's language imposed no limit on the
Court's ability to determine its meaning. Consequently, when policy
reasons supported the assertion of federal jurisdiction, the Court
could readily ignore the text and employ the fiction of "consent" to
avoid it.'
63
Only two years after Hans, for example, the Court held in United
States v. Texas"M that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a suit
against a state brought in federal court by the United States
government. Obviously, if the Eleventh Amendment placed the
states beyond "the judicial power of the United States," no federal
court could hear a suit against a state regardless of the nature of the
adverse party. The Court, however, construed Hans to mean only
that the Eleventh Amendment barred the judicial power from
162. The Court had previously referred to the idea that states could "consent" to suit in
the federal courts. E.g., New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883) (asserting
that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits citizen suits against states, unless the state
consents); Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1876) (accepting a state's right
to waive sovereign immunity).
163. See Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 291-93 (1906); Smith v.
Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445, 449 (1900); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
The Court reaffirmed the basic principle that parties could not confer subject matter
jurisdiction on a federal court by consent in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley,
211 U.S. 149 (1908).
164. 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
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reaching "suits of individuals against States"'65 and ruled that Texas,
"when admitted into the Union," had "consented" to suit by the
United States.'66 Of course, such a malleable "consent" rationale
could just as logically have supported the proposition that states
entering the Union consented to suit on any claim that was based on
supreme federal law and, consequently, that the Eleventh
Amendment did not symbolize any sovereign immunity broader than
the immunity its specific words indicated. That logic, however, did
not serve the Court's purposes. United States v. Texas illustrated once
again that the Court was neither "construing" the Eleventh
Amendment nor relying on text, history, actual "consent," or any
logically necessary "legal" reasoning. 1 7 Rather, it confirmed that the
Court was construing the amendment instrumentally to serve the
changing policy goals that it accepted as appropriate and desirable. 68
Third, the Court made it equally clear that, notwithstanding
Hans and the Eleventh Amendment, the federal courts would
continue to hear suits against state officers and enjoin their actions,
even when the officers acted on behalf of the state in performing
official duties necessary to carry out the state's authorized policies.
The year after Hans came down, in fact, the Court upheld an
injunction against a state's governor, secretary of state, and treasurer,
who together constituted the state's board of land commissioners,
preventing them from selling a tract of land over which plaintiff
asserted title. Relying on Osborn69  and Hans's "[t]o avoid
165. Id. at 644.
166. ld. at 646.
167. Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Lamar dissented, noting that no provision in the
Constitution authorized a suit (which was filed under the Court's original jurisdiction) by
the United States against a state. Id. at 648-49 (Fuller, C.J., and Lamar, J., dissenting).
The dissenters were correct in the formal premise they advanced, but the Court adopted
the sounder view on the dispositive issue, the instrumental policy analysis.
168. The policy-based nature of the Court's decisionmaking was similarly obvious eight
years later in Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900). There, the Court held that a state
could consent to be sued and limit its consent to suits in its own courts but that, in so
doing, it also "consented" to review of any federal questions in the suit by the Supreme
Court of the United States. Id. at 445. Further, the Court in effect limited its holding in
United States v. Texas by ruling that, unlike the United States government, a federally
created corporation could not sue a state. Id. at 446-49. Again, the "consent" to review
was wholly fictitious, and the ruling about federally created corporations was wholly
unrelated to the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. The Court's policy analysis seemed
compelling on the first issue and at least reasonable on the second issue, but it was still a
pragmatic Court-made policy judgment that shaped its decision. See Vicki C. Jackson, The
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1,
27-29 (1988).
169. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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misapprehension" paragraph, 7 ° Pennoyer v. McConnaughy17' ruled
that the suit was not against the state. Plaintiff "merely asks that an
injunction may issue against [the three officials] to restrain them from
acting under a statute of the State alleged to be unconstitutional.'
' 72
The officials' planned acts would be "violative of his contract made
with the State when he purchased his lands.' ' 73 Thus, Pennoyer not
only allowed an injunction against officials holding the state's highest
governmental offices but also, in effect, compelled performance of a
contract to which the state itself was a party. The decision made it
clear that the Court could severely limit or negate the Eleventh
Amendment whenever it wished.
Finally, the Court broadened the situations in which it would
grant injunctive relief against state officials. Three years before Hans,
the Court had denied federal jurisdiction in Ayers,74 where a party
had sought to enjoin the Attorney General of Virginia from bringing
an enforcement action, as directed by state statute, against persons
who tendered certain repudiated tax-receivable state bond coupons in
payment of their state taxes. Recognizing that such suits were often
de facto suits against states, Ayers sought to explain when such suits
were proper. "The vital principle in all such cases is that the
defendants, though professing to act as officers of the State, are
threatening a violation of the personal or property rights of the
complainant, for which they are personally and individually liable.'
' 75
In Ayers the Virginia Attorney General had not done or threatened
any action that was legally wrong, the Court explained, because he
had done nothing but institute an enforcement proceeding that was
authorized by state law. To merely compel a person to defend against
a lawful proceeding-where he or she could raise defenses and
challenge the constitutionality of the state's action-was not a legal
wrong for which an official could be personally liable.'76 Thus, Ayers
held, the lower court was without jurisdiction to enjoin the official.
170. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890); see text accompanying supra note 149.
171. 140 U.S. 1 (1891).
172. Id. at 18.
173. Id.
174. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
175. Id. at 500.
176. Although the Court did not spell its reasoning out as clearly as it might have, its
point seemed clear:
If a suit may be rightfully brought at all by the State to recover a judgment for
taxes, in such a case, certainly, there is nothing in these provisions that violates
any legal or contract right of the party sued. If he defends the action on the
ground of a lawful tender of payment, he must, of course, plead the tender, and
may rightfully be required to bring into court the tender alleged to have been
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The Ayers rule stood firm for only seven years. In 1894 in
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,177 the Court affirmed an
injunction prohibiting a proceeding to enforce the rate order of a
state regulatory commission. 178 The decision ignored the fact that
Ayers had involved just such a proceeding and had held that state
officials committed no independent legal wrong when they merely
threatened or began such an enforcement action. 7 9 Although the
Court revived the Ayers rule in 1899, Is it ignored it once again in
1903.181 Finally, in 1908 the Court in effect repudiated Ayers formally
in Ex parte Young.182 There, it held that the mere threat of an
enforcement proceeding could be the "equivalent to any other
threatened wrong or injury to the property of a plaintiff."' 83 As a
result, an officer who did nothing more than threaten to enforce a
state law alleged to be unconstitutional was potentially enjoinable in a
federal court suit notwithstanding Ayers, Hans, and the Eleventh
Amendment.
Thus, by the first decade of the twentieth century, the Court had
reduced the Eleventh Amendment to narrow and easily managed
proportions. Its ambient doctrine remained jumbled, and the courts
had precedents available to decide most cases in whatever way they
chose. The two practical issues at stake, however-paramount
matters of society and governance-were clearly settled. First, the
Court would apply the Eleventh Amendment to block bondholders
seeking to compel payments on southern state bonds. Second, the
Court would not allow the amendment to provide immunity from a
federal equity court when states or their agents took economic
regulatory actions. The amendment's principal legal significance,
made .... If, in pursuance of other acts of the General Assembly, the contract
rights of the defendant, as a tax-payer having tendered tax-receivable coupons,
are denied to him in that trial, by reason of requirements in regard to the nature
and quantity of proof as to the genuineness of the coupons, the errors of law thus
committed can only be remedied, according to the common course of judicial
proceedings, by a writ of error, which, as it would present a Federal question,
might ultimately be sued out in this court. But it is not to be assumed in advance,
either, that such questions will arise, or that, if they arise, they will be
erroneously decided.
Id. at 494-95.
177. 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
178. Id. at 390.
179. CURRIE, supra note 135, at 425-28; CURRIE, supra note 92, at 51-52; JACOBS,
supra note 23, at 131.
180. See Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 525 (1899).
181. See Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903).
182. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
183. Id. at 158.
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then, turned out to be ironic. In an age when the Court embraced
"liberty of contract," it wound up construing the Eleventh
Amendment relatively consistently on only one point. The
amendment generally barred parties from suing states on contracts to
which the state was a formal contracting party.184
And yet, the result was not quite as ironic as it might appear.
"Liberty of contract," after all, was not a constitutional command but
an ideological persuasion rooted in a broad set of evolving political,
economic, cultural, and moral assumptions.'85 The Court's narrowing
construction of the Eleventh Amendment after Hans served that
animating persuasion directly and well by enabling the Court to
intervene to protect contractual freedom whenever state economic
regulation seemed to endanger it. Moreover, the Court's
jurisprudence barring contractual actions against states-the apparent
doctrinal residue of Hans and the southern state bond cases-did not
seriously conflict with that persuasion. In a new age of sophisticated
national and international financial markets, it was clear that states
would have to pay, one way or another, for whatever immunity they
enjoyed. Notwithstanding Hans and its doctrine of state sovereign
immunity, the expanding financial markets of the new industrial
world had their own devices to discipline errant borrowers, whether
they were private parties or state governments.'86
Regardless of their impact on state credit, however, the Court's
Eleventh Amendment decisions traced a familiar and revealing
pattern. Like the Court's jurisdictional decisions involving diversity
actions, federal receivership suits, and federal question cases, they
traced changes in national politics and adapted the law to the
perceived needs of the nation. Hans stood in the jurisdictional
184. This was one of the core ideas the Court stressed in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 502-
06 (1887). See, e.g., Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 168 (1909) (holding that
purchases by state officers constituted purchases by the State and therefore the court had
no jurisdiction).
185. Ideas about race and gender, for example, repeatedly shaped and limited the
Court's application of the constitutional doctrine of liberty of contract. For race, see
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896);
for gender, see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), and Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1873). See generally, e.g., Soifer, supra note 89, at 250 (showing how social
attitudes and values shaped the Court's jurisprudence).
186. For an analysis of the protections available to lenders contracting with entities
which enjoy sovereign immunity, see James R. Greene, Financing Foreign Governments
and Official Entities, in OFFSHORE LENDING BY U.S. COMMERCIAL BANKS 213, 213-48
(F. John Mathis ed., 2d ed. 1981); ORTH, supra note 23, at 118 (noting a decline in the
financial ratings of state bonds as compared to municipal bonds).
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mainstream, a calculated effort to serve the post-Reconstruction
settlement.
IV. THE PARTICULARLY DUBIOUS NATURE OF HANS, II:
JURISDICTIONAL INSTRUMENTALISM AND THE POST-
RECONSTRUCTION SETTLEMENT
If federal jurisdiction was shaped by a flexible judicial
instrumentalism, then a recognition of the substantive goals the
Justices sought to serve is essential to understand the practical
meaning and true significance of the Court's decisions. In the late
nineteenth century the policies and values that guided the Court were
those embodied in the post-Reconstruction settlement and, closely
related, those that inspired the doctrine of substantive due process.
Hans and the evolving jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment
can be fully and properly understood only in relation to those two
developing policy commitments.
A. The Resonance of the Southern State Bond Litigations
The problem presented by the southern state bond cases, serious
and perplexing to be sure, was not sufficient by itself to explain the
Court's willingness to distort Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as
obviously and severely as it did. Although the practical challenge was
sobering, it was also limited. Neither Mississippi nor Kentucky
repudiated or sought to readjust its debts during the post-
Reconstruction years.'87 Further, at least two other southern states,
Texas and Florida, had relatively small debts which were unlikely by
themselves to spur extreme reactions against adverse federal
judgments. 88 In addition, Virginia-one of the most determined of
the repudiators-repeatedly lost before the Court for special reasons
related to the provisions in its bonds. 9 Thus, the bond problem itself
was, at its most serious, limited to only a handful of states.9 °
187. WOODWARD, supra note 21, at 87.
188. Id.
189. Often, though not uniformly, Virginia lost before the Court. The most likely
explanation for its losses is that its bonds contained a provision making their coupons
receivable by the state in payment of taxes. Thus, the Court could usually rule against the
State and for its bondholders without worrying about most enforcement problems beyond
the need to prohibit the State from prosecuting taxpayers who tendered bond coupons in
payment of their taxes. See ORTH, supra note 23, at 60-109.
190. The exact amounts involved in the various readjustment efforts are disputed.
According to one of the most detailed accounts, excluding Virginia, the two most
substantial repudiators were Louisiana and North Carolina, which repudiated total
amounts of $23.9 and $29.2 million, respectively, followed by South Carolina ($16.4
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More important, even in the repudiating states with significant
debts there were often strong internal political pressures for full
recognition and payment of state debts. Established conservative
groups committed to the protection of property and social order as
well as incipient commercial interests seeking financial respectability
and ready credit in the North and in Europe fought the
repudiationists persistently over state policy. 191  In Arkansas,
Louisiana, Tennessee, and Virginia the internal factions supporting
full payment were strong enough on occasion to win control of the
state government and at least temporarily alter the state's debt
policy.
1 92
On the bond issue, in short, the South was hardly monolithic. It
was divided both from state to state and within several of the
individual states that repudiated their bonds.
Moreover, the Court's general determination to enforce the law
in the face of political pressures or popular protests was apparent.
When the Court faced repudiationist efforts in the towns and counties
of some twenty different states in the Midwest and West, it refused to
bend in the slightest. 193 In spite of the comparable size of the debt at
issue and the large number of local government entities involved, the
Court was adamant. Indeed, in adjudicating claims from the Midwest
and West, it refused in many cases to accept persuasive arguments
that the bonds in question had been issued without lawful authority
or that bondholder-claimants were implicated in fraud or other
practices that should deny them the status of holders in due course.'94
The Court's contrasting rhetoric in cases coming from the two regions
suggested the remarkable difference in its attitude. Addressing
southern state repudiation in Jumel, the Court bemoaned the
difficulties it would face trying to enforce a judgment; addressing
municipal repudiation in the Midwest, it declared floridly that it
million), Alabama ($13.4 million), and Tennessee ($13 million). Three other Southern
States repudiated smaller amounts: Arkansas ($8.3 million), Georgia ($7.7 million), and
Florida ($4.0 million). B. U. RATCHFORD, AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 192 tbl.15 (1941);
see also REGINALD C. MCGRANE, FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS AND AMERICAN STATE
DEBTS 282-389 (1935) (chronicling the problem of state debts following the Civil War);
WOODWARD, supra note 21, at 86-87 (summarizing southern state bond repudiations in
the post-Reconstruction era).
191. CARL N. DEGLER, THE OTHER SOUTH: SOUTHERN DISSENTERS IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 264-315 (1974); WOODWARD, supra note 21, at 89-106.
192. WOODWARD, supra note 21, at 89. On the complexities of Virginia politics, for
example, see JANE DAILEY, BEFORE JIM CROW: THE POLITICS OF RACE IN
POSTEMANCIPATION VIRGINIA passim (2000).




"shall never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State
tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice.'
1 95
Similarly, the Court was not intimidated when it faced
increasingly controversial issues of state economic regulation and
popular political protests. In the 1880s and 1890s, powerful political
forces gathered behind efforts to regulate corporate business, control
transportation rates and facilities, and improve the conditions of
industrial workers. 96 Those forces exerted growing, widespread, and
well-organized pressures, and they were powerful across the South as
well as in the Midwest and Far West.' 97 Indeed, agrarian protests, the
complaints of small business interests, the rapid emergence of the
Populist Party, and the organizing efforts of the Knights of Labor and
the American Railway Union were concentrated in those regions and
seemed to unite the interests of southerners with the interests of
those in the rest of the country. 198 Yet, in spite of the intensifying
political pressures, the Court remained firm and, indeed, after the
mid-1880s showed rapidly declining sympathy for the efforts of the
various protest movements. In confronting the demands of those
movements the Justices knew, as they did when addressing
Midwestern and Western debt repudiation, that they could count on
the support of the federal government and the dominant elements of
American society. 199 Indeed, in the years after the Civil War the
195. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175,206-07 (1864).
196. These issues are discussed in the following representative historical accounts of
the 1880s and 1890s: ROBERT V. BRUCE, 1877: YEAR OF VIOLENCE (1959); SIDNEY
FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN
AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901 (1956); JOHN A. GARRATY, THE NEW
COMMONWEALTH, 1877-1890 (1968); SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO
INDUSTRIALISM, 1885-1914 (1957); MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE
IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1977); EDWARD C. KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY
COMES OF AGE: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1860-1897 (1961); CRAIG
PHELAN, GRAND MASTER WORKMAN: TERENCE POWDERLY AND THE KNIGHTS OF
LABOR (2000); DAVID P. THELEN, THE NEW CITIZENSHIP: ORIGINS OF PROGRESSIVISM
IN WISCONSIN, 1885-1900 (1972); IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FINANCE, 1865-1879 (1964).
197. See sources cited supra note 196.
198. See sources cited supra note 196.
199. With respect to the Midwestern bond cases, in 1870 President Ulysses S. Grant
made it clear that he was prepared, if necessary, to use the army to enforce the judgments
of the federal courts. 6 FAIRMAN, supra note 69, at 984. To enforce order and a series of
federal court injunctions against the American Railway Union and others, President
Grover Cleveland ordered federal troops to intervene in the Pullman Strike in 1894. The
armed intervention ended the strike and defeated the union's efforts. See, e.g., GERALD
G. EGGERT, RICHARD OLNEY: EVOLUTION OF A STATESMAN 133-50 (1974) (discussing
the Pullman strike and the role of the federal government in defeating it, focusing on the
actions of the U.S. Attorney General); RAY GINGER, ALTGELD's AMERICA: THE
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Court became increasingly aggressive in striking down state
legislation that it found inconsistent with certain constitutional
mandates. Under the Contract Clause alone, for example, it
invalidated state statutes in twenty separate cases between 1865 and
1873, and it did the same in another twenty-nine cases between 1873
and 1888.200
Why, then, did the Court bend specifically and only to the
pressures generated by the southern state bond cases? Not because
that limited challenge was unmanageable in itself. Rather, the Court
gave ground because two powerful and compelling conditions swayed
its judgment.
The first was the fact that the southern state bond cases did not
present an isolated issue. To the contrary, they constituted an
integral part of a far larger, intractable, and galvanizing phenomenon,
the deeply rooted and intensely bitter sectional strife that had long
riven the nation, finally erupted in a brutal civil war, and then
continued almost unabated through Reconstruction and into the post-
Reconstruction world. It was because of that long, ingrained, and
emotional conflict that the Southern States would rally to one
another's support and present a united front. It was for that same
reason, too, that the state bond cases carried a powerful symbolic
significance for southerners that transcended the actual amount of
money at stake and forged the region into a unified and defiant bloc.
The southern debt-much of which originated under postwar
Republican regimes-symbolized Confederate defeat and Union
victory, the South crushed under the heel of the North and its puppet
carpetbag governments. "By 1870," concluded David W. Blight,
"most white Southerners viewed Reconstruction as a hated, imposed
regime." 0' 1 Most intensely and most viscerally, for white southerners
the bonds symbolized the unendurable outrage of "black
Reconstruction." They represented what white southerners framed
as the corrupt, rapacious, devastating, and utterly intolerable rule of
their newly freed-and now uncontrolled-black slaves.2 2
LINCOLN IDEAL VERSUS CHANGING REALITIES 143-67 (Quadrangle Paperbacks 1965)
(1958) (same, focusing on the role of the governor of Illinois); RAY GINGER, THE
BENDING CROSS: A BIOGRAPHY OF EUGENE VICTOR DEBS 108-51 (1949) (same,
focusing on the leader of the American Railway Union).
200. WRIGHT, supra note 22, at 93-94.
201. DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN
MEMORY 106 (2001).
202. Both the politics and economics of the southern bond problem were complicated.
Many white Democrats profited from their lavish issue, and after Reconstruction black
leaders often supported repudiation on economic grounds. The symbolism of the bonds
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The South's hostility toward federal judicial enforcement of its
state bonds, moreover, was an integral part of its more general
opposition to the power of the North, the federal government, and
the national courts.2 °3 Southern hostility to the federal judiciary had
grown steadily throughout the late nineteenth century, and it spurred
constant attacks on the federal courts, especially on their diversity
and removal jurisdiction and on their expanding equity powers.2°4
Southern leaders identified the federal courts as tools of an aggressive
northern capitalism and blamed them for their region's economic
stagnation and poverty.2 °5 The idea that the federal judiciary might
order southern states to honor their bonded debt seemed only one
more instance of northern political oppression and economic
exploitation. Undergirding the persistent southern opposition to both
northern capitalism and the federal judiciary, however, was the
driving issue of race and the paramount goal of maintaining white
supremacy.206 Southerners who criticized the federal courts as the
tools of northern capitalism, Harry N. Scheiber concluded, directed
"their attack in a way that dovetailed well with racist views" and
were, in effect, "setting up a smoke screen."2 7 The South failed to
make serious efforts to establish the conditions necessary to develop
an advanced economy, and its leaders focused, instead, on securing
their own individual economic advantage while ensuring the
continuation of white rule.
White southerners took a variety of diverse and conflicting
positions on the economic issues their region faced, including the
repudiation of their state bonds.20 8 On matters of race, however, they
stood as one. It was race, not repudiation, that united the white
and their close connection with the hated era of "black Republican rule" nevertheless
gave them a powerful political and emotional resonance. On the end of Reconstruction,
see FONER, supra note 71, at 512-601; WOODWARD, supra note 21, at 1-174.
203. From the moment they had returned to Congress during and after Reconstruction,
southern congressmen began agitating for limitations on the powers and jurisdiction of the
federal courts. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 108, at 88-93. The jurisdictional
limitations contained in the Judiciary Act of 1887-88 represented their first significant, if
limited, victory in this area. Indeed, one northern federal judge immediately labeled the
act a "confederate" measure. Fiske v. Henarie, 32 F. 417,422 (C.C.D. Or. 1887).
204. Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism, the Southern Regional Economy, and Public Policy
Since 1865, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 69, 73-86
(David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1984).
205. Id. at 77-78.
206. Id. at 80.
207. Id.
208. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
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South.2 9 It was race, not repudiation, that gave the southern state
bond litigations their ominous, overarching, and potentially explosive
political significance.
The second fundamental condition that led the Court to bend
was the fact that the North had tired of the entire matter of southern
racial politics and had concluded that the South should be placated
and allowed its own special independence.2" The North had accepted
a post-Reconstruction settlement, and it had done so in large part
because it shared the racist ideas and attitudes that dominated the
white South.2 1' After the terrible war and the tumultuous failure and
disillusionment of Reconstruction, most northerners had come to
accept the white southern view of race, Reconstruction, sectional
reconciliation, and the nation's desired political and social future.212
It was race that forged the post-Reconstruction settlement, and it was
northern racial attitudes that guaranteed that the nation as a whole
would accept and honor its terms. "Ultimately," Joel Williamson has
written, "the critical factor in the capitulation of the North was its
own racism." '213 Northern acquiescence in the repudiation of southern
state bonds, then, was merely a corollary of an avidly embraced
national reconciliation, one provision of the comprehensive and, by
whites, warmly welcomed post-Reconstruction settlement.214
209. As Bertram Wyatt-Brown explained: In the post-Reconstruction era "the Rebel
banner was the emblem of a sacralized determination to keep African Americans
underfoot. Any means to do so were deemed honorable. The ethic that so long has
sustained the racial prescriptions of the white South required no respect or humanity
toward those outside its moral boundaries." BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, THE SHAPING
OF SOUTHERN CULTURE: HONOR, GRACE, AND WAR, 1760s-1890s, at 295 (2001).
Indeed, it had been race, not abstract principles of federalism, that inspired southern
secession. See MANISHA SINHA, THE COUNTERREVOLUTION OF SLAVERY: POLITICS
AND IDEOLOGY IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA 187-220 (2000). See generally
CHARLES B. DEW, APOSTLES OF DISUNION: SOUTHERN SECESSION COMMISSIONERS
AND THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR (2001) (showing that secession commissioners
urged secession as a way to protect slavery).
210. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C, & IV.D.
211. See infra Part IV.C.
212. See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C, & IV.D.
213. JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 340 (1984).
214. See JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: THE
ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH passim
(1982); WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE
SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL, 1861-1915 passim (1991); Michael J.
Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 886-95 (1998).
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B. Law, Politics, and Race
1. The Post-Reconstruction Era, 1877-1890
The quarter century from the end of Reconstruction to the early
years of the twentieth century was a period of massive social
transformation. From a largely decentralized, small-town, and
agricultural society with a dominant Anglo-Saxon Protestant
population and culture, the United States became a centralizing,
urbanizing, and industrializing nation with an ever more
heterogeneous population and an increasingly secular, pluralistic, and
commercial culture.215  As the nation turned to address
unprecedented challenges, it resolved in the process what had been
the paramount problem of its immediate past-slavery and the
consequences of its abolition-by accepting a de facto political and
social resolution.216  The post-Reconstruction settlement consigned
the "race question" to the states. It allowed the South to manage its
racial relations as it wished, subject only to the tacit condition that the
states not act officially to deprive blacks, in a direct and express
215. The changes were profound in both scope and nature. As one historian wrote:
In the decades following the Civil War, American capitalism began to produce a
distinct culture, unconnected to traditional family or community values, to
religion in any conventional sense, or to political democracy. It was a secular
business and market-oriented culture, with the exchange and circulation of
money and goods at the foundation of its aesthetic life and of its moral
sensibility.
WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS, POWER, AND THE RISE OF A NEW
AMERICAN CULTURE 3 (1993); see FONER, supra note 71, at 18-34, 460-601; KELLER,
supra note 196, at 197-237; T. J. Jackson Lears, From Salvation to Self-Realization:
Advertising and the Therapeutic Roots of the Consumer Culture, 1880-1930, in THE
CULTURE OF CONSUMPTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1980, at
1, 1-38 (Richard Wightman Fox & T. J. Jackson Lears eds., 1983); WOODWARD, supra
note 21, at 107-174. See generally THE GILDED AGE: ESSAYS ON THE ORIGINS OF
MODERN AMERICA (Charles W. Calhoun ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE GILDED AGE]
(discussing changes in a variety of areas that resulted from the industrialization of
America).
216. See generally BLIGHT, supra note 201 (discussing changing attitudes toward, and
interpretations of, the Civil War and Reconstruction); VINCENT P. DE SANTIS,
REPUBLICANS FACE THE SOUTHERN QUESTION-THE NEW DEPARTURE YEARS, 1877-
1897 (1959) (discussing the evolution of the Republican Party after Reconstruction);
STANLEY P. HIRSHSON, FAREWELL TO THE BLOODY SHIRT: NORTHERN REPUBLICANS
& THE SOUTHERN NEGRO, 1873-1893 (1962) (discussing the changing political attitudes
of northern Republicans during and after Reconstruction); JOSEPH FRAZIER WALL,
HENRY WATrERSON: RECONSTRUCTED REBEL (1956) (discussing the politics of
Reconstruction from the viewpoint of a southern leader); C. VANN WOODWARD,
REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF
RECONSTRUCTION (1951) (discussing the origins and resolution of the Compromise of
1877).
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manner, of certain constitutional rights that the Court would not
overtly deny.
As Reconstruction wound down,1 7 white southerners intent on
overturning its remaining achievements rallied behind the
Democratic Party and reasserted their control over the governments
of the ex-Confederate states. They heralded their ideology and their
coming triumph by identifying their cause with the mission of Jesus
Christ-to the world, they announced themselves proudly as the
South's "redeemers." Employing a variety of tactics-from violence
and intimidation through racially abusive administration to gossamer
legal rationales for institutionalized racial oppression-they gradually
disenfranchised blacks, eliminated the Republican Party as a serious
political rival, and established a rigidly segregated and white-
dominated society. Perhaps most telling, the nation's very language
and discourse quickly acknowledged their triumph and their virtue,
accepting them almost immediately on their own terms, and referring
to them widely and commonly as, indeed, the South's "redeemers. '21 s
What was happening in the South was clearly observable as early
as the mid-1870s. 219 In the South Carolina gubernatorial election of
217. In 1874 the Democrats won control of the House of Representatives, and for the
first time since the Civil War the Republicans no longer held complete control of the
national government. "The election of 1874 offered only one indication of a pronounced
shift in Northern attitudes toward the South during Grant's second term." FONER, supra
note 71, at 524. At the beginning of 1875, before the new Congress was seated,
Republicans used their control in a lame-duck session to enact the last Reconstruction
statutes: the Judiciary Act of 1875, expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear
federal law claims, and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, extending new civil rights protections
to black Americans. Support for Reconstruction continued to wane while opposition
spread widely. The disputed election of 1876 and the consequent Compromise of 1877 led
directly to its negotiated, widely accepted, and clearly understood termination. See
generally WOODWARD, supra note 216 (discussing the origins and resolution of the
Compromise of 1877).
218. See, e.g., C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF
CHARACTER 155 (1963) (quoting Benjamin R. Tillman using the term "redeem" in
referring to the effort to restore white rule in South Carolina); WOODWARD, supra note
21, at 1-22 (using the term "Redeemers" to refer to white southern Democrats at the end
of Reconstruction).
219. Evidence was plentiful. For example:
Especially affected by continued white hostility were the Negroes in Atlanta and
Montgomery, where the black vote had ceased to be a factor in the regular
elections since the mid-1870s. At least partially because of the absence of black
officeholders in these two cities, there was also far greater disparity in the level of
educational and welfare services made available to blacks in comparison to
whites.
HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865-1890, at 329
(1978).
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1876, for example, while the Union army still occupied the state,
whites used intimidation and open violence-what they called "the
Mississippi Plan"-to control the black vote. 22°  After a group of
armed whites attacked blacks in Edgefield County and killed six of
them, one of its leaders, Benjamin R. ("Pitchfork Ben") Tillman, a
future governor and United States Senator, acknowledged the
organized and racist nature of the whites' campaign. "It had been the
settled purpose of the leading white men of Edgefield to seize the first
opportunity that the Negroes might offer to provoke a riot and teach
the Negroes a lesson. 2 21 White southerners, Tillman believed, had
no choice. It "was generally believed that nothing but bloodshed and
a good deal of it could answer the purpose of redeeming the state."
222
In neighboring Aiken County the election spurred even more
bloodshed near the town of Ellenton. Almost open racial warfare
broke out and continued sporadically until federal troops finally
arrived to restore a semblance of order. Two whites and as many as
125 blacks were killed. The Democrats, whose gubernatorial
candidate had tacitly approved the violence, won the election and
took over the state's government. The election and the Aiken
County "massacre" quickly became notorious throughout the nation,
leading to a federal prosecution and trial in Charleston of twelve
whites who were charged with violating the civil rights of the
murdered blacks.223
With vigorous and selective enforcement of laws and discriminatory sentencing,
the jails and prisons [in the South] came to be filled with unprecedented numbers
of blacks. Tens of thousands would be compelled to serve long terms at hard
labor, more often than not for petty theft and misdemeanors .... The convict
leasing system emerged as early as Reconstruction, matured in the 1870s and
1880s, and soon became in many states the dominant policy of the penal system.
LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM
CROW 271 (1998).
220. The material in this and the succeeding paragraph is drawn from Stephen
Kantrowitz, One Man's Mob Is Another Man's Militia: Violence, Manhood, and Authority
in Reconstruction South Carolina, in JUMPIN' JIM CROW: SOUTHERN POLITICS FROM
CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL RIGHTS 67, 67-87 (Jane Dailey et al. eds., 2000); MAGRATH, supra
note 218, at 155-65; and Lou Falkner Williams, Federal Enforcement of Black Rights in the
Post-Redemption South: The Ellenton Riot Case, in LOCAL MATTERS: RACE, CRIME,
AND JUSTICE IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 172, 172-200 (Christopher Waldrep
& Donald G. Nieman eds., 2001) [hereinafter LOCAL MATTERS].
221. MAGRATH, supra note 218, at 155 (quoting Benjamin R. Tillman).
222. Id. (quoting Benjamin R. Tillman).
223. Tillman played an active, if somewhat tardy, role in the massacre:
Tillman led fifty Red-shirts thirty miles to Ellenton but arrived too late for the
slaughter. However, two men from his unit were detailed to execute an
important prisoner, black Republican state senator Simon Coker, who had come
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The episode in Aiken County held particular importance for the
Supreme Court of the United States. Sitting on circuit, Chief Justice
Morrison R. Waite served as the trial judge, and he drew a profound
lesson from his extended and distressing experience in Charleston.
Waite learned firsthand about "the bitterness of hate" that southern
whites felt for the North and about the "sickening" and "horrid"
nature of the violence they used against blacks. "Negroes, so far as
the case thus far shows," he wrote his wife, "were shot down in cold
blood without any cause or provocation. '224 The whites in South
Carolina "are further from reconstruction than they have been since
the war," he concluded pessimistically, and they "have gone back to
their original idols. '225 At the trial's conclusion a jury of six blacks
and six whites split evenly along racial lines. Waite declared a
mistrial, and the federal government let the matter drop without a
retrial. For the future of American law, however, the South Carolina
trial continued to resonate, for Waite saw it as demonstrating the
futility of Reconstruction and its goals. "The President's Southern
policy, as it is called, is no policy at all," he wrote his son shortly after
the trial.2 26 "He simply accepted what time and circumstance had
already accomplished. '2 7  The return of white rule was a fait
accompli, and the North had washed its hands of the matter. It was
"perfectly certain," Waite explained, "that the people of the north
were tired of keeping men in office by the help of the general
government. "228 The jolting lesson of pessimism and defeat that he
drew from his Charleston experience colored his remaining years of
service as Chief Justice from 1877 to 1888, the pivotal post-
Reconstruction era when the Court began yielding to the South by
severely contracting the Civil War amendments while rapidly
expanding the Eleventh.
2 9
to investigate reports of violence. They shot Coker while he knelt in his final
prayer.
STEPHEN KANTROWITZ, BEN TILLMAN & THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WHITE
SUPREMACY 74 (2000).
224. MAGRATH, supra note 218, at 160 (quoting Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite).
225. Williams, supra note 220, at 183 (quoting Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite).
226. MAGRATH, supra note 218, at 165 (quoting Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite).
227. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite).
228. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite).
229. Waite was one of the "principal architects" of the Court's decisions minimizing
the reach of the Civil War amendments. MAGRATH, supra note 218, at 133. He was with
the majority in almost all of the Court's decisions limiting the Civil War amendments and
expanding the Eleventh Amendment. He wrote for the Court in Louisiana v. Jume, 107
U.S. 711 (1883), and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), for example, and
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While the 1870s brought the end of Reconstruction and the
return of white rule to the South, the 1880s witnessed the racial tide
turn, unevenly but decisively, against the freed persons and their
rights.23° Symbolically, the decade opened with the first "Great
Exodus" of blacks fleeing from the region's increasingly hostile racial
climate, 23' and it ended in 1889 with the formation of the United
Confederate Veterans.232  During the intervening years racial
lynchings rose sharply, reaching their peak in the late 1880s and early
1890s when they averaged well over a hundred per year.233 Legal
victories on behalf of black litigants challenging segregated schools,
which had been relatively common in the 1870s, peaked in 1881 and
joined the majority in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443 (1887).
230. See JOSEPH H. CARTWRIGHT, THE TRIUMPH OF JIM CROW: TENNESSEE RACE
RELATIONS IN THE 1880S passim (1976); ROGER A. FISCHER, THE SEGREGATION
STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA, 1862-1877 passim (1974); RABINOWITZ, supra note 219,
passim; WILLIAMSON, supra note 213; CHARLES E. WYNES, RACE RELATIONS IN
VIRGINIA, 1870-1902 (1961); Klarman, supra note 88, at 309. For the black response, see
AUGUST MEIER, NEGRO THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1880-1915: RACIAL IDEOLOGIES IN
THE AGE OF BOOKER T. WASHINGTON 3-82 (3d prtg. 1969).
231. HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-
1925, at 433-42 (1976); HEATHER COx RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF
RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH,
1865-1901, at 156-82 (2001).
232. WOODWARD, supra note 21, at 156; see Keith S. Bohannon, "These Few Gray-
Haired, Battle-Scarred Veterans".- Confederate Army Reunions in Georgia, 1885-95, in
THE MYTH OF THE LOST CAUSE AND CIVIL WAR HISTORY 89, 89-110 (Gary W.
Gallagher & Alan T. Nolan eds., 2000).
233. AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT M. RUDWICK, FROM PLANTATION TO GHETTO: AN
INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGROES 204 (3d ed. 1976). David Levering
Lewis explained the phenomenon:
Lynching was race relations by means of a rope, a sanguinary pageant reenacted
by community leaders for whom the untruthfulness of accusations was not
merely irrelevant but even an essential element in what was but the everlasting
apotheosis of white supremacy. For all its violence, mindless solidarity, and
unspeakable bestiality, standard Southern lynching was an objectively rational
spectacle with a prescribed emotional rhythm and scripted ritual, whose purposes
were ultimately political and economic.
David Levering Lewis, An American Pastime, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 21, 2002, at 27,
27. On the transformation of lynching into a distinctive southern racial phenomenon after
Reconstruction, see, e.g., EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984) (discussing lynching and
other criminal punishments in the nineteenth-century South); E.M. BECK & STEWART E.
TOLNAY, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 1882-
1930 (1995) (discussing race and lynching in the South); PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF
PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA (2002) (same); UNDER
SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHINGS IN THE SOUTH (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997)
(same).
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began an abrupt and drastic decline thereafter. 34 In South Carolina
widespread and organized violence made a mockery of the electoral
process, and after the Democrats' triumph in 1882 the state's
Republicans were reduced to insignificance. 235  The "Readjuster"
movement in Virginia-which sought to join the fortunes of whites
and blacks against the state's elite-dominated Democratic
government-won spectacular electoral victories between 1879 and
1882 but quickly disintegrated in mid-decade under the hammer
blows of a concerted Democratic campaign to divide the Readjusters
along racial lines. 236  In Louisiana during the mid-1880s, large
landowners and other established interests used the same tactic to
defeat efforts of the Knights of Labor to organize agricultural
workers.237 In spite of other occasional and ultimately unsuccessful
attempts to forge interracial coalitions, the overwhelming majority of
white southerners rejected both social and political equality for
blacks.238
Similarly, the 1880s witnessed the growing de facto
disenfranchisement of blacks through intimidation, artifice, and fraud.
In Louisiana and Mississippi during the 1870s, for example, the black
population grew by thirty-three and forty-six percent, respectively,
but from the presidential election of 1872 to the presidential election
of 1880 the Republican vote in the two states declined by forty-seven
and fifty-nine percent.239 In Alabama white Democrats retook power
in 1874 and the very next year adopted a new constitution designed to
reverse Reconstruction by reducing government and its services,
234. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, DEAD END: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH-
CENTURY LITIGATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SCHOOLS 23 (1986).
235. KANTROWITZ, supra note 223, at 107.
236. See generally DAILEY, supra note 192 (discussing the Readjuster movement and
Virginia politics between emancipation and disenfranchisement); DEGLER, supra note
191, at 292-311 (same).
237. Rebecca J. Scott, Fault Lines, Color Lines, and Party Lines: Race, Labor, and
Collective Action in Louisiana and Cuba, 1862-1912, in BEYOND SLAVERY:
EXPLORATIONS OF RACE, LABOR, AND CITIZENSHIP IN POSTEMANCIPATION SOCIETIES
61, 72-82 (Frederick Cooper et al. eds., 2000). The "Knights of Labor" was the leading
national labor organization in the United States in the 1870s and 1880s.
238. DEGLER, supra note 191, at 337, 347, 351, 370 (discussing antiblack attitudes of
white southerners); RABINOWITZ, supra note 219, at 31-60 (discussing southern white
rejection of ideas of racial equality); WILLIAMSON, supra note 213, at 104-07, 111-39
(discussing the rise of "radical racism" after the 1880s); Donald G. Nieman, African
American Communities, Politics, and Justice: Washington County, Texas, 1865-1890, in
LOCAL MATTERS, supra note 220, at 201, 201-24 (discussing race relations in Washington
County, Texas, between 1865 and 1890).
239. Charles W. Calhoun, The Political Culture: Public Life and the Conduct of
Politics, in THE GILDED AGE, supra note 215, at 185, 189.
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lowering taxes, and limiting the political power of blacks.24° A variety
of tactics-from gerrymandering and other "structural" reforms to
violence, coercion, and corruption-firmly entrenched white rule
during the following decade. 2 1 Georgia in the late 1870s introduced a
facially neutral poll tax that reduced voting generally but had a
particularly adverse impact on blacks.2 2 While thirty-nine percent of
eligible Georgia blacks voted in the presidential election in 1880,
eight years later only nineteen percent did SO. 243 During the 1880s
Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Florida adopted a variety of
electoral rules and practices that complicated voting procedures and
gave officials numerous opportunities to disqualify black votes and
voters.244 More broadly, at the beginning of the 1880s Democrats had
still lost elections in most predominantly black counties throughout
the South, and in the black-belt areas of Arkansas, Florida, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Texas they lost by huge majorities,
often by more than two to one. By the end of the decade, however,
the Democrats had not only effectively suppressed black voting in the
black-belt counties, but they had gained such control that they were
able to use the returns from those counties to fraudulently inflate
their own statewide totals.2 45  The laws formally disenfranchising
blacks that the Southern States adopted after 1890 were made
possible by the de facto disenfranchisement of the region's black
voters that had been accomplished during the preceding fifteen
years.246
240. Wayne Flynt, Alabama's Shame: The Historical Origins of the 1901 Constitution,
53 ALA. L. REV. 67, 68-69 (2001). See generally MALCOLM COOK MCMILLAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ALABAMA, 1798-1901: A STUDY IN POLITICS, THE
NEGRO, AND SECTIONALISM (1955) (discussing how politics, African Americans, and
sectionalism have affected Alabama's political conventions and constitutions from 1819 to
1901).
241. See sources cited supra note 240.
242. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE
RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910, at 66-
68 (1974) (discussing South Carolina and Florida's "eight-box law," which essentially
served as de facto literacy tests in elections).
243. Id. at 68 (providing statistics on black voting).
244. KOUSSER, supra note 242, at 50; Leslie H. Fishel, Jr., The African-American
Experience, in THE GILDED AGE, supra note 215, at 137, 142. The first of two periods of
severe racial disenfranchisement in the South occurred between 1888 and 1893.
KOUSSER, supra note 242, at 238.
245. KOUSSER, supra note 234, at 36.
246. EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH: LIFE AFTER
RECONSTRUCTION 283-309 (1992); KOUSSER, supra note 234, at 139; MICHAEL PERMAN,
STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888-1908, at 5-6, 38,
324 (2001); RABINOWITZ, supra note 219, at 305-28.
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The 1880s also witnessed the increasingly formalized racial
segregation of the South. Though there were substantial differences
by time, place, and activity, the overall trend in the decade was clear.
In education, a majority of southern and border states had adopted
some form of legalized racial segregation in their schools by the late
1870s, and during the 1880s such legislation became even more
widespread and rigid.247 In railroad transportation, by the mid-1880s
blacks were commonly forced to travel in less desirable railroad cars
in every southern state but two, Louisiana and Arkansas.248 In 1881
Tennessee adopted the first Jim Crow law for railroad cars, and the
practice began spreading widely throughout the South at the end of
the decade. Between 1887 and 1892 nine states adopted such laws.249
"What the white South did," Leon F. Litwack concluded from his
study of the Jim Crow era, "was to segregate the races by law and
enforced custom in practically every conceivable situation in which
whites and blacks might come into social contact .... 250
As southern racial trends hardened and northern approbation
grew, the Supreme Court of the United States embarked on a
cautious and acquiescent course.2 1' To some extent, it seemed to
247. LITWACK, supra note 219, at 102-05. "The overthrow of the Reconstruction
governments, however, fully restored segregation throughout the southern educational
system." Id. at 103.
248. CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION 15-16 (1987).
249. Id. at 23 (discussing the development of racial segregation in railroad
transportation); MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 233, at 202-03 (discussing Jim Crow laws
in various states); RABINOWITZ, supra note 219, at 182-97 (discussing segregation efforts
by various states in public accommodations during Reconstruction). See generally Barbara
Y. Welke, When All the Women Were White, and All the Blacks Were Men: Gender, Class,
Race, and the Road to Plessy, 1855-1914, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 261 (1995) (discussing the
relationship between race and gender in the development of Jim Crow laws in the
antebellum South).
250. LITWACK, supra note 219, at 233.
251. It may be that in the 1870s the Court was unusually sensitive to shifts in national
mood and especially to changes in the attitude of Congress. During the preceding years,
the Reconstruction Congresses had overtly and directly challenged the authority of both
the President and the Supreme Court. See generally MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE
IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON (1973) (describing the attempt to
impeach Andrew Johnson as a step reluctantly taken by Republicans because Johnson's
activities threatened to overturn congressional Reconstruction legislation), ERIC L.
MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960) (discussing how three
congressional Acts passed by Congress in 1867 "brought executive power to the lowest
point it has ever reached before or since"). Quite likely, the Justices were especially
anxious to avoid further confrontations with the legislative branch. See, e.g., United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141-48 (1872) (cautiously invalidating a congressional
statute that restricted the Court's appellate jurisdiction); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
700, 731 (1869) (declining to inquire into the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts
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anticipate and encourage the trend as much as follow it.25 2 Early on,
in 1871, it gutted a criminal provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
in Blyew v. United States,253 and two years later in the famous
Slaughter-House Cases-which did not involve black parties or
directly raise the issue of race-it did the same to the new Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4 Before the
decade was out the Justices added several more significant decisions
that ruled against the rights and interests of blacks.2 5  Popular
reaction in the North was increasingly positive and approving, and
scattered criticism from congressional Republicans mild, ineffective,
or the paramount authority of Congress), dismissed by Texas v. Hardenberg, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 68, 91 (1869); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-15 (1869) (upholding
power of Congress to make "exceptions" to the Court's jurisdiction). In this regard, it is
worth noting that in 1874 the Republicans lost control of the House of Representatives for
the first time since the Civil War. See supra note 217.
252. The Court, for example, construed the various Reconstruction measures far more
narrowly than did the lower federal courts that addressed them in the early postwar years.
See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at xiii
(1985) (stating that the Supreme Court's decisions after 1873 "took much of the Civil War
victory away from the Union nationalists and transferred it to Southern states' rights
proponents"); Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship,
and Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45, 68 (1987) [hereinafter To
Begin the Nation Anew] (discussing how the Supreme Court "rejected the revolutionary
congressional Republican theory of constitutionalism and read into the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments the theory of states' rights promoted by congressional
Conservative Democrats"). Kaczorowski, who argues that the Republicans intended to
"revolutionize" and nationalize American government with respect to civil rights,
nonetheless accepts the idea that most Americans-and perhaps most Republicans-were
also racists. See Kaczorowski, supra note 88, at 870-71, 877-79. See generally PAMELA
BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 52-55 (1999) (supporting the view that many
Radical Republicans were racist, even though they felt a duty to protect blacks from
racially motivated deprivations of civil rights).
253. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 593 (1872) (holding that the 1866 Civil Rights Bill did not
give the circuit court jurisdiction over a state criminal prosecution for a public offense,
merely because two of the witnesses in the case were black); see Robert D. Goldstein,
Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV. 469 passim (1989)
(discussing Blyew in the context of the Reconstruction Era).
254. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-80 (1873). The case may
well have involved not only Reconstruction politics but racism as well. See HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 116-24 (1991).
255. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878) (invalidating as a burden on interstate
commerce a Louisiana statute prohibiting racial segregation in transportation); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (construing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments and the Enforcement Act of 1870 narrowly to void convictions of whites for
murder of blacks); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (declaring two sections of
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 unconstitutional). The ready availability of legal and
factual grounds for deciding otherwise was obvious from Justice Ward Hunt's solo dissent
in Reese, 92 U.S. at 238-56 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
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and dwindling. As early as 1876 the Richmond, Virginia, Enquirer
gloated over the "return to reason" that it saw in the "improved
temper of the North.
256
Into the early 1880s, the Court did on occasion provide some
highly circumscribed protection for the formal rights of blacks. It
struck down official actions that discriminated expressly on the basis
of race and occasionally provided relief against those who sought to
defeat the right of blacks to vote in federal elections."7 In one of its
most doctrinally significant decisions in this regard, Strauder v. West
Virginia,2 58 the Court invalidated a state statute that excluded blacks
from jury service.2 59 The decision, however, did not foreclose other
slightly less formal but equally effective devices for keeping blacks off
juries, and Southern States quickly learned the lesson. After
Strauder, the states accomplished the racial exclusion they sought by
adopting a variety of informal, off-the-book methods that the Court
regularly let pass.26°
In spite of the few limited exceptions, the Court's major
decisions continued to narrow the reach of the Civil War
amendments, minimize the significance of Reconstruction legislation,
and open wide de facto avenues of avoidance to southern white
supremacists.26" ' In 1882 the Court upheld an Alabama
256. MAGRATH, supra note 218, at 130-31 (quoting the Richmond Enquirer).
257. E.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) (upholding federal convictions of
individuals who sought to prevent blacks from voting in a federal election); Ex parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880) (upholding federal convictions of state election officials for
stuffing ballot boxes in federal election); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (upholding
federal prosecution of a state judge for overtly excluding blacks from juries). See generally
HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 70, at 473-515 (discussing various cases decided during the
1870s and 1880s that implicated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments).
258. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
259. Id. at 310.
260. Schmidt, supra note 89, at 1456-76 (examining jury discrimination cases decided
after Strauder v. West Virginia).
261. E.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318-21 (1880) (denying the right of a black
criminal defendant to remove on the alleged ground that court would, in fact, exclude
blacks from the jury even though formal law did not compel such exclusion).
The Supreme Court decisions on jury service imparted an important lesson to
white southern legislators that they would not soon forget. Rather than bar
blacks directly, they would have to find other means to keep them off juries.
That lesson would subsequently be applied to voting, as legislators searched for
ways to disenfranchise blacks without violating the Fifteenth Amendment. The
same lesson would be used to affirm the constitutionality of racial segregation in
an equally ingenious if devious fashion, as whites eagerly embraced their own
version of the separate-but-equal doctrine.
LITWACK, supra note 219, at 255-56; see also HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 70, at 494-
503 (examining cases where the Court struck down the Reconstruction amendments and
laws).
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antimiscegenation statute on the ground that it punished whites as
harshly as blacks.262  The next year in United States v. Harris263 -
where a group of whites had taken several blacks from state custody
and beat them, killing one in the process-the Court voided the
provision of the Enforcement Act of 1871 that authorized defendants'
indictment.26  In justifying the result, Harris seemed to limit the
Thirteenth Amendment to its barest possible meaning and to deny
Congress the power to legislate thereunder to secure equal protection
of the laws against the commonest and most violent forms of racial
abuse.
What was perhaps the Court's most significant action came in
1883 in the ironically named Civil Rights Cases.2 65 There, the Court
invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the final Reconstruction
measure that the Republicans had been able to enact, and construed
the Fourteenth Amendment to protect only against actions taken by
states or their official agents but not against actions taken by
"private" individuals or groups.266 Several of the Court's earlier
opinions had suggested that limitation,267 and the Civil Rights Cases
imposed it explicitly and gave it a highly restrictive meaning.2 68 The
North reacted favorably to the decision, and the South was ecstatic.
Immediately recognizing the decision's massive importance and
passionate appeal, the operators of the Atlanta Opera House
interrupted a performance to announce it. The audience erupted
with "such a thunder of applause.., as was never before heard within
the walls of the opera house. 2 69 The ruling was a giant neon arrow
262. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
263. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
264. Id. at 644.
265. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
266. Id. at 8-26.
267. The Court had pointed to a "state action" idea in earlier cases. See Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1876).
268. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 8-26. On the elasticity of the "state action"
doctrine, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 556
(1985) (arguing that "limiting the Constitution's protections to state action makes no
sense" because the historical and jurisprudential underpinnings of the "state action"
doctrine are anachronisms); Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, the Public-Private
Distinction, and the Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 329, 377
(1993) (arguing that "private" power is based on "public" laws and hence should be within
the power of the state to regulate, notwithstanding a formal "state action" limitation).
269. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 199 (1973). The
reaction in the North, although somewhat mixed, was generally positive and accepting.
The reaction in the white South was joyous. "As the survey of the press indicated, the
consensus at the time was that the decision was right." 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN,
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888: PART I1, at 588 (1987). For an extensive
compilation of press reports, see id. at 568-85. Blacks immediately recognized the gravity
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flashing in the sky, directing white southerners toward the road to
racial supremacy.2 0
Practically, two other aspects of the Court's decisions may have
been of even greater significance. One was the Court's apparent
willingness to construe the "state action" requirement stringently, to
demand formal and "official" action by a state or its officers, and to
ignore for the most part regular and officially condoned "practices"-
even those that involved state officials-as insufficient to implicate
the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 ' The Court, in other words, opened
the door widely for the lethal alliance of official duplicity and
complicity with "unofficial" oppression and abuse. The other key
element was the exceptional refinement with which the Court
construed and applied the various Reconstruction measures. In spite
of its repeated acknowledgment of the broad purposes of the Civil
War amendments, as well as the obvious intent of the Reconstruction
Congresses, the Court nonetheless found all too frequently-often for
reasons of exceptional legal nicety-that statutes or constitutional
amendments fell short of providing the legal rights or governmental
powers that were necessary to protect blacks in the actual cases that
came before it.272 The delicacy of the Court's reasoning was, at best,
of the decision and its hostility to their rights and interests. BLIGHT, supra note 201, at
309-11 (2001). See generally RICHARDSON, supra note 231, at 122-55 (discussing the
attitudes and actions of African Americans, Northern Republicans and Democrats
between 1870 and 1883).
270. John Hope Franklin, History of Racial Segregation in the United States, 304
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 5-6 (1956) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
decision in the Civil Rights Cases was an important stimulus to the enactment of
segregation statutes across the South).
271. E.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881) (construing the Civil Rights Removal
statute more narrowly than the Fourteenth Amendment, compelling blacks needing relief
from state courts to seek their remedy solely in the United States Supreme Court, and
suggesting that the "state action" requirement could be met only by formal enactments of
state law or, possibly, by overwhelming evidence of state sponsored racial discrimination);
Rives, 100 U.S. at 319-22 (same). For discussions of the flexibility of the "state action"
doctrine, see Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on
Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (1993) (arguing that private power is subject to
constitutional scrutiny because such power is a product of public laws and affects interests
of constitutional significance); Chemerinsky, supra note 268 (arguing that "limiting the
Constitution's protections to state action makes no sense" because the historical and
jurisprudential underpinnings of the "state action" doctrine are anachronisms); and Kay,
supra note 268 (arguing that "private" power is based on "public" laws and hence should
be within the power of the state to regulate, notwithstanding a formal "state action"
limitation).
272. E.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637-40 (1883) (holding
unconstitutional a provision of the 1871 Enforcement Act on the ground that it did not
require an allegation of racial motivation, even though the indictment at issue had alleged
such motivation and the government had proved it at trial); United States v. Cruikshank,
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wholly unsuited to the manifestly remedial purposes of the law and
the massive and outrageous abuses that were occurring throughout
the South. Indeed, Justice Henry Billings Brown, an overt Anglo-
Saxonist with little sympathy for his perceived "racial inferiors,
' 273
expressed qualms about the Court's treatment of black defendants.
"In some criminal cases against negroes, coming up from the
Southern States," he wrote privately, "we have adhered to the
technicalities of the law so strictly that I fear injustice has been done
to the defendant. '274  Reading the Court's artfully crafted opinions,
attorneys sympathetic to the white South could hardly have failed to
pick up salient hints about the potential narrowness of federal law
and the variety of effective approaches to their "race problem"-legal
and otherwise-that the Court's decisions appeared to place beyond
existing federal law.
The practical social coherence of the Court's Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence from 1877 to 1890 was
painfully clear. The Justices steadily narrowed the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment to an ever slimmer concept of "state action,"
while steadily expanding the immunity that the Eleventh Amendment
offered to "states," the only legal entities which the Fourteenth
Amendment restrained. For the rights of black Americans, the
combination was fatal.
92 U.S. 542, 551-59 (1876) (combining statements about the narrow and delegated nature
of federal power with finding of narrow failings in indictments that required reversal of
convictions below); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1876) (finding two
provisions of the Enforcement Act of 1870 unconstitutional because they did not require
allegation that offenses were motivated by race or previous condition of servitude, even
though the indictments themselves did allege such motivation).
One could try to defend the Court by arguing either that it had no realistic choice
and simply made the best of a bad situation or that it was shifting responsibility to
Congress in the hope of finding political support for efforts to enforce the various
Reconstruction measures. The latter hypothesis might have some plausibility for decisions
made in the years prior to 1877. After that date, however, it would seem highly doubtful
that the Justices could have anticipated any serious congressional response to their
decisions of delicacy which, in theory, left national power to deal with racial problems still
available. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 88, at 77-79 (arguing that the Court's
construction of congressional power under the constitutional amendments hardly
subverted Republican intent and actually sustained Congress's power to protect citizens'
fundamental civil and political rights).
273. See infra text accompanying notes 387-97.
274. Henry Billings Brown to Charles A. Kent, Feb. 27, 1903, reprinted in CHARLES A.
KENT, MEMOIR OF HENRY BILLINGS BROWN: LATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 92 (1915).
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2. 1890
The year 1890 has held a special symbolic status in American
history ever since the historian Frederick Jackson Turner called
attention to a statement that appeared in the federal census of that
year. 275  For the first time in the nation's history no discernible
frontier line existed in the United States, the census noted, and
Turner suggested in 1893 that the passing of the frontier meant that
America was entering a new and potentially dangerous age.276 Over
the past century the significance of the 1890 census has faded, but the
belief that the year did mark a time of profound national transition
has not only persisted but sharpened. With respect to the post-
Reconstruction settlement, that sense of transition was particularly
acute.
In Congress in 1890, a group of Republicans tried belatedly-in
what would be the last such effort for well over half a century-to
pass major legislation to aid southern blacks. The election of 1888
had given the Republicans control of the presidency and both houses
of Congress for the first time since 1874, and many of the party's
stalwarts felt they had to carry through on their traditional promises
to the party's black supporters. One bill would have provided federal
funds to combat illiteracy, a proposal that in the early 1880s had
drawn commendations even from some "moderate" white
southerners. The possibility of success quickly faded, however, and in
1890 the bill went down to final defeat when Republican leaders
abandoned it and the Senate reversed its position and rejected the
proposal. 7  The second bill was directly related to black political
rights and consequently was far more controversial. It attracted no
support from the South. Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge of
Massachusetts sponsored a Federal Elections bill, the so-called Lodge
Force Bill, designed to protect black voting rights in the South.278
Directly challenging southern efforts to disenfranchise blacks through
intimidation and terror, the bill provided for the use of federal
officials to supervise congressional elections in the region. Although
275. HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880'S, at 41-54, 293-95 (1950);
PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 93-94 (1988).
276. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1-38
(1920).
277. KELLER, supra note 196, at 480-81; Allen. J. Going, The South and the Blair
Education Bill, 44 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 267,275 (1957).
278. GARRATY, supra note 196, at 243-44; PERMAN, supra note 246, at 38-43.
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it passed the House, splits among the Republicans, a Senate filibuster
by Democrats, and an increasingly hostile public opinion stymied the
bill and then killed it. It was never revived.279
The very attempt to pass the Lodge Force Bill exacerbated white
resentments by confirming the image of blacks as a disaffected mass
of poor laborers who sought to exploit the federal government to gain
special political and economic advantages.280 E. L. Godkin, the liberal
editor of the Nation and the New York Evening Post, spoke for many
northerners in 1889 when he opposed the bill and acknowledged his
strong and growing sympathies with the white South. Godkin asked
his audience to imagine "how it would behave if it suddenly found all
its great interests, both moral and material, placed at the mercy of a
majority composed of half-barbarous laborers acting through the
forms of law. '281 Neither the principles of universal suffrage nor the
command of the legislature, he declared, were sufficient to lead any
northerner to sacrifice "either himself or his property" for such a
destructive purpose.282
In the South itself in 1890, Mississippi held a constitutional
convention whose work resonated throughout the region. Called in
significant part because the state's leading senator, James Z. Gregory,
was worried that the Lodge Force Bill might pass Congress, the
convention approved a new constitution that cut the state's voter rolls
drastically. The new suffrage provisions contained a flexible and
potentially lethal literacy test that required voters to be able to read
and "give a reasonable interpretation" of every provision in the
state's constitution. For good measure, the convention added another
provision that required voters to pay a poll tax for two years before
the election in which they intended to vote. Depriving many poor
whites of the vote, the new constitution essentially eliminated the
black vote altogether. On the state's proffered theory that the new
constitution was based not on race but on the effort to eliminate unfit
and dangerous voters, many northerners expressed their approval.283
In 1890 there were 190,000 blacks registered to vote in the state; two
years later there were 8,000.284 Other southern states quickly
279. See sources cited supra note 277.
280. RICHARDSON, supra note 231, at 201-08.
281. Id. at 204 (quoting E. L. Godkin, editor of the Nation and the New York Evening
Post).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 209-10.
284. ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, BETTER DAY COMING: BLACKS AND EQUALITY 1890-
2000, at 6 (2001); KOUSSER, supra note 242, at 139-45.
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followed Mississippi's lead, and by the early years of the twentieth
century all of them had adopted legal devices that accomplished
similar results.
285
In the Supreme Court in 1890, the Justices announced their
decision in Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v.
Mississippi.28 6 At issue was the constitutionality of a Mississippi racial
segregation statute that required all passenger trains in the state to
provide "equal, but separate, accommodation for the white and
colored races."2 7  The railroad, convicted of violating the statute,
challenged its validity under the federal Commerce Clause. The
Court upheld the measure.288
Louisville, New Orleans was important for two related reasons
beyond the fact that it affirmed the constitutionality of separate-but-
equal facilities. One was that it illustrated the Court's willingness to
compartmentalize its doctrines to avoid acknowledging the
underlying racial realities that forged the post-Reconstruction
settlement. The Court maintained its lofty position and preserved the
purity of its "law" simply by refusing to concede that it was deciding
racial issues.289 Louisville, New Orleans, it blandly pretended, was
simply a Commerce Clause case involving a common carrier.
The other reason why the decision was important was that it
exemplified the arbitrary and result-oriented nature of the Court's
reasoning in race cases. In Louisville, New Orleans the Court
confronted a then-recent precedent that seemed on all fours, Hall v.
DeCuir90 Decided only a dozen years earlier, Hall had invalidated
on Commerce Clause grounds a Louisiana statute-enacted while the
state was under Republican control-that had prohibited racial
discrimination against passengers on common carriers.' Louisville,
New Orleans distinguished Hall on the ground that the statute in the
285. PERMAN, supra note 246, passim; C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE
CAREER OF JIM CROW 82-86 (2d ed. rev. 1966).
286. 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890) (finding a Mississippi statute requiring separate but equal
accommodations constitutional). "In many ways this Mississippi case was more pivotal
than the more widely known Plessy v. Ferguson." JOHN E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE
FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 15
(1978).
287. Louisville, New Orleans, 133 U.S. at 588.
288. Id. at 592.
289. Id. at 589. The tactic was typical of Justice Brewer, who wrote the Court's opinion
in Louisville, New Orleans. See J. Gordon Hylton, The Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v.
Ferguson: Justice David Brewer and the Problem of Race, 61 MiSS. L.J. 315, 332-34, 348,
358 (1991).
290. 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
291. Id. at 490.
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earlier case had applied to interstate passengers while the statute it
addressed was limited only to intrastate passengers.292 In finding the
Mississippi statute so limited, the Court in Louisville, New Orleans
relied on the fact that the state's supreme court had specifically
placed that narrowing construction on the statute. 293  Basing its
decision on that distinction, however, the Court ignored two
considerations. One was that in Hall the Louisiana Supreme Court
had placed an identical "intrastate passengers only" construction on
the state statute, 294 a construction that the United States Supreme
Court had simply disregarded. 295 The second consideration that the
Court ignored was that Hall's reasoning applied snugly and directly to
the nearly identical fact situation in Louisville, New Orleans. Hall
had reasoned that, in spite of the state's attempt to limit the reach of
its statute to intrastate passengers, the provision
must necessarily influence [the carrier's] conduct to some
extent in the management of his business throughout his
entire voyage. His disposition of passengers taken up and
put down within the State, or taken up within to be carried
without, cannot but affect in a greater or less degree those
taken up without and brought within, and sometimes those
taken up and put down without.
296
The Mississippi statute in Louisville, New Orleans had identical
practical consequences for the carrier, and Hall's reasoning meant
that the latter statute should also be unconstitutional. Harlan,
dissenting with Bradley, pointed helplessly to the obvious parallel
between the cases. "It is difficult to understand how a state
enactment, requiring the separation of the white and black races on
interstate carriers of passengers, is a regulation of commerce among
the States," he wrote, "while a similar enactment forbidding such
separation is not a regulation of that character."29 '
There was, in fact, only one ground on which the two cases could
be reasonably and fairly distinguished. They embodied contrasting
292. Louisville, New Orleans, 133 U.S. at 589-90.
293. Id. at 591.
294. Hall, 95 U.S. at 490.
295. Hylton, supra note 289, at 333-34.
296. Hall, 95 U.S. at 489.
297. Louisville, New Orleans, 133 U.S. at 594 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan "was for
commerce clause consistency: the rest of the Court, by 1890, was more interested in
upholding segregation." LOREN P. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION, 1877-1917, at 196 (1971). More than a half century later, the Court
essentially acknowledged that Harlan's analysis was accurate. Morgan v. Virginia, 328
U.S. 373, 384 & n.29, 385 (1946).
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racial policies. Simply put, the Court approved the segregationist
policy in the later statute and disapproved the racially egalitarian
policy in the earlier one. 98
Louisville, New Orleans came down on March 3, 1890, the same
day the Court announced its decision in Hans. On their facts, Hans
and Louisville, New Orleans were unrelated. In terms of the law, they
raised entirely different issues. Ideologically, politically, and
culturally, however, the two decisions were twins. Decided at the
same time by the same Justices, they served the same social values
and the same political purposes. Hans and Louisville, New Orleans
stood shoulder to shoulder lifting into place the legal pillars of the
post-Reconstruction settlement.
The work of the United States Supreme Court is complicated
and uneven, and numerous influences play on the Justices, ranging
from the promptings of preexisting doctrine to the pressures of
immediate crises.299  Variations, tensions, inconsistencies, and
298. It has been suggested that the difference between the two cases lay more in the
Court's changed view of federalism than in its attitude toward racial segregation. Such a
contention seems implausible for several reasons, including the fact that views about
"federalism" were themselves often merely corollaries of attitudes about race and the
further fact that the social attitudes of the Justices regularly seemed to influence the Court
in Commerce Clause cases. See BETH, supra note 297, at 145-52. Compare OWEN M.
Fiss, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 354-56 (1993)
(arguing that Hall and Louisville, New Orleans were essentially indistinguishable).
299. Louisville, New Orleans is a perfect example of the numerous and complex factors
that may affect the judgments of individual Justices. Although Bradley wrote Hans and
played a key role in facilitating the post-Reconstruction settlement, see infra Part IV.C.4,
he nevertheless joined Harlan's dissent in Louisville, New Orleans. It seems likely that he
acted as he did because the issue in the latter case appeared less pressing in terms of the
need to confirm the post-Reconstruction settlement than did the pivotal issues presented
in Hans and the Civil Rights Cases and because the value of allowing states to impose
racial segregation in the context of interstate railroad transportation appeared less
desirable to him than the value of maintaining national uniformity in the area and
eliminating troublesome burdens on interstate commerce. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 99
(1988) (Bradley believed that "regulation should not disturb the free flow of interstate
traffic," and he wanted economic regulation "to be uniform, and preferred federal to state
control where possible."); Jonathan Lurie, Mr. Justice Bradley: A Reassessment, 16 SETON
HALL L. REV. 343, 371 (1986) (stating that in "Bradley's judicial hierarchy of values, an
'untrammeled' interstate commerce ... ranked extremely high"). Although Bradley
accepted broad state regulation of the railroads, he also favored an open national market
and tended to give wide sway to the dormant Commerce Clause. Only two years earlier,
for example, he had joined the Court's opinion in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern
Railway Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888), holding that a state statute which prohibited the
importation of liquor was a regulation of interstate commerce and hence unconstitutional.
The decision was particularly noteworthy because the Court had, only three months
earlier, held that state prohibition laws themselves were valid exercises of the police
power. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see FISS, supra note 298, at 269 n.37, 270-72
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surprises are inevitable. °  In spite of such complexities and
crosscutting pressures, however, historical periods forge distinctive
"Courts" that enforce across doctrinal lines their own characteristic
sets of values and policies. One thinks, for example, of the Marshall
Court in 1819 deciding Dartmouth College v. Woodward °l and
McCulloch v. Maryland;302 the Taney Court in 1842 deciding Prigg v.
Pennsylvania3"3 and Swift v. Tyson;3°4 the early New Deal Court in
1937 deciding West Coast Hotel v. Parrish35 and National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ;306 the Warren Court
in 1964 deciding Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States307 and New
York Times v. Sullivan;3"8 and the Rehnquist Court in 2001 deciding
(suggesting that Bradley gave a broader scope to the dormant Commerce Clause than did
Harlan, who dissented in Bowman). Further, in Louisville, New Orleans Bradley was
likely especially sensitive to the force of precedent. He had joined the Court's opinion in
Hall, and it seems probable that he could not deny the obvious conclusion that Harlan
stated in his dissent: Hall and Louisville, New Orleans were indistinguishable. Leon
Friedman, Joseph P. Bradley, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1181, 1197 (Leon Friedman &
Fred L. Israel eds., 1969) [hereinafter 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT]
(suggesting that Bradley's decision in Louisville, New Orleans was based on his broad view
of the Commerce Clause and his belief that Hall was properly decided and therefore
controlling).
300. In 1944, for example, the Stone Court decided Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
664-66 (1944) (expanding the concept of "state action" and holding an "all-white" primary
election system unconstitutional), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944)
(upholding military order that Japanese-Americans be excluded from designated areas of
the western United States). The first struck a resounding blow against institutionalized
racial discrimination, while the latter validated one of the nation's most extreme instances
of governmental racial oppression. The dramatically contrasting decisions are, of course,
readily understandable only in light of the circumstances that existed when they were
decided.
301. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 650 (1819) (holding that a state-granted charter was a
contract and that the Contract Clause prohibited states from infringing such charters by
subsequent legislation).
302. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423, 436 (1819) (upholding authority of United States to
charter a national bank and prohibiting the states from either excluding the bank or taxing
it).
303. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 608-26 (1842) (holding a state statute unconstitutional,
asserting supremacy of federal law, and expanding area in which federal power was
exclusive).
304. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (upholding power of federal courts to develop a
federal common law of commercial transactions and freeing them from obligation to
follow the common-law decisions of state courts).
305. 300 U.S. 379, 396-400 (1937) (rejecting doctrine of substantive economic due
process and broadening regulatory powers of both the state and federal governments).
306. 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (broadening power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause).
307. 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (upholding power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause to forbid racial discrimination in facilities that affected interstate commerce).
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Alexander v. Sandoval3 °9 and Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett."' The cases in each of those pairs are legally and
factually unrelated. Yet, in a far more meaningful sense-and, as a
matter of historical analysis, in a decisive sense-they are one. So,
too, are Hans and Louisville, New Orleans.
The Court's contemporaneous decisions shaping the scope of
federal diversity jurisdiction confirm that unity. It was also in 1890
that the Court handed down its dubious decisions in Pennsylvania and
Austin, cases that were equally of a piece with Hans and Louisville,
New Orleans. All four curtailed federal judicial power. All four
deferred to the states. While Hans and Louisville, New Orleans
limited the ability of federal courts to intrude into the decisions of
state legislatures, Pennsylvania and Austin limited their ability to
intrude into the work of state courts.
31
Most important, all four cases were coldly instrumentalist
decisions marked by dubious reasoning and unacknowledged social
goals. Pennsylvania and Austin demonstrated that the Court
understood full well that it had the power to shape the scope of
federal jurisdiction and, further, that it was determined to use that
power to serve what it regarded as desirable national policy.
Pennsylvania and Austin suggest, in short, that when the Court
decided Hans and Louisville, New Orleans the same year it not only
understood its power to mold federal law but also acted, as it did in
the other two cases, for a considered reason of substantive social
policy. In Hans and Louisville, New Orleans that reason of
substantive social policy was to accommodate and help finalize the
twin components of the post-Reconstruction settlement, honoring the
special independence of the South and, implicitly, the dispositive
racial bargain that lay at the settlement's core.
308. 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (applying First Amendment to limit state defamation
claim, where claim was brought by a southern official who sought damages against
individuals for publicly criticizing his efforts in defense of racial segregation).
309. 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (narrowing scope of federal civil rights statute and
denying power of federal courts to create private cause of action).
310. 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (applying Eleventh Amendment to limit congressional
power and preclude application of federal civil rights statute to state government).
311. In re Pennsylvania Co., 137 U.S. 451, 457 (1890); N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Austin, 135
U.S. 315,318 (1890).
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C. The Driving Power of Race and Racism
1. The Intensification of Racism in the Late Nineteenth Century
Racist ideas and attitudes were rooted deeply in the origins and
spread of American slavery, and during the antebellum years they
increasingly fueled American politics." 2 Three-quarters of a century
ago the well-known, racist historian of the South, Ulrich Bonnell
Phillips, identified "the central theme of Southern history" as the
conviction that the South "shall be and remain a white man's
country." '313 If that mandate was not a "central theme" of the nation's
other sections, it was often a powerful subtheme.
314
Before the Civil War not only Democrats, but Whigs, Free-
Soilers, and Republicans shared the racist ideas that dominated
312. See generally DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN
ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS 1O SLAVERY
(completed and edited by Ward M. McAfee, 2001) (arguing that the Constitution did not
consider slavery a national institution, but the federal government adopted that position);
GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON
AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914 (1971) (discussing the
intellectual development of racist theory and ideology in the United States); WINTHROP
D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RACISM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1974) (tracing the historical roots of racism in America); WINTHROP D.
JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1580-
1812 (1968) (offering an in-depth discussion of the attitudes of white men toward Negroes
in the early development of America).
313. Ulrich B. Phillips, The Central Theme of Southern History, 34 AM. HIST. REV. 30,
31 (1928). On Phillips, see GUTMAN, supra note 231, at 542; WILLIAMSON, supra note
213, at 317-22. On the idea of the South, the mythology of its "Lost Cause," and the
central role of race, see BLIGHT, supra note 201, passim; THE MYTH OF THE LOST CAUSE
AND CIVIL WAR HISTORY, supra note 232, passim; WHERE THESE MEMORIES GROW:
HISTORY, MEMORY, AND SOUTHERN IDENTITY 88-218 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed.,
2000). White racial supremacy, David W. Blight concludes, was "the cause that was not
lost." BLIGHT, supra note 201, at 258.
314. African slavery had persisted in the North well into the nineteenth century. As
late as 1810 there were 27,000 slaves living in the so-called "free" states. IRA BERLIN,
MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH
AMERICA 228 (1998). Throughout the pre-Civil War years, moreover, free blacks in the
North lived under severely restricted and discriminatory conditions. See, e.g., GRAHAM
RUSSELL HODGES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM IN THE RURAL NORTH: AFRICAN
AMERICANS IN MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW JERSEY, 1665-1865, at 157-66 (1997)
(describing the growth of free black communities and the challenges they faced); JOANNE
POPE MELISH, DISOWNING SLAVERY: GRADUAL EMANCIPATION AND "RACE" IN NEW
ENGLAND, 1780-1860, at 119-62 (1998) (discussing the political and social implications of
the emergence of a class of free blacks in New England); GARY B. NASH & JEAN R.
SODERLUND, FREEDOM BY DEGREES: EMANCIPATION IN PENNSYLVANIA AND ITS
AFTERMATH 167-93 (1991) (discussing the hardships faced by newly freed blacks in
Pennsylvania).
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southern values,315 and those groups often gave voice to their feelings
of racial hierarchy and hatred. Although committed to barring
slavery from the western territories, the Free-Soil Party was devoted
not to racial equality but to maintaining the purity of the West as a
"white man's territory." '316 The situation in the East was similar. "So
deep ran the current of racism fostered by the Democratic Party [in
New York] that the new Republican Party chose to address the issue
of land reform, rather than slavery, to gain national standing,"
Anthony Gronowicz concluded. 317 New York Republicans criticized
slavery, but they were not pro-black. "To the contrary, most
Republicans were racists who did not believe in social equality of the
races."318 Northerners resented the "Slave Power" because the
combination of slavery and the Constitution's "three-fifths" clause
gave the Southern States and their dominant planter class
disproportionate power in national politics, not because they
supported black freedom and equality. 19 Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney seemed to speak for the great majority of white Americans
when he declared in Dred Scott that blacks were "beings of an inferior
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race. ' 320 Even
Lincoln himself-granted the remarkable nature of his character and
the fact that his thinking about race was in many ways ahead of his
times-shared widespread ideas about white racial superiority, the
315. See, e.g., DEGLER, supra note 191, at 337, 347, 351, 370 (noting that the South was
not monolithic and gave rise to a variety of dissenters, but almost all of the dissenters
rejected ideas of racial equality).
316. EUGENE H. BERWANGER, THE FRONTIER AGAINST SLAVERY: WESTERN
ANTI-NEGRO PREJUDICE AND THE SLAVERY EXTENSION CONTROVERSY 125 (1967)
(asserting that some members of the Free-Soil Party opposed slavery "more out of
,repugnance to the presence of the Negro' than to the moral revulsion of slavery"). See
generally PHYLLIS F. FIELD, THE POLITICS OF RACE IN NEW YORK: THE STRUGGLE
FOR BLACK SUFFRAGE IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 83-85 (1982) (noting the Free-Soilers'
disassociation with racial equality); JAMES A. RAWLEY, RACE & POLITICS: 'BLEEDING
KANSAS' AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (1969) (discussing racial attitudes of
antislavery whites before the Civil War); Richard H. Brown, The Missouri Crisis, Slavery,
and the Politics of Jacksonianism, 61 S. ATL. Q. 55 (1966) (same); Eric Foner, Racial
Attitudes of the New York Free Soilers, 46 N.Y. HIST. 311 (1965) (discussing the conflicting
racial views of the Free-Soil Party in New York State); Ronald P. Formisano, The Edge of
Caste: Colored Suffrage in Michigan, 1827-1861, 56 MICH. HIST. 19, 35 (1972) (noting the
racist attitudes of the Free-Soilers).
317. ANTHONY GRONOWICZ, RACE AND CLASS POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 132 (1998).
318. Id.
319. LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE NORTH AND
SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780-1860, at 32-46 (2000).
320. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (Taney, C.J.) (noting
that at the time of the Declaration of Independence, this was the prevailing sentiment
regarding blacks).
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propriety of black political and social subordination, and the
desirability of sending blacks back "to Liberia-to their own native
land.
32'
Racist ideas and attitudes remained strong after the Civil War,
fueled much of the opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment,32  and
then began to intensify in the anti-Reconstruction reaction that
spread in the 1870s. By 1880, the Nation was ready to defend the
exclusion of blacks from southern juries because of "the difficulty
which exists in many parts of the South of finding negroes mentally
and morally qualified to sit on juries. 323  The Chief Justice of
Delaware agreed, announcing in open court the same year that "the
great body of black men residing in this State are utterly unqualified
by want of intelligence, experience, or moral integrity to sit on
juries.
' 324
In the late nineteenth century racist ideas and attitudes became
increasingly common, acceptable, and hard-edged, and these attitudes
suffused all levels of American society.325  Racial discrimination in
employment became common, with whites steered into better jobs
and blacks-when they were hired-used for the most undesirable
and lowest paying work.326 An outpouring of books and articles,
often purporting to be thoroughly "scientific," flooded the country
and reached all social classes and subgroups.3 27  The "new"
321. Eric Foner, The Education of Abraham Lincoln, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Feb. 10,
2002, at 11. By the end of the war, Lincoln had modified some of his earlier views. Id. at
12.
322. NELSON, supra note 88, at 96-104. See generally RICHARD PAUL FUKE,
IMPERFECT EoUALITY: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE CONFINES OF WHITE RACIAL
ATTITUDES IN POST-EMANCIPATION MARYLAND (1999) (discussing the political and
economic opportunities available to newly freed slaves in Maryland); LEON F. LITWACK,
BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY (1979) (discussing the
struggles faced by newly freed slaves).
323. Schmidt, supra note 89, at 1446 n.221 (quoting the Nation).
324. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 393-94 (1881) (quoting the Chief Justice of
Delaware).
325. THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 253-86
(2d prtg. 1964); STOW PERSONS, AMERICAN MINDS: A HISTORY OF IDEAS 276-97
(1958).
326. See, e.g., VENUS GREEN, RACE ON THE LINE: GENDER, LABOR, AND
TECHNOLOGY IN THE BELL SYSTEM, 1880-1980, at 227-57 (2001) (describing the hiring
practices of the Bell System, which channeled black women into segregated positions);
WALTER LICHT, WORKING FOR THE RAILROAD: THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 223-25 (1983) (describing the almost total absence of blacks
hired by railroads in the post-Civil War era); RICHARDSON, supra note 231, passim
(describing the complex relationship between race and labor).
327. See generally NICHOLAS WRIGHT GILLHAM, A LIFE OF SIR FRANCIS GALTON:
FROM AFRICAN EXPLORATION TO THE BIRTH OF EUGENICS (2001) (tracing the life of
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immigration from southern and eastern Europe and Asian
immigration on the West Coast nourished nativist and antiforeign
sentiments that compounded the force of antiblack attitudes and
helped spread the gospel of race and the cult of Anglo-Saxon racial
superiority.3 28 Gradually, northerners who had supported the Civil
War and sympathized with the cause of antislavery changed their
views. "It was quite common in the 'eighties and 'nineties,' " C. Vann
Woodward reported, "to find in the Nation, Harper's Weekly, the
North American Review, or the Atlantic Monthly Northern liberals
and former abolitionists mouthing the shibboleths of white supremacy
regarding the Negro's innate inferiority, shiftlessness, and hopeless
unfitness for full participation in the white man's civilization. 3 29 Eric
Foner identified the dynamic of intensifying racism that marked the
post-Reconstruction years. "If racism contributed to the undoing of
Reconstruction," he explained, "by the same token Reconstruction's
demise and the emergence of blacks as a disenfranchised class of
dependent laborers greatly facilitated racism's further spread . ... "I"
Throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
southerners conducted a purposeful and persistent campaign to
convince the North that Reconstruction had been a time of outrage,
that blacks were intrinsically inferior and a menace to white
civilization, and that the South as well as the nation had to control
blacks stringently as a matter of basic self-defense.33" ' In the 1880s, for
Francis Galton and his development of the idea of eugenics); GOSSETT, supra note 325
(describing the history of racial thinking in America).
328. See, e.g., JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925, at 35-105 (2d ed. 1988) (describing changing American attitudes
toward race and ethnicity in the 1880s and 1890s); MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON,
WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE (1998) (discussing the importance of the idea of "whiteness" and its cultural
significance in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century America); Lucy E. SALYER,
LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN
IMMIGRATION LAW 122-35 (1995) (discussing the rise of nativism among middle-class
white Americans in the early twentieth century); Paul A. Kramer, Empires, Exceptions,
and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule Between the British and United States Empires, 1880-
1910, 88 J. AM. HIST. 1315 passim (2002) (discussing the use of ideas about Anglo-Saxon
racial superiority to support expansive American foreign policy in the 1890s); Edward
Shapiro, Anti-Semitism Mississippi Style, in ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY 129,
137-41 (David A. Gerber ed., 1986) (describing racist and anti-Semitic attitudes of two
Mississippi politicians in the early- to mid-twentieth century).
329. WOODWARD, supra note 285, at 70. On the racism of the North and the region's
acquiescence in southern racial lynching practices, see DRAY, supra note 233, at 258-72
(discussing Congress's failure to pass a federal anti-lynching law).
330. FONER, supra note 71, at 604.
331. There were "dissenting" southerners who showed sympathy for blacks or sought
to create black-white political alliances. The former were relatively few, scattered, and
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example, Henry W. Grady, the editor of the Atlanta Constitution and
a leading spokesman for the "New South," toured the country,
lecturing on the need to ensure the "supremacy of the white race of
the South" while restoring and modernizing the southern economy.
332
"When you plant your capital in millions," he urged the Boston
Merchants' Association in 1889, "send your sons that they may help
know how true are our hearts and may help to swell the Anglo-Saxon
current until it can carry without danger this black infusion. '333  By
the century's last decade most northerners had embraced, or at least
acquiesced in, the southern message, and in the name of national
reconciliation and racial unity they had accepted the South's efforts to
disenfranchise blacks and establish a segregated social order.334
Racist convictions marked many of the most thoughtful and
cultured individuals in the nation. Henry James, William James, Jack
London, Charles Sanders Peirce, Owen Wister, Henry Adams,
Woodrow Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt, William Graham Sumner,
and Grover Cleveland-the president whom Richard Hofstadter
called "the flower of American political culture in the Gilded
Age"335-were but a few of the prominent and distinguished
individuals who in varying ways harbored or proclaimed racist
ineffective, and they seldom challenged the fundamental premises of white racial
superiority and political supremacy. The latter-such as the Virginia Readjusters in the
early 1880s and Populists in the 1890s--enjoyed a few victories and raised the possibility of
substantial change. Their successes, however, were limited to a mere handful of states and
proved to be fleeting. Their ultimate failure was in significant part the result of race-
baiting by their Democratic opponents. See DEGLER, supra note 191, at 264-37t. Few of
these southern dissenters, moreover, believed in racial equality or urged major changes in
the customs and practices of southern race relations. "The Populists, in short, were no
more ideologically committed to equality for blacks-even political equality-than most
other Southern white men." Id. at 337.
332. GOSSETT, supra note 325, at 264-65 (quoting Henry W. Grady, editor of the
Atlanta Constitution).
333. Id. at 265 (quoting Henry W. Grady). Despite his "New South" rhetoric, Grady
was uncompromising on the subject of race. As he declared in a speech in Dallas, Texas in
1887:
The supremacy of the white race of the South must be maintained forever, and
the domination of the negro race resisted at all points and at all hazards-because
the white race is the superior race. This is the declaration of no new truth. It has
abided forever in the marrow of our bones, and shall run forever with that blood
that feeds Anglo-Saxon hearts.
Id. at 264 (quoting Henry W. Grady).
334. FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 284, at 7-17; GOSSETT, supra note 325, at 253-86;
KOUSSER, supra note 234, at 9; MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 233, at 192-93;
WILLIAMSON, supra note 213, at 327-40; WOODWARD, supra note 285, at 67-109.
335. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 182 (1948).
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attitudes. 33 6 Northerners " 'no longer denounce the suppression of
the Negro vote in the South as it used to be denounced in the
reconstruction days,' " proclaimed a New York Times editorial in
1900.117  " 'The necessity of it under the supreme law of self-
preservation is candidly recognized.' 338
2. Racism and Its Influence on the Legal Profession and the Judiciary
Common throughout American society and its upper reaches,
racist attitudes suffused the legal profession as well. 339 The author of
one of the most extreme and influential statements of the southern
racist ideology was a graduate of the Harvard Law School and a
member of the Baltimore bar. In 1889, Philip A. Bruce wrote The
Plantation Negro As Freedman, a book with a simple and blunt
message. Blacks were childlike, driven by "licentious" instincts, and
incapable of taking care of themselves or their families.34°
Emancipation had caused a steep, escalating, and dangerous
deterioration in all aspects of their lives, a result that was "gloomy
and repelling in its moral aspects. ' 341' Absent the discipline of slavery,
their conditions could only continue to worsen, and they would end
up living in "anarchy and barbarism. '34 2 The only remedy, Bruce
maintained, was immediate disenfranchisement and, if at all possible,
massive deportations.
343
336. GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 14-80 (2001); GOSSE'r, supra note 325, at 153-54, 204-08, 280-86,
304-05; GUTMAN, supra note 231, at 538; Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB
144-45, 161 (2001).
337. GOSSETT, supra note 325, at 285 (quoting a New York Times editorial).
338. Id.
339. Such attitudes were particularly prevalent in the late nineteenth century and
continued well into the twentieth. See, e.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA ch. 4 (1976) (discussing attempts
to "cleanse" the bar following World War I); KERMIT HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 216-18 (1989) (discussing the struggles of blacks and women
attempting to practice law in the nineteenth century); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR.,
SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS 127-51 (1996) (discussing racism in the criminal justice system); ROBERT
STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE
1980S, at 92-111 (1983) (discussing law schools' efforts to standardize and professionalize
the practice of law).
340. The material in this paragraph is drawn from GUTMAN, supra note 231, at 534-38.
Bruce was the scion of a wealthy slave-owning family from Virginia who, in 1887, left the
practice of law for a career in business.
341. Id. at 535.
342. Id. at 537.
343. Id. at 537-38.
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For their part, the law schools guarded the professional gates
with vigilance. Most remained entirely white, and the few that began
admitting blacks after the Civil War accepted no more than a
handful.3" Even during Reconstruction only one publicly supported
law school in the entire South, the University of South Carolina,
admitted black students, and when Reconstruction ended it quickly
reverted to a policy of racial exclusion. 345 Although a dozen black law
schools were founded between 1870 and 1896, most failed within a
decade or two.3 46 Howard, for example, founded in 1868 and destined
to become a preeminent national black law school, struggled
desperately through the late nineteenth century. In 1887, Howard
enrolled only eight black students, and during the depression of the
1890s it teetered on the brink of bankruptcy.347 No "white" law
school hired a black professor until well into the twentieth century.348
Similarly, the practicing bar remained almost uniformly white.
In many areas black lawyers were virtually nonexistent. Where black
lawyers did exist, they occupied the profession's periphery, relegated
to serving a small black clientele and entertaining little hope of
professional recognition. As late as 1890 there were only thirty-eight
black lawyers in Virginia, approximately two percent of the state's
total.349 Texas hosted a bare dozen, scattered for the most part among
the state's small towns and rural areas.5 0 South Carolina admitted
approximately sixty black lawyers to the state bar between 1868 and
1890, but for a variety of practical reasons the great majority did not
continue, or often even begin, to practice law.35' Those who did faced
particularly difficult conditions. Well into the twentieth century black
lawyers "were consistently frustrated by impoverished clients, local
344. J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER,
1844-1944, at 33-40, 64 (1993).
345. Id. at 35-36.
346. See id. at 41, 56-58 (detailing the early struggles of black law schools throughout
the country).
347. STEVENS, supra note 339, at 81.
348. SMITH, supra note 344, at 41 (recounting Clarence Maloney's review year at
Buffalo School of Law in 1925 as the first time a "white" law school hired a black
professor).
349. W. Hamilton Bryson & E. Lee Shepard, The Virginia Bar, 1870-1900, in THE
NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 171, 173 (Gerard W.
Gawalt ed., 1984) [hereinafter THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS].
350. Maxwell Bloomfield, From Deference to Confrontation: The Early Black Lawyers
of Galveston, Texas, 1895-1920, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 349, at 151,152.
351. John Oldfield, The African American Bar in South Carolina, 1877-1915, in AT
FREEDOM'S DOOR: AFRICAN AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS AND LAWYERS IN
RECONSTRUCTION SOUTH CAROLINA 116, 126 (James Lowell Underwood & W. Lewis
Burke, Jr., eds., 2000).
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prejudice, and, except for the fortunate few, lack of business. 3 52 The
situation was hardly better in the North. In Massachusetts there were
no more than a handful of black lawyers, and they were scarcely
visible to the profession or public at large.35 3  The 1890 census
identified more than eighty-nine thousand "white" attorneys in the
United States but only 431 "negroes."354 Blacks thus constituted less
than one-half of one percent of the nation's bar.355 The American Bar
Association, founded in 1878 as the voice of the profession's elite,
simply excluded blacks from membership.
356
With the rarest and most minor of exceptions, the bench was also
exclusively white. While the first black judge ever to sit on a state
supreme court was elected during Republican Reconstruction in
South Carolina in 1870, he was easily defeated for reelection with the
return of white rule six years later.357 In Washington, D.C., it was not
until 1909 that a black was appointed to a judicial post higher than
justice of the peace, and then only to the position of municipal
judge.358 In the federal judiciary the pattern was absolute. There was
not, and had never been, a single black judge in the courts of the
United States. In fact, no African American would be named to the
federal bench until the 1930s, and none would sit as a life-tenured
Article III judge until 1950.
311
In such a context, it was not surprising that both state and federal
judiciaries reflected the nation's racist attitudes or that they put their
racial thinking on public display. In spite of substantial efforts during
the 1860s and 1870s to protect the educational rights of blacks, for
example, the courts gradually succumbed to racist and segregationist
352. Id; see also LITWACK, supra note 219, at 249-52 (describing the myriad of
obstacles facing the black lawyer during Reconstruction); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The
Action Was Outside the Courts: Consumer Injuries and the Uses of Contract in the United
States, 1875-1945, in PRIVATE LAW AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE:
COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED
STATES 505, 522-23 (Willibald Steinmetz ed., 2000) (explaining the violence and injustice
responsible for limiting blacks' ability to pursue tort claims).
353. Gerard W. Gawalt, The Impact of Industrialization on the Legal Profession in
Massachusetts, 1870-1900, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 349, at 97, 103-05.
354. The number of lawyers is drawn from the "Appendix" in Oldfield, supra note 351,
at 126-29.
355. SMITH, supra note 344, at 623.
356. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW
MAKERS 255 (1950) (identifying the administrative practice of the ABA to exclude
blacks).
357. SMITH, supra note 344, at 216-17.
358. Id. at 137-38.
359. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION
FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 101,183 (1997).
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pressures. A study of school desegregation cases in Louisiana and
Kansas found that in the 1880s the courts had grown increasingly
hostile to black claims.36° Ultimately "in both states," J. Morgan
Kousser concluded, "blacks lost out because a new set of racist judges
took office and emasculated constitutional guarantees.""36 In 1890 a
federal judge in Georgia upheld the constitutionality of a law
forbidding interracial marriages on the simple ground that the law
preserved "the home life of the people, their decency and their
morality," which was the foundation of the nation's "vast social
structure of liberty. 362 The same year the Missouri Supreme Court
relied on intrinsic racial differences in upholding educational
segregation. "There are differences in races, and between individuals
of the same race, not created by human laws, some of which can never
be eradicated," it explained. 63 "These differences create different
social relations recognized by all well-organized governments.
361
Similarly, during the quarter century before Hans, both state and
federal courts had come to accept a "separate-but-equal" doctrine in
transportation law. Repeatedly, these courts relied on an 1867
Pennsylvania case, West Chester & Philadelphia Railroad Co. v.
Miles.365 There, in extensively cited and frequently quoted language,
the judge had upheld racial segregation on the ground of inherent
racial differences, the instinctive "aversion" and "repulsion" that
whites felt for blacks, and a divinely implanted instinct for racial
separation.3 66 "By 1890," Charles A. Lofgren concluded, "state and
federal courts had extensively cited, quoted, and paraphrased Miles in
the course of implanting the separate-but-equal doctrine into the
common law of carriers of passengers. "367
360. See J. Morgan Kousser, Before Plessy, Before Brown: The Development of the
Law of Racial Integration in Louisiana and Kansas, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST:
LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 213, 239 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E.
Gottlieb eds., 1991).
361. Id.
362. KELLER, supra note 196, at 451 (quoting a federal judge in Georgia). For a
thorough discussion of how a typical southern state treated miscegenation, see Julie
Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in Alabama, 1890-
1934, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 225 (2002).
363. Lehew v. Brummell, 15 S.W. 765 (1891), quoted in NELSON, supra note 88, at 185-
86.
364. Id.
365. 93 Am. Dec. 744 (1867).
366. See LOFGREN, supra note 248, at 118-21 (discussing the importance of West
Chester in establishing the "reasonableness" of racial segregation).
367. Id. at 121.
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Justices who served on the Supreme Court of the United States
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, both before and
after Hans, embraced those views. Chief Justice Waite's experience
in South Carolina was informed by his relatively mild but
nevertheless deep belief in the racial inferiority of blacks.368 Joseph
McKenna from California, appointed in 1897, shared the common
Western hostility to the Chinese. As a politician and legislator on
both state and national levels, McKenna consistently and
enthusiastically advocated various types of anti-Chinese legislation,
and as a federal judge in California he construed the law rigorously to
enforce the exclusion of Chinese, including even those who presented
evidence of American citizenship.36 9 Once on the Court he had no
qualms in citing and following Plessy.37 ° Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
an abolitionist sympathizer from Massachusetts and thrice-wounded
Union officer, had quickly lost sympathy for the racial cause of his
youth. The experience of battle, he declared, taught him the folly of
abolitionism and its moralistic activism.3 7' Readily accepting the post-
Reconstruction settlement and the ideal of white reconciliation,
Holmes declared in 1884 that his wartime experiences had given him
an intense feeling of "the same brotherhood for the enemy that the
north pole of a magnet has for the south. 3 72  Some of his later
opinions on the Court, one of his biographers concluded, can be
explained only on the basis of "notions of white supremacy." '373
368. See MAGRATH, supra note 218, at 153-54 (discussing Justice Waite's conformity
with the typical nineteenth-century white person's view of the black race).
369. MATHEW McDEvITF, JOSEPH MCKENNA: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES 56, 64, 66, 84, 98 (1974).
370. See, e.g., Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co., 218 U.S. 71, 77 (1910)
(McKenna, J.) (relying on and quoting Plessy).
371. 2 HOLMES-LASKI LEITERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916-1935, at 942 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
372. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., An Address Delivered May 30, 1884, at Keene, N.H.,
Before John Sedgwick Post No. 4, Grand Army of the Republic, in THE OCCASIONAL
SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 4, 5 (compiled by Mark DeWolfe
Howe 1962).
373. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE
INNER SELF 340 (1993); see United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (19t4) (Holmes,
J., concurring) (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment, on its face, allows peonage);
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (declining to
recognize disparate racial impact as a factor in the decision); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475
(1903) (Holmes, J.) (refusing to grant equitable relief to black citizens demanding to be
placed on voting lists). See generally SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE
LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 257-59, 458 n.15 (1989) (suggesting influence of
racist ideas in Holmes's opinion in Giles); WHITE, supra, at 333-43 (arguing that Holmes's
opinions suggest influence of racist ideas); Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a
Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833,
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Justice Nathan Clifford, a Maine Democrat who joined the Court
in 1858 and remained until 1881, was identified with the pro-southern
wing of his party before and after his appointment to the Court.34 He
opposed antislavery efforts, fought abolition in the District of
Columbia, and attacked "incendiary schemes" to abrogate the three-
fifths clause and base representation on free persons only.375 In Hall
v. DeCuir,37 6 in 1878, where a unanimous Court invalidated a state
Reconstruction statute that prohibited racial segregation on common
carriers, Clifford was not satisfied. He wrote a separate concurrence
to emphasize the law's unreasonable and outrageous nature and to
emphasize the utter irrelevance of the Fourteenth Amendment to
racial segregation in transportation. 371 Providing separate facilities,
he declared, was essential "to prevent contacts and collisions arising
from natural or well-known customary repugnancies which are likely
to breed disturbances, where white and colored persons are huddled
together without their consent. '37 1 Clifford equated the commands of
the law with his personal feelings. The "laws of the United States,"
he wrote, "do not require the master of a steamer to put persons in
the same apartment who would be repulsive or disagreeable to each
other.
379
Chief Justice Edward D. White of Louisiana, named to the Court
in 1894 and then raised to the center chair in 1910, exemplified the
social realities that helped shape the Court's thinking. During the
Civil War White served in the Confederate army, and after the war he
worked assiduously to overthrow Republican Reconstruction and
844-48 (1986) (arguing Justice Holmes believed science should be used to produce a
better race).
374. See William Gillette, Nathan Clifford, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT, supra note 299, at 963, 964, 967-68, 970.
375. See Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 627, 665-
66 (1994) (describing Justice Clifford's politics, career and reputation).
376. 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
377. Id. at 504-06 (Clifford, J., concurring).
378. Id. at 503 (Clifford, J., concurring). In Hall, one scholar wrote, Clifford
"attempted to establish his prewar racist biases as part of the Constitution." KOUSSER,
supra note 234, at 11.
379. Hall, 95 U.S. at 504 (Clifford, J., concurring). Clifford often wrote separate
opinions to elaborate particularly restrictive constitutional doctrine and, in effect, to
defend southern racial policies. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 272 (1880)
(Clifford, J., dissenting) (arguing that the decision should remain a state court matter out
of the reach of federal courts); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 222 (1876) (Clifford, J.,
dissenting) (defending voter requirements as legitimate under the Fifteenth Amendment
despite disparate racial impact).
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return white rule to the South.38° When D. W. Griffith made his
egregiously racist movie Birth of a Nation in 1915, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP")
mounted a campaign against it.381 Thomas W. Dixon, a well-known
and highly influential racist ideologue who had written The
Clansman, the book on which the film was based,382 sought to counter
the campaign by persuading President Woodrow Wilson and Chief
Justice White to see, and hopefully approve, the film. Wilson quickly
agreed, watched it in the White House, and immediately expressed
his admiration. When Dixon met with White, the Chief Justice grew
excited as soon as Dixon described the film's subject. "I was a
member of the Klan, sir," White blurted out.383 Immediately, the
Chief Justice began to recount how on "many a dark night, I walked
my sentinel's beat through the ugliest streets of New Orleans with a
rifle on my shoulder." '384 Then, White asked Dixon one dispositive
question: "You've told the true story of that uprising of outraged
manhood?""3 5 When Dixon assured him that he had, White agreed to
attend a showing. Subsequently, whenever the NAACP mounted an
effort to ban the movie, Dixon showed up with a statement that the
President and the Chief Justice had both seen and praised the movie.
Neither the White House nor the Supreme Court ever denied his
claim.386
The racism of Justice Henry Billings Brown, a Michigan
Republican who supported Lincoln in 1860 and arrived on the Court
the year after Hans, was even more overt.387 In spite of his northern
background, Brown was deeply sympathetic toward the South and its
"race problem." In 1906-when racial lynchings in the South were
frequent, brutal, and utterly notorious-he criticized the nation's
criminal laws as, in the words of one report, "deplorably feeble and
inefficient" and then, in effect, defended lynching because it showed
380. James F. Watts, Jr., Edward Douglas White, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT, 11789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, at 1633,1636
(Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
381. ERIC F. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 228 (1963).
382. WILLIAMSON, supra note 213, at 140; Raymond A. Cook, The Man Behind 'The
Birth of a Nation,' 39 N.C. HIST. REV. 519 passim (1962).
383. The story of Dixon and White is reported in GOLDMAN, supra note 381, at 228-
29. Goldman found an account of the meeting in a private manuscript Dixon had written
that was in the possession of Dixon's family. Id. at 229 n.8.
384. Id. at 228.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 229.
387. Robert J. Glennon, Jr., Justice Henry Billings Brown: Values in Tension, 44 U.
COLO. L. REV. 553, 555 (1973).
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"a determination on the part of the people to see that criminals were
punished. '38 His argument, sentiment, and rhetoric were those of the
turn-of-the-century white South at its most callous and racist.389
Brown was, in fact, an ardent Anglo-Saxonist who believed
unquestioningly in the innate superiority of the "Caucasian race." He
frequently disparaged blacks, Jews, laborers, and "aliens" of all
varieties, and he readily invoked the maxim that "Blood will tell."390
In one of his Supreme Court opinions, he announced the right of "the
American Empire" to impose "Anglo-Saxon principles" on "alien
races."39I Not surprisingly, Chief Justice Fuller selected him to write
for the Court in Plessy, and Brown did not disappoint. "Legislation is
powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based
upon physical differences," he declared for the Court, "and the
attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the
present situation." '392 The superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race
dictated the only possible result. "If one race be inferior to the other
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon
the same plane. '393  Brown rejected the "underlying fallacy" of
plaintiff's constitutional challenge-the assumption that a statute
mandating racial segregation stigmatized blacks with "a badge of
inferiority"-on the ground that any sense of inferiority would follow
only if "the colored race chooses to put that construction" on the
act.394 At that point, his own racial arrogance and racial identification
leaped to the surface of the Court's opinion. Were the situation to be
reversed and the "colored race" to become the "dominant" power in
388. Justice Brown's Response, in Retirement of Mr. Justice Henry B. Brown from the
Supreme Court of the United States, 40 AM. L. REv. 548, 551 (1906). The report does not
purport to contain a verbatim account of Brown's remarks.
389. "To white Southerners, lynching was a necessary means of law enforcement aimed
at a specific threat from a brutalized race." FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 284, at 25. See
generally id. at 23-28 (cataloguing the reason for the rise of lynchings between 1880 and
1910).
390. Glennon, supra note 387, at 600-02 (quoting Justice Henry Billings Brown). See
the apparently anti-Semitic reference in Henry Billings Brown to Charles A. Kent, Jan. 1,
1912, reprinted in KENT, supra note 274, at 113.
391. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 261, 287 (1901) (Brown, J.). Although Brown's
opinion was formally for the Court, his bald statements led the other Justices to write
separately. Id. at 244.
392. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
393. Id.; see Joel Goldfarb, Henry Billings Brown, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT, supra note 299, at 1553, 1561 (discussing Justice Brown's critical role in
the Plessy decision).
394. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
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the legislature, Brown announced smugly, "[w]e imagine that the
white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption. '395
Privately, Brown was even blunter. "I know nothing more
ineradicable than racial antipathy," he wrote, "except, perhaps,
national antipathy. ' 396  Subsequently, he opposed the establishment
of self-government in the District of Columbia for the bluntest of
reasons. "No suffrage without nigger-no suffrage, no nigger.
397
3. Racism and the Hans Court
The Justices who decided Hans were identical to their immediate
predecessors and successors in two critical ways. They were white,
and they shared the nation's dominant racial attitudes. 398  They
shaped the law accordingly.399
Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller, appointed in 1888, was a
Democrat from Illinois who had supported Stephen A. Douglas in his
famous 1858 Senate campaign against Abraham Lincoln.40 Although
395. Id.
396. Henry Billings Brown to Charles A. Kent, Feb. 27, 1903, reprinted in KENT, supra
note 274, at 92.
397. Henry Billings Brown to Charles A. Kent, May 26, 1913, reprinted in KENT, supra
note 274, at 133.
398. It is worth noting that two of the Justices with the strongest ties to antislavery and
abolitionism, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase and Justice Noah Swayne, had left the Court
by 1890. The former died in 1873, and the latter resigned in 1881. Chase had been a major
political figure in the antebellum North, a Senator from Ohio and then Governor who
served during most of the war as Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury. More to the point,
he had been a dedicated antislavery activist who earned national recognition for his
vigorous and repeated defense of fugitive slaves. Aynes, supra note 375, at 676-78.
Swayne had been born into a slave holding family in Virginia but had emancipated his
slaves and moved to Ohio to escape the "peculiar institution." He not only supported
Lincoln's war policies and the program for extending suffrage to blacks, but his son
subsequently served as director of the Freedman's Bureau in Alabama. Id. at 674-75.
399. 1 have found little relevant information on the racial views of two of the Justices
who participated in Hans: Samuel Blatchford (1882-1893) of New York and Horace Gray
(1881-1902) of Massachusetts. There seems to be no reason, however, to think that either
disagreed materially with the views of their colleagues on racial matters. Gray, in
particular, shared fairly standard "upper-class Anglo-Saxon prejudices" and showed little
interest in or sympathy toward blacks or Chinese. A. E. Keir Nash, Horace Gray, in THE
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 197, 199-201 (Melvin i.
Urofsky ed., 1994). Both joined the majority not only in Hans but in other major decisions
establishing the post-Reconstruction settlement, including the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883) and Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587
(1890). After Blatchford's death, Gray joined the Court's later decisions in Plessy and
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899). See generally
Soifer, supra note 89 (discussing ways in which racial and other cultural attitudes
influenced the Justices).
400. The following discussion is drawn from ELY, supra note 65, at 6-9, 155-65;
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Fuller regarded slavery as an evil, he also believed that it should be
kept out of politics.4"1 At the Illinois constitutional convention in
1861 he supported a provision to prohibit blacks and mulattoes from
immigrating into the state and another proposal to deny the vote to
blacks who already lived in the state. Two years later, as a member of
the state legislature, he joined the Democratic effort to defeat Lincoln
by trying to prevent Union soldiers in the field from voting. Most
telling, Fuller introduced a bill to ratify a proposed amendment to the
United States Constitution that would forbid the federal government
from interfering with slavery. A self-proclaimed Jeffersonian
Democrat, he maintained that his party's fundamental principle was
that the Constitution should be strictly construed."2 There "is little
doubt," concluded a recent study of the Fuller Court, "that Fuller
shared the prevalent racial outlook" of his Court and nation.4 3
Justice Samuel Miller of Iowa, who served on the Court from
1862 until 1890, had been an opponent of both slavery and
abolitionism, but after the war he quickly became disaffected with
Republican Reconstruction. In particular, he denounced the effort to
grant blacks the vote as an "extreme policy,"4 4 and in 1873 he wrote
the Court's opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, gutting the new
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 5
By the late 1880s Miller had lost all concern for the plight of southern
blacks and had begun to fix his eyes on the proliferating problems of
industrial America. He saw the nation threatened by immigration
from southern and eastern Europe and by the spread of communism,
socialism, anarchism, and nihilism. "He regarded with mistrust,"
STATES, 1888-1910 (The University of Chicago Press 1967) (1950), and Irving Schiffman,
Melville W. Fuller, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 299, at
1471, 1473-74.
401. Schiffman, supra note 400, at 1473.
402. Id. at 1476. Although Fuller gave some support to the Northern war effort and
denounced secessionism, he remained highly critical of Lincoln and blamed the
abolitionists for causing the war. KING, supra note 400, at 47-60.
403. ELY, supra note 65, at 155.
404. Aynes, supra note 375, at 657-65. The quoted phrase is taken from a letter Miller
wrote in 1867. Id. at 659 n.223. Miller had grown disillusioned with Reconstruction as
early as 1867. See 6 FAIRMAN, supra note 69, at 139-40.
405. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The significance of the
Slaughter-House Cases has long been recognized. See, e.g., Eugene Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1337 (1952) ("The
most far-reaching incident of this counter-revolution came in 1873 in the Slaughterhouse
Cases."). The extent to which the Court misconstrued the original intent of Congress,
moreover, has been documented and generally accepted. " '[E]veryone' agrees the Court
incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause ... of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Aynes, supra note 375, at 627.
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explained his sympathetic biographer, "the growth of a foreign-born
population not accustomed to Anglo-Saxon traditions of
government."
40 6
The Californian Justice Stephen J. Field, who sat on the Court
from 1863 to 1897, explicitly acknowledged his racial views. "You
know I belong to the class, who repudiate the doctrine that this
country was made for the people of all races," he wrote privately in
1882. 4 117 "On the contrary, I think it is for our race-the Caucasian
race." 4°s  Before the Civil War, when running for the California
legislature, he had denounced the accusation that he was an
abolitionist "as a base calumny."409 Slavery, he had insisted, "was a
domestic institution which each State must regulate for itself, without
question or interference from others."410  On the Court his racist
assumptions surfaced vividly in Neal v. Delaware4 ' in 1880.412 There,
he argued that there was no basis to infer racial discrimination in jury
selection from the fact that not a single black had been selected for
service in Delaware for the preceding five years. His reason was
simple. State law limited jury service to those who were "sober and
406. 6 FAIRMAN, supra note 69, at 430.
407. PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN J. FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD
RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE 212 (1997) (quoting Justice Stephen J. Field).
408. Id. (quoting Justice Stephen J. Field). Kens points out that Field continued on to
say that "[w]e are obliged to take care of the Africans; because we find them here, and
they were brought here against their will by our fathers." Id. at 327 n.68. Field, he notes,
"usually voted against black civil rights." Id. at 210. He comments as follows:
In terms of practical result, [Field] was willing in Rives [Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313 (1880)] to compel a black man to stand trial before a jury from which his
race had been systematically excluded. In order to reach that result, Field
conveniently had to miss the point that the Rives case was about fair process. He
focused instead on an abstract right to participate in government. Choosing to
ignore the realities of the case, Field, a champion of substantive due process,
took a very narrow view of what the guarantee of fair procedure required in this
case.
Id. at 193.
409. Manuel Cachan, Justice Stephen Field and "Free Soil, Free Labor
Constitutionalism": Reconsidering Revisionism, 20 LAW AND HIST. REV. 541, 553 (2002)
(quoting STEPHEN J. FIELD, PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF EARLY DAYS IN
CALIFORNIA 58-60 (1893)).
410. Id. at 553-54 (quoting STEPHEN J. FIELD, PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF EARLY
DAYS IN CALIFORNIA 58-60 (1893)). In his campaign Field apparently had been accused
of being an abolitionist because his brother in New York, David Dudley Field, was a Free-
Soiler. He acknowledged his brother's views but immediately informed his audience that
"I have another brother who is a slaveholder in Tennessee." Id. at 553 (quoting STEPHEN
J. FIELD, PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF EARLY DAYS IN CALIFORNIA (1893)).
411. 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
412. One of Field's biographers has suggested that his opinions at this time were
influenced by his presidential ambitions and his efforts to secure southern support within
the Democratic Party. KENS, supra note 407, at 181-96.
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judicious." Thus, Field reasoned, the uniform exclusion of blacks
over the five-year period "may be attributed to other causes than
those of race and color.
413
Justice Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar of Mississippi, whose
short tenure on the Court lasted only from 1888 to 1893, was the
Court's pragmatic but essentially unreconstructed white southerner.
The descendant of a wealthy and aristocratic planter family that had
been one of the largest slaveholders in Georgia, Lamar subscribed to
all the racial assumptions that underwrote and justified the South's
"peculiar institution. '' 414  Before joining the Court, he had been a
political ally of Jefferson Davis, an outspoken defender of Dred Scott,
a major figure at the Mississippi secession convention, a Confederate
army Colonel and diplomatic envoy, and a leader in the long and
tumultuous struggle to end Reconstruction and return white rule to
the South.4 15  Although by late nineteenth-century standards Lamar
was a southern moderate who spoke out against violence and the
unjust treatment of blacks, his ultimate values and goals were never in
doubt. Whites were "the original citizens" of the South, he insisted,
413. Neal, 103 U.S. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting). In 1880-joined only by Clifford, who
had trumpeted his own racist biases two years earlier in Hall v. DeCuir-Field urged an
exceptionally narrow construction of the Civil War amendments and the civil rights
removal statute, revealing in the process the way in which his attitudes about race guided
his legal views. He acknowledged, as the Court had repeatedly affirmed, e.g., Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880);
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 51 (1873), that the Civil War
amendments "were primarily designed to give freedom to persons of the African race," Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 349, 361 (Field, J., dissenting) and, further, that "a person may
be denied his rights" by "popular prejudices, passions, or excitements," including the
"antagonism of race." Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 324, 332-33 (1880) (Field, J.,
dissenting). Immediately, however, he negated the significance of both of those
propositions. First, he noted that the civil rights removal statute was directed only toward
ensuring "equal" rights, and then he generalized the dangers of "prejudice" by suggesting
that a "multitude" of other different kinds of "animosities" could also deny persons their
legal rights. Id. (Field, J., dissenting). On the basis of those assertions, he then ignored
both the distinctive purpose of the Civil War amendments and the acute relevance of the
"antagonism of race." The removal statute did not protect blacks against the effects of
racial prejudice because it "was not designed to relieve [blacks] from those obstacles in the
enjoyment of their rights to which all other persons are subject, and which grow out of
popular prejudices and passions." Id. at 333 (emphasis added). Thus, Field argued that
the statute did not protect blacks from informal "prejudice" because blacks were already
"equal" with "all other persons" because "all other persons" also suffered from one or
more of the various kinds of prejudices that marked human life. The argument, logical in
form, ultimately made sense in the context, and drew whatever persuasive force it had,
only from its clear-eyed and profoundly racist purpose.
414. WIRT ARMISTEAD CATE, Lucius Q. C. LAMAR: SECESSION AND REUNION
102-03, 374-75,399 (1935).
415. Arnold M. Paul, Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 299, at 1431, 1431-35, 1437.
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and they had suffered enough.4 16 "We white people ought to keep
united," he preached in the 1880s, for "brethren of the same blood
must not allow themselves to divide" over political issues.417 White
unity was "a supreme necessity of self-preservation, an only refuge
from ruin and woe."41  Consistently inhospitable to extensions of
federal power, Lamar readily joined and encouraged the Court's
participation in the post-Reconstruction settlement.
Perhaps most striking were the views of the two Justices who
seemed least affected by the racism of their age and most likely to
support the enforcement of black rights, Justices David J. Brewer and
John Marshall Harlan. Brewer, an offspring of New England
abolitionism and a prewar critic of Dred Scott, was a recognized
supporter of African-American education who also showed sympathy
for the cause of Chinese Americans.4 19 At the same time, however, he
held religious ideas that suggested anti-Semitism, doubted that
immigrants from southern and eastern Europe had the capacity to
understand American ideas of liberty, and believed unquestioningly
in the intrinsic superiority of the Anglo-Saxon "race. '"420 With respect
to blacks, Brewer did nothing significant, as either a state official or a
state and federal judge, to translate his vague benevolence into
practice. While still in Kansas, he helped establish and operate
racially segregated schools, and as a state judge he voted to uphold
their legality. In an 1881 dissent while on the Kansas Supreme Court,
he announced that he rejected "entirely" the view that the Fourteenth
Amendment barred states from segregating schools by race.421
More important, after he took his seat on the United States
Supreme Court in 1890, Brewer still failed to turn his ostensible
sympathies into tangible legal results for black litigants. Indeed, he
consistently found ways-often technical and even quite arbitrary-to
avoid the substance of their claims and deny them relief.422 Perhaps
416. Id. at 1437 (quoting Justice Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar). Underlying
Lamar's judicial attitudes "was his perspective of Radical Reconstruction, which reflected
the typical Southern upper-class view." Id. at 1445.
417. CATE, supra note 414, at 400 (quoting Justice Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar).
418. Id. (quoting Justice Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar).
419. The discussion of Brewer is drawn largely from the excellent study by Hylton,
supra note 289. For a discussion of Brewer's abolitionist background, see id. at 323-26.
420. MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID J. BREWER: THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE, 1837-1910, at 178-80 (1994).
421. Hylton, supra note 289, at 328-31. As a state judge in Kansas, Brewer did decide
that the state's constitution, which denied the vote to blacks, did not exclude from the
franchise an individual who was one-quarter black. BRODHEAD, supra note 420, at 14; see
also id. at 44, 104-05.
422. Hylton, supra note 289, at 333-35, 348-49, 350-55, 358, 362.
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the most that can be said for his claimed racial benevolence while on
the Court was that, when Plessy appeared on the docket, he found a
way to absent himself and thereby avoid participating.423 Brewer's
failure to back up what were ostensibly his relatively benevolent
views about race is particularly probative because he was one of the
most willful, activist, and result-oriented Justices ever to sit on the
United States Supreme Court.424 Indeed, no sooner had he joined the
Court than he announced forthrightly that "we must re-cast some of
our judicial decisions. 4 25 In many areas, moreover, he proceeded to
try to do just that. If Brewer did not give judicial voice to his
purportedly benevolent racial views, it could only mean that those
views were jejune if not hypothetical. Essentially, Brewer shared the
underlying racism of the age and the general determination to keep
blacks in their place. "[H]is attitude toward African-Americans was
colored by the very same paternalistic impulse that had led him to
accept the legitimacy of separate schools," J. Gordon Hylton
concluded from his detailed analysis of Brewer's judicial treatment of
blacks.4 26 "The status of African-Americans was essentially that of
minor children.
427
Harlan, of course, occupies a special position. A Kentucky slave
owner who initially opposed the Civil War Amendments, he came in
the late 1860s to accept Republican Reconstruction and most of its
underlying goals.428 When the Republican program collapsed, Harlan
continued to carry its flag, standing as the sole dissenter in Plessy, the
Civil Rights Cases, and other decisions where the Court legitimized
the post-Reconstruction settlement.429  Harlan was unquestionably
423. Hylton shrewdly suggests that Brewer used another public commitment and a
family tragedy as excuses to purposely absent himself from the Court's deliberations. His
goal was to avoid having to take a clear public position on the formal legality of racial
segregation. Id. at 336-44, 362.
424. Id. at 334; PURCELL, supra note 107, at 46-63; Kousser, supra note 360, at 215-17.
425. David J. Brewer, Protection to Private Property from Public Attack, 55 NEW
ENGLANDER & YALE REV. 97, 109 (Aug. 1891).
426. Hylton, supra note 289, at 361.
427. Id.
428. Harlan has been the subject of several fine biographies. See LOREN P. BETH,
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE (1992); LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI,
THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN (1999); TINSLEY E.
YARBROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN (1995); see also Alan F.
Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The
Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637 (1957).
429. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (upholding the
separate-but-equal doctrine); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875). Harlan was also the sole dissenter
in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1883), where the Court invalidated the Ku
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ahead of his time in his attitude toward the constitutional rights of
blacks. He understood the de facto truth about racism and racial
oppression in-the South, and he insisted that the Constitution was
intended to provide them with meaningful protections against racial
discrimination.
Yet, in spite of his unusual qualities and singular position,
Harlan, no less than his judicial brethren, was a creature of his age.
He shared many of the prevailing prejudices about race in general
and African Americans in particular. He accepted a variety of racial
stereotypes about blacks, and he used racial humor both in public
when campaigning for office and in private when conversing with
friends. Indeed, according to one of his recent biographers, he held
"doubts about the general integrity of blacks."43  Further, Harlan
shared widespread anti-Chinese attitudes. In Plessy he referred to
the Chinese as "a race so different from our own that we do not
permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United
States." '431 Even more striking, in a private letter to his son written in
1883, he seemed to draw a rigid line that not only separated "our
own" race from the Chinese but also from African Americans. The
"Chinese are of a different race, as distinct from ours as ours is from
the negro. "432
Although Harlan supported the Reconstruction Amendments,
he rejected the idea that they endorsed or required social equality
between the races.433 Several of his opinions and votes on the Court,
moreover, reflected the racially oppressive attitudes of the post-
Reconstruction settlement. In 1880, for example, he joined an
opinion that essentially negated the civil rights removal statute and
provided a roadmap for white southerners seeking to institutionalize
Klux Klan Act of 1871. Harlan was also alone in refusing to join the Court's opinion in
Hans. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgement).
430. YARBROUGH, supra note 428, at 139. "Evidence that Harlan shared certain racial
attitudes common to those of the most unreconstructed Southerner is not confined to his
stances on public issues or infrequent lapses into racial humor on the stump." Id. See
generally id. at 138-45 (discussing Harlan's attitude toward race).
431. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559, 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Gabriel J. Chin,
The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151 (1996)
(assessing Harlan's attitude toward the Chinese).
432. YARBROUGH, supra note 428, at 190 (quoting Justice John Marshall Harlan).
The author points out that Harlan may have merely been outlining a debating strategy for
his son, but he notes that in his letter Harlan "made no effort to separate his own position
from the arguments he was advancing." Id. at 191. Further, Yarbrough adds that "[o]ther
bits of evidence also suggest that the justice was hardly free of ethnocentric attitudes." Id.
433. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 428, at 83.
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their racial supremacy without running afoul of the Constitution.434
Similarly, he joined other decisions that ignored racial inequalities
and confirmed the prevailing elements of the post-Reconstruction
settlement.435 Indeed, dissenting in Plessy itself, Harlan penned words
that seem discordant, if not shocking, today:
Every true man has pride of race, and under appropriate
circumstances, when the rights of others, his equals before
the law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express
such pride and to take such action based upon it as to him
seems proper.436
Thus, like most of his contemporaries, Harlan believed in the
centrality of race and in the legitimacy of racial thinking. Often
overlooked or ignored, that characteristic helps explain both his
inconsistencies in civil rights cases and his easy rejection of broader
ideas of social equality between the races.437 Although Harlan was
highly unusual in the courage, integrity, and decency he showed in
racial matters, he nonetheless also remained a person of his time.438
4. Hans and Its Author: Justice Joseph P. Bradley and the
Acquiescent Turn
Finally, we come to Justice Joseph P. Bradley, the author of
Hans. A New Jersey Whig who became a Unionist and then a
Republican, Bradley was an ardent advocate of the northern war
effort and an early supporter of Reconstruction.439 In 1865 he
defended the Republican position that three-fourths of the states
which remained in the Union could amend the Constitution, and he
subsequently supported ratification of all three Civil War
434. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); see PURCELL, supra note 107, at 142-47.
435. E.g., Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (upholding
racially discriminatory funding for public schools); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883)
(upholding state antimiscegenation law). On Cumming, see BETH, supra note 428, at 234-
35; KOUSSER, supra note 234, at 27-29 (stating Harlan's opinion was "retrograde,"
"credulous," and "exhibited a disingenuousness which fully matched Justice Brown's
breezy assurance in Plessy that Jim Crow car laws did not discriminate against blacks").
436. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Linda
Przybyszewski explores the significance of this statement in her perceptive and subtle
examination of Harlan's civil rights jurisprudence. See PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 428,
at 81-117.
437. PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 428, at 116-17; see id. at 203-07; Cumming, 175 U.S.
at 544-45.
438. "Harlan had by the 1880s come light years away from the Kentucky slave owner
of the 1850s. That he did not go beyond his liberal contemporaries is hardly surprising.
The surprise is, in fact, that he went as far as he did." BETH, supra note 428, at 226.
439. Leon Friedman, Joseph P. Bradley, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT, supra note 299, at 1181, 1184.
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amendments. In 1868 he backed Republican Ulysses S. Grant in the
presidential election and served as one of his official electors.44'
If Bradley's politics were northern, unionist, and Republican, his
attitudes toward race were hardly advanced. While he supported the
abolition of slavery, he neither anticipated nor approved significant
changes in relations between blacks and whites. As a Republican
candidate for Congress in 1862, according to one scholar, he was
"pro-Union, anti-slavery, and anti-black. '' 441 Even after secession and
the beginning of war, Bradley wanted the Constitution to remain
unchanged, to "stand just as it is, word for word and letter for
letter."'442 Notwithstanding the onset of war and the reality of slavery,
he remained unyielding: "I do not want it altered."'443 Long after the
war, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875, he reacted
angrily to its provisions requiring racial equality in places of public
accommodation. "[S]urely Congress cannot guarantee to the colored
people admission to every place of gathering and amusement," he
complained privately." 4 "To deprive white people of the right of
choosing their own company would be to introduce another kind of
slavery." 445  Bradley's racial feelings were deep-seated. The
"antipathy of race cannot be crushed and annihilated by legal
enactment," he insisted, and the Civil War "constitutional
amendments were never intended to aim at such an impossibility.
446
To Bradley the Civil Rights Act was a bitter and personal affront.447
"Surely a white lady cannot be enforced by Congressional enactment
to admit colored persons to her ball or assembly or dinner party," he
exclaimed.448 It "never can be endured that the white shall be
compelled to lodge and eat and sit with the negro. 449
440. Id. Bradley has been identified as an antislavery justice. William E. Nelson, The
Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth
Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513,551-55 (1974).
441. Jonathan Lurie, Joseph Bradley, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A
BIOGRAPHICAL DICrIONARY, supra note 399, at 33, 33.
442. Lurie, supra note 299, at 349 n.49 (quoting Justice Joseph P. Bradley).
443. Id. (quoting Justice Joseph P. Bradley).
444. Lurie, supra note 441, at 35 (quoting copybook of Joseph P. Bradley).
445. Id. (quoting copybook of Joseph P. Bradley).
446. 7 FAIRMAN, supra note 269, at 564 (quoting draft of letter from Justice Joseph P.
Bradley to Judge William B. Woods (Oct. 30, 1876)).
447. Id.
448. Id. (quoting draft of letter from Justice Joseph P. Bradley to Judge William B.
Woods (Oct. 30, 1876)).




Appointed to the Court in 1870, Bradley initially seemed
committed to enforcing Republican Reconstruction. In 1871 he
counseled a lower court judge to construe a Reconstruction statute
broadly in order to sustain the prosecution of a group of whites who
had broken up a black political meeting and killed a large number of
those assembled.45° The following year he dissented in Blyew v.
United States,45" ' where the Court construed a criminal provision of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 with exceptional narrowness and began its
long process of checking Republican Reconstruction.45 In his first
year on the bench he heard the Slaughter-House Cases on circuit and
gave a relatively broad construction to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the new Fourteenth Amendment.453  Three years later,
when the case reached the Supreme Court, he maintained his broad
view of the amendment in dissent.
454
The most striking characteristic of Bradley's early
Reconstruction opinions was not their doctrinal analysis but their
relatively honest recognition of southern realities. Bradley argued
that a liberal construction of the civil rights statute in Blyew was
essential because he admitted the practical consequences of
construing it narrowly. To deny blacks access to the courts, he
protested, "is to expose them to wanton insults and fiendish assaults;
is to leave their lives, their families, and their property unprotected by
law. '455  His dissent was precisely on point. In denying federal
jurisdiction, he argued, the majority offered "a view of the law too
narrow, too technical, and too forgetful of the liberal objects it had in
view. '456 Similarly, on Circuit in 1874, Bradley again emphasized that
the major threat to black rights came not from formal laws but from a
private "war of race" that engulfed the South. 457  The federal
government required, and the Civil War amendments conferred, the
450. John A. Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth Amendment
from the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 552, 556-57
(1971).
451. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872).
452. See Goldstein, supra note 253, at 474 ("The appeal of Blyew v. United States
afforded the Supreme Court with its earliest opportunity-an opportunity that it used-to
begin the substantial devastation of the federal government's civil rights powers that
followed over the next generation.").
453. See Live-Stock Dealers & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City, 15 FED. CAS. 649, 652
(C.C.D. La. 1870).
454. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 122-24 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
dissenting).
455. Blyew, 80 U.S. at 599 (Bradley J., dissenting).
456. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
457. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 FED. CAS. 707, 714 (C.C.D. La. 1874).
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power to secure black rights "not only as against the unfriendly
operation of state laws, but against outrage, violence, and
combinations on the part of individuals, irrespective of the state
laws. "458
During the 1870s, however, like so many other white Americans,
Bradley lost what commitment he had to the goals of
Reconstruction. 49  A variety of forces-the era's turmoil and
disappointments, pressures from colleagues on the Court, the return
of the Democrats to power in the South and then in the Nation, the
seemingly bottomless depths of white racial animosity, and the
passage of what he regarded as the unendurable Civil Rights Act of
1875-combined relentlessly to dilute his earlier sympathies and
remold his jurisprudential assumptions. By late 1876 his attitudes
toward Reconstruction were apparently understood to have changed
so substantially that all seven of the Democrats on the Electoral
Commission-the body charged with determining the results of the
disputed presidential election of 1876-agreed to accept Bradley as
the Commission's critical fifteenth-and ostensibly nonpartisan-
member.46 °  Although Bradley's votes on the Commission
disappointed the Democrats in 1877, his votes on the Court over the
years that followed did not.
461
Bradley's judicial opinions after the Compromise of 1877
reflected the change in national attitudes. Increasingly, they seemed
suffused with the deep, if largely unspoken, assumptions that marked
the opinions of most of the other Justices in cases involving race,
Reconstruction, and the South.462  Over the years Bradley
collaborated repeatedly and closely with Chief Justice Waite, 463 and
Waite surely passed on to his friend and colleague the profound
458. Id. at 713.
459. One student of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment charged that Bradley
"completely changed positions." CURTIS, supra note 88, at 179. For discussions of
Bradley's changing views, see generally Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition:
Critical Race Theory and Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 57 (1995); Scott, supra note 450. For a defense of Bradley and an argument that
he did not change, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN
BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900, at 70-71 (1982).
460. Lurie, supra note 441, at 33.
461. The most extensive treatment of the commission's work and Bradley's
involvement in it appears in 7 FAIRMAN, supra note 142.
462. For a thoughtful defense of Bradley's doctrinal consistency based on a close
analysis of his opinions, see generally Michael G. Collins, Justice Bradley's Civil Rights
Odyssey Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1979 (1996). For the argument that Bradley did not
change in the Civil Rights Cases because he was hostile to blacks and the idea of racial
integration in public places, see Lurie, supra note 299, at 349-50, 366-68.
463. See MAG RATH, supra note 218, at 182-84,208, 298-99.
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lesson he had drawn from his experience in 1877 trying to enforce
black civil rights in Charleston, South Carolina. By 1883 Bradley was
prepared to write for the Court in the Civil Rights Cases, severely
limiting the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, rejecting the idea
of "primary" national citizenship rights, and largely abandoning
southern blacks to post-Reconstruction oppression.4t"
More telling, in construing Reconstruction measures Bradley
moved from articulating a deep concern with the de facto dangers and
abuses that southern blacks faced to exhibiting a cold disregard for
whatever fate they might be compelled to suffer.465 Indeed, he
seemed to transfer his efforts to combat the practical evils of
"prejudice" in the judicial system from safeguarding blacks from
464. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883). At the same time that he
showed his respect for state sovereignty by limiting the power of Congress to protect black
rights, Bradley did the opposite by reaffirming his belief in the power of the federal courts
to make "general" federal common law. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1883);
accord R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357, 367-68 (1873) (expanding scope of
federal common law to control issues of railroad liability for injuries to passengers and
goods). The federal common law constituted a well-established and substantial intrusion
into "state" law and state sovereignty. It could have been, but was not, used to support
expanded national powers to protect black rights. See, e.g., Note, Federalism and Federal
Questions: Protecting Civil Rights Under the Regime of Swift v. Tyson, 70 VA. L. REV.
267, 273-75, 280-81 (1984) (discussing federal common law in the context of the Ku Klux
Klan Act).
465. Some supporters of black rights have attempted to broaden the idea of "state
action" in Bradley's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases (and thus to expand opportunities
for federal action under the Fourteenth Amendment) by citing "an interesting series of
letters written prior to the 1883 opinion" in which Bradley advanced a relatively expansive
view of "state action." Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21
RUTGERS L. REV. 387, 416 (1967) (citing Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286, 308-10, 338
nn.29-31 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)). Several considerations undermine such a use
of Bradley's letters. One is that the letters in question were written in the early 1870s, a
full decade prior to the Civil Rights Cases and, more importantly, during what was still the
height of Republican Reconstruction. The early 1870s were part of a political and social
era far distant, and radically different from, the era of the early 1880s. There is, moreover,
no reason to assume that Bradley's views in the early 1870s remained unchanged during
the course of the tumultuous years prior to 1883. A second reason to discount the
argument is that there is, as this Article discusses, a considerable amount of evidence
suggesting that Bradley did, in fact, change his views substantially during the decade
between the early 1870s and the early 1880s. Finally, there is the fact that sometime
between 1871 and 1883, Bradley wrote a memo explicitly recording the fact that he had
changed his earlier views about the power of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In his papers, there is a memo attached to a draft of one of his earlier letters (this one
written in 1871) that states: "The views expressed in the foregoing letters were much
modified by subsequent reflection, so far as relates to the power of Congress to pass laws
for enforcing social equality between the races." Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 309 n.30
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting draft of letter from Joseph P. Bradley to Circuit
Judge William Woods).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
white repression to safeguarding interstate railroads from tort suits. 466
For sheer callousness, too, few statements in the history of American
law can match his assertion in the Civil Rights Cases that "there must
be some stage" when those who have "emerged from slavery" would
"cease[] to be the special favorite of the laws" and be content with
"the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. 467
The statement was not only callous and dishonest but also deeply
personal, an acknowledgment of exasperation and exhaustion, a de
facto admission that he had abandoned any effort to achieve the goals
of Reconstruction.
Another statement Bradley made in the Civil Rights Cases was
even more revealing. In rejecting the idea that the law could grant
blacks equal social rights, he wrote for the Court with a telling
specificity, and a multiplicity of concrete social references, that
conveyed his own deep sense of personal involvement and private
outrage at the Civil Rights Act. Applying the strictures of the
Thirteenth Amendment to any and all discriminatory acts that "a
person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to
the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his
concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or
business," he exclaimed for the Court, "would be running the slavery
argument into the ground. ' 468  The statement was particularly
revealing, and its significance undeniable, because it was a resounding
public echo of the bitter private condemnation he had penned eight
years earlier when he recorded-with the same outpouring of specific
social references-his own personal anger at the act's passage.
"Surely a white lady cannot be enforced by Congressional enactment
to admit colored persons to her ball or assembly or dinner party," he
had then exclaimed.469 It "can never be endured that the white shall
be compelled to lodge and eat and sit with the negro. '470  Such
"enforced fellowship," he had raged, would "require the slavery of
the whites.""47
466. PURCELL, supra note 107, at 142-43.
467. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.
468. Id. at 24-25.
469. 7 FAIRMAN, supra note 269, at 564 (quoting draft of letter from Justice Joseph P.
Bradley to Judge William B. Woods (Oct. 30, 1876)). Bradley made other such statements
that implied he endorsed the separate-but-equal principle. See id. at 288-89, 563-67;
LOFGREN, supra note 248, at 133-34; Lurie, supra note 299, at 367.
470. 7 FAIRMAN, supra note 269, at 564 (quoting draft of letter from Justice Joseph P.
Bradley to Judge William B. Woods (Oct. 30, 1876)).




The very "essence" and "purpose" of the Civil Rights Act,
Bradley declared in the Civil Rights Cases, was to ensure that in
places of public accommodation "no distinction shall be made
between citizens of different race or color. '4 72 He identified the act's
very "essence," then, as exactly what he had privately condemned as
a personally intolerable result, the imposition of "slavery" itself on
"the whites." In the Civil Rights Cases, Bradley wrote an opinion for
the Court that tracked his own highly personal, intensely felt, and
overtly racist rejection of the very idea that blacks and whites could
assemble as social equals.
4 73
That profound change in Bradley's civil rights jurisprudence
paralleled the change that transformed his Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence.474 In the 1870s, while Republicans continued to
support Reconstruction and Bradley was still defending the rights of
southern blacks, he had readily joined the Court's muscular
reaffirmations of Osborn and traditional Marshallian Eleventh
Amendment doctrine. As late as 1876, he wrote for the Court
upholding the jurisdiction of the federal courts to issue mandatory
orders prohibiting state officers from taking actions that would impair
the value of their states' bonds.475  As Reconstruction ended, the
contours of the post-Reconstruction settlement took shape, and his
commitment to the enforcement of black civil rights flagged, however,
Bradley's view of the Eleventh Amendment turned in a direction that
paralleled precisely the direction of his shifting civil rights
jurisprudence. In 1883, when Bradley authored the Civil Rights
Cases, he also joined the Court's opinion in Jumel, invoking the
Eleventh Amendment to deny federal jurisdiction over a southern
472. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 9, 10.
473. The extent to which prevailing cultural attitudes and values influenced Bradley's
jurisprudence was equally apparent from his concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). There, Bradley agreed with the
Court's decision to reject the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented states from
denying females admission to state bars on the grounds of gender. His reasoning flowed
directly from his acceptance of prevailing cultural preconceptions and stereotypes: "The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as
in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the
domain and functions of womanhood." Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Similarly, the
predominant influence of common cultural attitudes and values was equally apparent in
Bradley's opinion in Late Corp. v. United States, 136 U.S. 15 (1890), which addressed
issues involving the Mormon Church. See, e.g., SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE
MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 208-20 (2002) (arguing that Bradley's opinion in Late Corp. was
charged with antipolygamy and anti-Mormon sentiment).
474. See supra text accompanying notes 139-48.
475. Bd. of Liquidation v. McConb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1876).
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state bondholder suit and confessing the Court's fear about its ability
to enforce a judgment against the state.476 Thereafter, Bradley
consistently joined the Court's opinions expanding state sovereign
immunity in such suits. 477 In 1885, he suggested that state sovereign
immunity be extended even further, and in 1890 he issued his plea
that the courts be relieved from the "vexation" of the southern bond
suits. 478 Then, he wrote Hans.
Thus, Bradley's views of both black civil rights and the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment evolved in tandem-contemporaneous in
time, identical in purpose, and single in result. He moved from
vigorous support for both Republican Reconstruction and the
enforcement of southern state bonds in the early 1870s to the
adoption, a decade later, of a series of cold and callous rationales for
abandoning both.
By 1890, Bradley held no illusions about Reconstruction, the
enforceability of southern state bonds, or the future of blacks in the
Democratic South. When he wrote for the Court in Hans, he
regarded the post-Reconstruction settlement as wholly acceptable,
probably highly desirable, and in any event an essentially
accomplished fact. Bradley was by all accounts an extremely
intelligent man and an unusually able judge. There is every reason to
believe that he understood exactly what he was doing and why he was
doing it.
D. Hans, Racism, and the Post-Reconstruction Settlement
Racism in its multitudinous forms has been a ubiquitous if
fluctuating force in American history.479 At various times and places
it has been particularly virulent, and at others mild or subtle. Its
476. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883).
477. See supra notes 118-25.
478. See supra notes 139-45.
479. Recent studies have revealed that racial and ethnic bias, both real and perceived,
continues to exist in both state and federal courts and that in some cases it still influences
the behavior of lawyers and judges. See, e.g., Elissa Krauss & Martha Schulman, The Myth
of Black Juror Nullification: Racism Dressed Up in Jurisprudential Clothing, 7 CORNELL
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 57-60, 72-75 (1997) (examining the way courts have treated
participation of minorities in the jury system); Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and
Judicial Discord Over Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds' Allegedly
Intentional and Immoral Conduct. A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State
Courts' Declaratory Judgments-1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1208 (1998) (stating
that judges are influenced by litigants' ethnicity in deciding lower courts' holdings in duty-
to-defend cases); Suellyn Scarnecchia, State Responses to Task Force Reports on Race and
Ethnic Bias in the Courts, 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 923, 927-40 (1993) (describing findings of
task forces of five states that investigated race and ethnic bias in the judicial system).
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power has sometimes dominated, while at other times it has been
moderated, opposed, and even defeated. Its relative force, content,
and direction have shifted in response to a wide variety of factors:
immigration, urbanization, economic conditions, class antagonisms,
demographic movements, sectional tensions, cultural pressures,
religious beliefs, considerations of foreign policy, and prevailing
scientific theories and political ideas.48° Regardless of changes and
complexities, however, the fact remains that racism was particularly
powerful and pervasive in the United States during the last quarter of
the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth.
That potent and pervasive racism influenced the United States
Supreme Court and helped shape its jurisprudence.481 Unless one
assumes that judicial "law" is automatic and autonomous-that it
involves logically necessary conclusions drawn from indisputably
clear and controlling principles-it would be hard to understand how
the Justices could possibly have avoided its influence. The
proposition that racism influenced the Court, however, rests on far
more than a plausible inference. Racist ideas and attitudes were
directly influential because most of the Justices-including an
overwhelming majority of those on the Hans Court-shared the
predominant racial views of other white Americans.482 Indeed, some
held racist attitudes that were particularly intense and incorrigible.
Racist ideas were also influential, moreover, because they pervaded
not only American society generally but also the social and
professional classes from which the Justices came and in which they
lived, worked, and advanced to professional preeminence.483 Further,
480. This complexity is a major theme of Eric Foner's superb study of Reconstruction.
See FONER, supra note 71, at xxiii-xxiv. For a similar complex and nuanced discussion of
race relations, see WILLIAMSON, supra note 213.
481. Lawyers and judges in the late nineteenth century "were not sexist or racist to a
greater degree than other elites," William M. Wiecek has written:
They were merely in accord with the dominant assumptions of their era, which
consigned women to the homemaking and nurturing roles dictated by the
ideology of "separate spheres." Similarly lawyer elites shared in the
contemporary Euro-American loss of confidence that African Americans could
assume a status of equality in American society. Classical judges readily
relinquished black Americans to domination by southern white supremacists,
who, after all, had accumulated a certain expertise in the matter of racial control.
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 150 (1998).
482. See supra Parts IV.C.3, IV.C.4.
483. Supreme Court Justices seem often to reflect the ideas and values of social elites.
See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 325-26 (2001) (discussing the Justices' concern for elite
opinion in the context of the controversy over school prayer); Michael J. Klarman, What's
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racist ideas and attitudes influenced the Justices because they shaped
the actions of the other branches of government, not only in the states
but at the federal level as well. Even Justices with the mildest racial
views were pressed to recognize that judgments enforcing black civil
rights in the South would provoke bitter and determined opposition
and would likely be unenforced and unenforceable.
The Court's decisions in other areas, moreover, evidence the
pervasive sway of racist ideas. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, racist and nativist attitudes appeared in its
opinions dealing not just with black Americans but also with a variety
of other "non-Anglo-Saxon" groups, including Native Americans,
Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and those from other Asian countries. In
such cases, Lawrence Friedman concluded, "the popular idea of race
was dominant."4"
Further, alternate explanations for the Court's behavior are
unpersuasive. Some scholars have argued, for example, that the
Court's decisions were the result of ambiguous constitutional or
statutory drafting, the Court's commitment to older ideas of
federalism, or the difficulties of construing the Fourteenth
Amendment in a way that would give it reasonable effect without
wholly subverting the authority and prerogatives of the states.485
So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 189-91 (1998) (attributing
such elitism to prominent upbringings and political associations of the Justices).
484. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 125 (2002);
see id. at 111-37. In United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904), Justice Brewer
himself charged the Court with racist behavior when he protested a decision allowing the
exclusion of persons of Chinese ancestry who claimed United States citizenship: "No such
rule is enforced against an American citizen of Anglo-Saxon descent, and if this be, as
claimed, a government of laws and not of men, 1 do not think it should be enforced against
American citizens of Chinese descent." Id. at 178 (Brewer, J., dissenting); see, e.g.,
SALYER, supra note 328, at 94-116 (describing the effect of laws in the 1880s on Chinese
immigrants): WIECEK, supra note 481, at 151-52 (describing late nineteenth-century cases
that embodied racist attitudes against Asians and indigenous peoples).
485. See, e.g., MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE:
CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION 1863-1869, at 315-24 (1974)
(explaining the split among politicians between commitment to state power and
commitment to national power); NELSON, supra note 459, at 80 (arguing that the Court's
behavior was driven by concerns of federalism); Benedict, supra note 88, at 41-45, 79
(arguing that the Court's commitment to ideas of federalism drove many of the Justices'
decisions); Michael Les Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of
Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. AM. HIST. 65, 69-77 (1974) (describing Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence and political occurrences as driven by concerns over
federalism). In the Civil Rights Cases, Bradley had suggested the same point: "If this
legislation is appropriate for enforcing the prohibitions of the amendment, it is difficult to
see where it is to stop." 109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883). This argument has been broadly attacked
by other scholars. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 88 (criticizing the federalism argument);
Kaczorowski, supra note 88 (arguing that the commitment to "national primacy" explains
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Neither separately nor together do those explanations seem
adequate. Ambiguous drafting does not limit but rather expands the
discretion of courts, and statutes can easily be construed to reach
desired results while still constraining them sufficiently to ensure their
constitutionality. Further, neither older ideas of federalism nor
difficulties in construing the Fourteenth Amendment explain the
specific ways in which the Court shaped American constitutional law
over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It
was, for example, quite possible both to retain the basics of an older
federalism and to limit the Fourteenth Amendment sharply-with or
without a "state action" requirement-on the straightforward ground
suggested in the Slaughter-House Cases: The amendment was
intended to protect blacks.486 Thus, the amendment could either have
been limited to enforcing the civil and political rights of blacks or, if
applied more generally, used in nonracial contexts only when highly
demanding conditions were met. The Slaughter-House Cases, after
all, suggested a kind of "strict scrutiny" idea.487
Moreover, there stands another undeniable fact. Once the racial
issue was consigned to the states and eliminated from the relevant
constitutional calculus, the Court began promptly to constrict the
immunity it attributed to the Eleventh Amendment and allow
substantial expansions of the lawmaking powers of the national
government. More to the point, it expanded both the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the judicial remedies available to
enforce the amendment's guarantees. In 1880, when addressing a
southern race case, the Court had declared that the Fourteenth
Amendment authorized Congress alone to protect the rights the
amendment guaranteed.488 Further, the Court expressly disclaimed
federal judicial power-absent authorizing legislation-to enforce the
amendment: "It is not said the judicial power of the general
government shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to
why early racist politicians helped blacks gain more civil rights); Kaczorowski, To Begin
the Nation Anew, supra note 252 (arguing that the Court rejected the "revolutionary"
intent of the Civil War amendments and construed them to protect prewar ideas of state
sovereignty).
486. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 51 (1873). The Court
reiterated the idea that the specific purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to protect
blacks in Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1880) and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 306 (1880).
487. It was possible to resolve the problems of limitation, for example, by adopting the
principle that the federal government would act only when racial discrimination or
violence went uncorrected by state authorities.
488. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-48.
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protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed," it declared in Ex
parte Virginia.489 "It is not said that branch of the government shall
be authorized to declare void any action of a State in violation of the
prohibitions. '490 A mere ten years later, however, addressing issues
of state economic regulation, the Court began to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment rights of substantive due process and liberty
of contract and to create judicial remedies-even in the absence of
congressional legislation-for violations of the amendment.49'
Indeed, by the early twentieth century it had moved the law so far
that it could declare sweepingly that "the Federal courts are charged
under the Constitution" with the duty of protecting rights under the
"comprehensive" Fourteenth Amendment.492 In spite of older ideas
and difficulties construing the Fourteenth Amendment, in other
words, when finally freed from the complicating issue of race, the
Court quickly moved to reshape the assumptions and practices of
American federalism and substantially broaden national authority-
especially national judicial authority.493
489. Id. at 345.
490. Id. The Court continued: "It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged.
Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate legislation. Some
legislation is contemplated to make the amendments fully effective." Id.
491. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v.
Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 457 (1890); see infra Part V.
492. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 284-85, 288 (1913).
That position remained the law throughout the twentieth century. The Fourteenth
Amendment limited state power "and so permits a federal court to disestablish local
government institutions that interfere with its commands." Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S.
33, 55 (1990).
493. While the Court ambitiously expanded the federal judicial power and the reach of
federal equity between 1890 and 1908, it remained peculiarly and characteristically
enfeebled when it addressed challenges to southern racial practices, even as those
practices became increasingly overt and formal. Compare the decisions in which the
federal courts dealt with state regulation of business, such as Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at
167-68 (recognizing broad federal power to enjoin state officials from enforcing
unconstitutional acts); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 516-17 (1898) (holding that state rate
regulation must be reasonable and striking down a state scheme on due process grounds);
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591, 593 (1897) (exercising power to strike down state
law that violated the Fourteenth Amendment); and Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
154 U.S. 362, 395 (1894) (stating that state legislatures cannot abridge the power of federal
courts), together with the cases in which the federal courts addressed labor matters, such
as Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating state law that voided yellow-dog
contracts); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 303-04 (1908) (enforcing the federal
government's power over interstate commerce against a labor union); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (voiding state law limiting hours of work as a violation of due
process); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (upholding the authority of the federal courts to
enjoin strikes and related actions by labor union), with the Court's contemporaneous
decisions in cases involving race, for example, Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53-
54 (1908) (denying equal protection claim and upholding state power to prohibit racially
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Indeed, it seems likely that the Court's acceptance of the post-
Reconstruction settlement was an essential prerequisite for that
subsequent reshaping of federal law. Had the Justices sought to deny
the constitutional terms on which the North and South reunited after
Reconstruction, their actions would have provoked bitter and
widespread opposition that would have severely undermined the
Court's political support and institutional authority. That, in turn,
might well have dissuaded or prevented it from adopting the
increasingly expanded supervisory role it began playing in other areas
of American politics and government in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century.
What stood in the way of enforcing black civil and political
rights, then, was not doctrine, logic, drafting, inherited constitutional
ideas, or the problem of drawing lines that could limit the Fourteenth
Amendment. The problem was that the Justices, and the nation, were
unwilling to protect and secure black rights.494 That unwillingness
integrated education); Giles v. Teasley, 193 U.S. 146, 164-67 (1904) (denying federal
jurisdiction over state court's judgment of a Fourteenth Amendment claim denying relief
to a black plaintiff); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486-88 (1903) (refusing to protect right
of black plaintiffs to vote because doing so would require federal courts to "supervise the
voting in that state"); Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528,
545 (1899) (deferring to state discretion on matter of pubic education in funding white
high school but not funding black high school); and Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213,
219, 225 (1898) (stating that federal courts can strike state law as unconstitutional only if
the law is being challenged as a result of the state constitution or state statute, but not if it
is being challenged on the basis of administration of the law).
494. Notwithstanding concerns over "federalism," for example, legal concepts
fundamental to nineteenth-century jurisprudence-the federal common law, the
"independent system" of federal equity, and the all-encompassing concept of a "federal
question" enshrined in Osborn-expanded national power over the states and were
readily available to help justify the power of Congress and the federal judiciary to protect
black rights. See, e.g., Note, supra note 464, at 280-81 (stating that federal courts could use
their remedial power as an "independent basis for federal question jurisdiction").
Together with the Civil War amendments, those jurisprudential foundations provided an
ample basis on which to uphold the constitutionality of the Republican Reconstruction
program.
Similarly, from another perspective, the Court's treatment of women under the
new Fourteenth Amendment further confirms the fact that it was largely cultural
preconceptions and social biases, not legal logic or principles of federalism, that explained
the nature and results of the Court's decisions. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162, 171, 174-76, 178 (1875) (holding that state did not have to allow women to vote
because suffrage is not one of the privileges and immunities of citizenship); Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138-39 (1873) (holding that state government has
discretion to control and regulate the granting of licenses to pass bar and thus allowing
state to refuse to grant such a license to a woman); accord GORDON, supra note 473, at
119-45 (arguing that antipolygamy and antislavery sentiment influenced the Court in its
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO
CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE
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was, in significant part, the result of the racist ideas and attitudes that
pervaded the South, the nation, the legal profession, the legislative
and executive branches of government, the state and federal courts,
and the Justices who sat on the United States Supreme Court itself.
495
Racism was not, of course, the "sole cause" of Hans.496 Rather, it
was an enveloping and almost unquestioned condition of American
life that profoundly shaped legal and constitutional thinking in all
areas during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It is
impossible to understand the contours of the era's thinking about
EMANCIPATION 175-263 (1998) (examining ways in which political and cultural forces
shaped legal ideas and doctrines).
495. See supra Part IV.C. In 1898 the Court heard a challenge to the Mississippi
Constitution of 1890 that was used to disenfranchise the state's black voters. The Court
rejected the challenge, declaring in Williams v. Mississippi that the state constitution and
its implementing statutes "do not on their face discriminate between the races." 170 U.S.
at 225. Further, in spite of the massive disenfranchisement that had taken place since
1890, the Court declared that "it has not been shown that their actual administration [of
the state's voting laws] was evil, only that evil was possible under them." Id. at 225.
In contrast, consider General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). There, in a
case involving state taxation of corporate property, the Court rejected a claim that states
had the power to deny their own courts jurisdiction to hear suits against state officials. If
states had such power, the Court declared, "an easy way is open to prevent the
enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution, and the Fourteenth Amendment,
which is directed at state action, could be nullified as to much of its operation." Id. at 226.
It refused to accept such a possibility and argued that it had to stand vigilant against any
such potential state scheme. "And it will not do to say that the argument is drawn from
extremes," it announced. Id. at 226. "Constitutional provisions are based on the
possibility of extremes." Id. at 226-27.
The difference between Williams and Crain is nothing but the difference between
a determination to find excuses to acquiesce in state transgressions and a determination to
scrutinize state actions rigorously to ensure that they comply with the law. Logic and
doctrine have little to do with the difference, beyond, of course, serving as malleable tools
of judicial rationalization. Ideas about federalism and the Constitution, and legal
doctrines and concepts in general, cannot explain such decisions. Only history, in the
fullest sense of that word, can do that.
496. Some northerners, for example, may have sympathized with the South because of
the vast economic devastation the region suffered as a result of the war and the
destruction of its labor system. An unusual leniency with respect to southern debts might
have seemed warranted as providing a kind of "fresh start" for nearly bankrupt states.
Similarly, racial considerations were usually filtered through a variety of other social
factors. See generally Richard Jensen, Democracy, Republicanism, and Efficiency: The
Values of American Politics, 1885-1930, in CONTESTING DEMOCRACY: SUBSTANCE AND
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY, 1775-2000, at 149, 149-80 (Byron E.
Shafer & Anthony J. Badger eds., 2001) (discussing ways in which certain "core values"
shaped the political and societal issues of the time), just as other social factors were often
shaped in part by racial considerations. Complexity is the rule, but so too is the profound
and pervasive significance of race. See generally RICHARDSON, supra note 231 (discussing
the causes for Northern abandonment of Reconstruction efforts); STANLEY, supra note
494 (discussing the influence of contract theory on social relations in the Reconstruction
South).
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federalism, state sovereignty, the Fourteenth Amendment, or the
federal judicial power without recognizing and accounting for the
powerful and sustained impact of those racist ideas and prejudices.497
They were common and public. They were accepted and respectable.
They were scientific and authoritative. They were intrinsic elements
of the nation's underlying cultural consensus, dominant in the South
and highly influential everywhere else. The Justices of the United
States Supreme Court were fully of a piece with their nation's life and
culture, and by and large they shared its racist assumptions and
attitudes. To whatever extent any of them harbored doubts or
disagreements, they fully recognized, understood, and at least
acquiesced in the racial consequences that followed. They may have
had little leeway and few practical alternatives.498
Thus, Hans was a corollary not of constitutional principle but of
political compromise. 499 Allowing the repudiation of southern bonds,
it helped to cement in place the post-Reconstruction settlement.
Floating on the high tide of racism, it was a practical jurisdictional
device that seemed, everything considered, useful in the
circumstances.
Indeed, both Hans's practical utility and its integral role in the
post-Reconstruction settlement were nowhere more vividly illustrated
497. The point is not, of course, that constitutional ideas and principles are without
significance or meaning. Those scholars who have emphasized the role of traditional
nineteenth-century ideas about dual Federalism have established that. See supra sources
cited in notes 88-89. The point is, rather, that such ideas and principles are general,
malleable, and changing, and that different people have given them a wide range of
different meanings at different points in time. The key historical question is always: At
any specific time, what particular meanings and particular applications have those terms
been given, by what specific individuals and groups, for what underlying reasons, for what
practical purposes, and with what practical consequences?
498. For views of the Court's historical role stressing its close relation to society and
politics, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293-95 (1957); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and
Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 614-15 (1993); Klarman, supra note 214, at 883;
Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1881,1925-26 (1991).
499. It is, of course, impossible to know the extent to which each of the Justices was
influenced by institutional concerns about the Court's authority as opposed to a
substantive agreement with the terms of the post-Reconstruction settlement. As a general
matter, it seems likely that all of the Justices were concerned with the need to preserve the
Court's position, that most (if not all) of them shared the racist assumptions that
underwrote the abandonment of southern blacks, and that few if any were entirely
comfortable with the bond cases. Most probably sympathized with the economic plight of
the South but remained quite uneasy with the repudiation of government bonds.
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than in the Court's 1903 decision in Giles v. Harris. °00 There, as the
movement for legalized racial segregation and disenfranchisement
swept across the South, a black citizen of Alabama invoked the
Fourteenth Amendment to challenge the validity of provisions in the
state's constitution that were being used to disenfranchise black
voters. 0 1 Plaintiff sought an order directing that his name and the
name of other qualified black voters be placed on the state's voting
lists. 50 2 Passing methodically over various technical objections that
could have allowed it to avoid the merits, the Court relentlessly
marched to "the substance of the complaint" and then declared
bluntly that it was "impossible to grant the equitable relief which is
asked. '503  With little camouflage, its reasoning invoked the hard
proposition that the Court simply lacked the de facto power to
enforce any order that would provide plaintiff a meaningful
remedy." 4 In such a situation, Hans provided the perfect legal
rationale. "This is alleged to be a conspiracy of a State, although the
State is not and could not be made a party to the bill," Giles
declared. As authority, it cited Hans. The necessary conclusion
followed logically. "The Circuit Court has no constitutional power to
control its [the State's] action by any direct means. 5 6 The Justices
affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's suit.
In Giles the Court's ready recognition and acceptance of its
helplessness was striking:
The bill imports that the great mass of the white population
intends to keep the blacks from voting. To meet such an
intent something more than ordering the plaintiff's name to
be inscribed upon the lists of 1902 will be needed. If the
500. 189 U.S. 475 (1903). Justice Holmes, the Union war veteran who had come to
scorn his earlier abolitionist faith, wrote for a six-Justice majority. Justices Brewer and
Harlan dissented in separate opinions. Id. at 488 (Brewer, J., dissenting), 493 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brewer, not surprisingly, argued that the federal courts had
jurisdiction to hear the suit, while Justice Harlan found other jurisdictional problems. Id.
at 488-504 (Brewer and Harlan, JJ., dissenting). Unlike Justice Brewer, however, Justice
Harlan noted his belief that, on the merits, plaintiff was entitled to relief. Id. at 504
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Surprisingly, Justice Brown also dissented, but without opinion.
Id. at 493.
501. Id. at 482.
502. Id.
503. Id. at 486.
504. Although the Court offered what purported to be legal reasons for its decisions, it
relied ultimately and explicitly on its own institutional helplessness, implying that a grant
of relief would have received no support from either the state or the legislative or
executive branches of the United States government. Id. at 487-88.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 488 (citation omitted).
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conspiracy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper
will not defeat them. Unless we are prepared to supervise
the voting in that State by officers of the court, it seems to us
that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would be an
empty form. Apart from damages to the individual, relief
from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the
people of a State and the State itself, must be given by them
or by the legislative and political department of the
government of the United States." 7
That recognition and acceptance of helplessness was also
familiar. Those same characteristics had marked the Court's opinion
in Jumel, where it had begun expanding the Eleventh Amendment to
avoid the problem of southern repudiationism:
The remedy sought, in order to be complete, would require
the court to assume all the executive authority of the State,
so far as it related to the enforcement of this law, and to
supervise the conduct of all persons charged with any official
duty in respect to the levy, collection, and disbursement of
the tax in question until the bonds, principal and interest,
were paid in full, and that, too, in a proceeding in which the
State, as a State, was not and could not be made a party. It
needs no argument to show that the political power cannot
be thus ousted of its jurisdiction and the judiciary set in its
place.5 08
The parallel stance and rhetoric, and the ultimate judicial
abdication, in Giles and Jumel was hardly surprising, for Giles was a
response to the same overarching problem that Jumel had
addressed-the need to accept, rationalize, and legitimize the
components of the post-Reconstruction settlement. On neither race
nor bonds would the South be dissuaded from its course, and on
neither race nor bonds would the North insist on compliance with the
relevant constitutional provisions. Giles merely echoed Jumel in
announcing the Court's recognition and acceptance of those practical
truths. Thus, it was both natural and appropriate that Giles would
find authority for its surrender to southern racism in Hans, the
opinion that most broadly theorized Jumel and the Court's surrender
to southern repudiationism. Giles confirmed the central role that
Hans played in weaving the cloak of constitutional legitimacy that the
Court draped over the twin components of the post-Reconstruction
settlement.
507. Id.
508. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711,727-28 (1883).
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A decade after Hans, and three years before Giles, United States
Senator "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman took the Senate floor. An
enthusiastic participant in the racial violence that enabled the
Democrats to seize control of South Carolina, and the model for the
hero of Thomas W. Dixon's novel The Clansman,°9 Tillman felt free
to brag about the achievements of the white South: "We took the
government away [from the blacks]," he boasted, "We stuffed ballot
boxes. We shot them. We are not ashamed of it."510 He did not stop
with praise for the efforts of his beloved South, however, but pointed
to parallel actions in the North.
The brotherhood of man exists no longer, because you shoot
negroes in Illinois, when they come in competition with your
labor, as we shoot them in South Carolina when they come
in competition with us in the matter of elections. You do
not love them any better than we do. You used to pretend
that you did, but you no longer pretend it, except to get their
votes." I
The North, Tillman charged bluntly, was fully and knowingly
complicitous in the nation's systemic racial abuses. While he spoke,
and when he took his seat afterward, not a single senator rose to
dispute his claims or utter a word of protest."' They all lived
comfortably together in the world of the post-Reconstruction
settlement.
509. KANTROWITZ, supra note 223, at 284-86.
510. HAROLD U. FAULKNER, POLITICS, REFORM AND EXPANSION, 1890-1900, at 7
(1959) (quoting Tillman's speech to the Senate in 1900). Tillman was a major force in
leading the South to restore white rule.
Democratic ringleaders threatened to spill blood to assert their right to rule.
Tillman harassed black voters as they arrived [at the polls in 1876], declaring that
he was manager of the poll and would notice if any Republican votes were cast.
Robert Chandler, a black Republican who later testified that he had been driven
off his land five weeks earlier, described a "whooping and holloing" group of
men, including Tillman, who drew pistols and told Chandler to stay away from
the ballot box. They warned him that if he came any closer, he "would come
through blood." Chandler said, "Benny Tillman said they had been the rulers of
Carolina and they intended to rule it."
KANTROWITZ, supra note 223, at 76.
511. FAULKNER, supra note 510, at 7-8 (quoting Tillman's speech to the Senate in
1900).
512. Id. at 8.
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V. THE PARTICULARLY DUBIOUS NATURE OF HANS, III: A
BYGONE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
As a key element of the post-Reconstruction settlement, Hans
helped close an era in the nation's history, the age when Americans
addressed the problems caused by slavery and its abolition. An
integral part of that bygone era, Hans-its purpose accomplished-
quickly faded in importance as the nation turned to meet the new
problems created by the emerging world of industrialization and
internationalization. The insignia of Hans's origins in both the
passing age and the necessities of the post-Reconstruction settlement,
however, were chiseled on its face, like angels of death on Puritan
gravestones.
Most striking, Hans was based on two older jurisdictional
approaches that the Court already had rejected. In Metcalf v.
Watertown,513 decided two years before Hans, the Court had
announced a "well-pleaded complaint" rule that limited federal
question jurisdiction, in suits originally brought in federal court, to
those that presented "federal questions" on the face of properly
pleaded complaints." 4 In Hans, which had been filed originally in
federal court in 1884, the federal law issue was not part of a "well-
pleaded complaint." Plaintiff's claim was based not on federal law
but on state law-it was a straightforward contract claim for money
due on bonds.1 5 The federal law involved, the Contract Clause,
became relevant only as a possible reply to the state's anticipated plea
that it had a valid defense under state law for its refusal to honor the
state-law claim for money due. Thus, two years before it rendered
final judgment in Hans, the Court had announced a jurisdictional rule
513. 128 U.S. 586 (1888).
514. Id. at 588; see Collins, supra note 30, at 730-34. Six years later, in Tennessee v.
Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894), the Court extended that plaintiff's pleading
rule to cases brought originally in state court and removed to federal court under federal
question jurisdiction. See Collins, supra note 30, at 734-37; supra notes 122-25 and
accompanying text.
515. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 1-3 (1890) (plaintiff pleading contract, breach, and
money due under state law). It is possible to conceive of Hans as impliedly recognizing a
federal cause of action directly under the Contract Clause. See Woolhandler, supra note
38, at 448-50 & n.280. It seems unlikely, however, that the Court shared that conception.
First, it did not articulate that concept or use that term until well into the twentieth
century. Second, its opinion in Hans and other similar late nineteenth-century cases
suggest that the Justices were living through a time of drastic social and jurisprudential
change and that they were unclear and uncertain about a great number of things. The law
of federal jurisdiction was unsettled and changing, and the Justices were in many ways
simply struggling along.
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that held claims such as those raised in Hans to be insufficient to
present federal questions for jurisdictional purposes. Yet, to reach its
desired result, the Court ignored Metcalf and regressed to an
outmoded rule.
Similarly, the Court in Hans accepted a complaint of a type that
it had already determined was insufficient to establish federal
jurisdiction and that properly required the suit's dismissal. In 1884, in
Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Railway Co. v. Swan,516 it had
ruled that a federal court could not hear a case unless the party
invoking its jurisdiction affirmatively pleaded, and if necessary
proved, a proper basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction.'
17
Actions should be dismissed and judgments on appeal reversed,
Mansfield declared, "not only in cases where it is shown negatively,
by a plea to the jurisdiction, that jurisdiction does not exist, but even
when it does not appear affirmatively that it does exist." '518 Under
that requirement, Hans did not present a proper federal question for
jurisdictional purposes, and thus Mansfield also called for Hans's
dismissal. Indeed, Justice Bradley's opinion in Hans acknowledged as
much. It brazenly ignored the problem by accepting what the Justice
slyly termed plaintiff's mere "suggestion" that the court below had
subject matter jurisdiction over the action." 9 As the Hans Court
ignored Metcalf to reach its goal, it also ignored Mansfield.
In addition to relying on outmoded doctrines on those two issues,
Hans also reflected two other doctrines that the Court would reject in
the early decades of the twentieth century. First, it embraced a broad
and amorphous concept of a "federal question" that was rooted in
Justice Marshall's opinion in Osborn. The older concept considered a
case within federal question jurisdiction if, in the words of Hans, "it
516. 111 U.S. 379 (1884).
517. Id. at 382-84. The Mansfield rule is usually traced to Capron v. Van Noorden, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 126 (1804).
518. Mansfield, I1 U.S. at 384. In their classic casebook, Henry M. Hart, Jr., and
Herbert Wechsler maintained that the "principle declared in the Mansfield case and
codified in the Federal Rules can properly be called the first principle of federal
jurisdiction." HART & WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 719. In the twentieth century no
federal court would allow a party to proceed on a mere "suggestion" that subject matter
jurisdiction existed. Id. "The first duty of counsel is to make clear to the court the basis of
its jurisdiction as a federal court," Hart and Wechsler explained. Id. "The first duty of the
court is to make sure that jurisdiction exists." Id.; accord CLINTON ET AL., supra note 60,
at 159 (affirming foundational nature of the Mansfield rule).
519. Hans, 134 U.S. at 9. Because Mansfield and Metcalf set the boundaries of federal
subject matter jurisdiction, they should have been applied in the Supreme Court,
regardless of the time at which the suit below was filed. The Court's decision to rely on a
"suggestion" of jurisdiction and to proceed to judgment evidenced the Court's
determination to use Hans to settle the southern state bond litigations once and for all.
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necessarily involves a question under said Constitution or laws. 52°
Indeed, it was indicative of the instrumentalist and even willful way
that Justice Bradley constructed his opinion in Hans that he
embraced Osborn's authority on one point-the jurisdictional nature
of a "federal question"-while rejecting it on another-the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment itself. In any event, in the early years of
the twentieth century the Court would abandon that unmodulated
concept of a federal question and substitute a narrower and more
highly focused approach designed to determine whether the federal
law element in a case was sufficiently important and central to
warrant the national courts taking jurisdiction over it.521 Under that
approach, Hans would likely have been dismissed for want of a
federal question.
Second, Hans's analysis of the Eleventh Amendment was
informed and crimped by the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson5 12 2 and the
"general" federal common law. In Hans the Court failed even to
consider whether the amendment's specific language referring to
aliens and noncitizens might have been intended to limit its denial of
federal judicial power to cases in which jurisdiction was based on
citizenship. It failed to consider that possibility, in part, because
520. Id.; see, e.g., Pac. R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885) (holding that a case
against a corporation organized under the laws of the United States is within federal
question jurisdiction); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 756-
57 (1824) (finding the case to be within federal question jurisdiction because the
controversy arose under the Constitution).
521. In a series of cases in the early twentieth century the Court narrowed Hans's
conception of a federal question by holding that federal law issues were not sufficient to
confer jurisdiction if they involved relatively peripheral or subsidiary issues that were
unlikely to be dispositive. Only those federal law issues that were central to plaintiffs'
claims were sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction on the lower courts. See
Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936); Moore v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 209-11 (1934); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255
U.S. 180, 199-202 (t921); Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,259-
60 (1916). The Court has essentially stayed with this narrowed concept of federal question
jurisdiction to the present day. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
807-12 (1986).
522. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (creating a special "federal common law" by
holding that the federal courts could make "independent" judgments on common-law
questions and were not bound by the common-law decisions of the state courts). For
general discussions of the growth of the federal common law see the following: ALLAN
RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U. WHITFEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON
LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
FEDERALISM (1977); TONY FREYER, FORUMS OF ORDER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
BUSINESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1979); TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE:
THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981); William P. LaPiana,
Swift v. Tyson and the Brooding Omnipresence in the Sky: An Investigation of the Idea of
Law in Antebellum America, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 771 (1986).
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under Swift the substantive law that governed the bonds would have
been the same-"general" federal common law-regardless of
whether jurisdiction was based on citizenship or the presence of a
federal question . 23 Thus, Hans understandably overlooked what was
arguably a more plausible construction of the Eleventh Amendment
because it was partially blinded by a doctrine of federal substantive
law that the Court would subsequently reject as not only misguided
but "unconstitutional. 52 4 Its implicit reliance on the Swift doctrine
further marked its roots in a passing age and a jurisprudence that the
Court itself would eventually repudiate.
21
Thus, Hans bore the marks of its historical origin. It
incorporated a variety of rules, procedures, and assumptions that the
Court had already rejected or would do so in the coming decades.
More significant, its recurrence to the outmoded rules rejected in
Metcalf and Mansfield evidenced its instrumentalism and its
determination to use Hans to accomplish the important national
results it sought.
While those doctrinal marks identified Hans with both a bygone
jurisprudential age and the compulsions of the post-Reconstruction
settlement, another of its characteristics did far more, not only
stamping Hans as outmoded and instrumentalist but also revealing it
as fundamentally inconsistent with the post-Civil War Constitution.
Hans also implicitly rejected the principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment had altered the nature of American government and the
reach of the federal judicial power. While the Court's other decisions
implementing the post-Reconstruction settlement adopted a variety
of devices to constrict the Fourteenth Amendment, Hans was the
most peremptory. It simply ignored the amendment as though it did
not exist.
From the nation's early years the Court had assumed that a
central purpose of the federal courts was to foster national unity and
commercial expansion by providing fair and neutral forums to resolve
disputes between states or their citizens on one side and other states
and nations or their citizens and subjects on the other. Through their
admiralty and diversity of citizenship jurisdiction the federal courts
protected outsiders from discrimination based on local prejudice,
523. See Sherry, supra note 13, at 1265.
524. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938); see also PURCELL,
supra note 107, at 172-91 (discussing the overruling of Swift in Erie).
525. "Because the legitimacy-to say nothing of the correctness-of Hans depended
on its integration with the related constitutional theory of an expanded Swift doctrine, the
Hans rule lost its legitimacy in 1938." Sherry, supra note 13, at 1271.
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parochial favoritism, and narrow, hostile, or anticommercial state
policies.126 Neither their authorized jurisdiction nor their presumed
role called for them to hear suits brought against states by a state's
own citizens.527
Then came the Civil War and the three constitutional
amendments that were intended to secure the fruits of Union victory.
All three amendments imposed radical new limitations on the states,
expanded the power of Congress substantially, and broadened the
scope of the federal judicial power.52  Even with the narrowed
construction the Court gave the amendments in the 1870s and 1880s,
and even with the severely constraining "state action" requirement it
imposed on the Fourteenth, the three amendments still wrought a
major change in the nature of American government and the
constitutional relationship between federal and state power.
Hans ignored the import of those amendments.52 9 It cemented
the post-Reconstruction settlement by rejecting their mandate and
clinging to an early nineteenth-century understanding of the role and
scope of the federal judicial power. At its core, Hans was based on
the outmoded assumption-repudiated by the Civil War
Amendments-that the federal courts were not authorized to hear
suits between states and their own citizens. The critical textual
problem that Hans addressed, after all, was that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibited only suits against states brought by
noncitizens or aliens. "It is true, the amendment does so read," the
526. The Court served the same policies through the federal common law developed
under Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368
(1893) (deciding a negligence case based on federal common law). The "general" federal
common law was not available in state courts nor in the United States Supreme Court in
cases appealed from state courts. See, e.g., Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104-06
(1878) (stating that the Court might consider the general federal common law if it were
reviewing the decision of a federal court).
527. Justice Field illustrated the extent to which the assumption remained fundamental
in 1880. Noting that the judicial power of the United States extended "to cases in law and
equity arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, and to
various controversies to which a State is a party," he nevertheless proceeded without
hesitation to declare that the Constitution "does not include in its enumeration
controversies between a State and its own citizens." Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 336
(1880) (Field, J., dissenting).
528. CURTIS, supra note 88, at 57-91; 6 FAIRMAN, supra note 69, at 1117-1206;
Kaczorowski, supra note 88, at 938-40; Schmidt, supra note 89, at 1420-29, 1497-99. Even
those who argue for a narrow interpretation of the amendments maintain that they
restricted the states and expanded federal power significantly. BELZ, supra note 88, at
115-17, 157-77; NELSON, supra note 88, at 114-47; Benedict, supra note 88, at 49-51, 63-
79.
529. For a similar argument involving the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
see Matasar & Bruch, supra note 102, at 1345-55.
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Court acknowledged, "and if there were no other reason or ground
for abating [plaintiff's] suit, it might be maintainable.""53 There was,
however, an "other reason." '531 If the amendment allowed such a suit,
Hans explained,
then we should have this anomalous result, that, in cases
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a
State may be sued in the federal courts by its own citizens,
though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the
citizens of other States, or of a foreign state; and may be
thus sued in the federal courts, although not allowing itself
to be sued in its own courts.32
Such an "anomalous result," the Court continued, would be
"startling and unexpected. 5 3  Indeed, it declared in seeming shock,
such a conclusion was "almost an absurdity on its face." '534 It was, the
Court finally exploded as it reached the zenith of its stunned disbelief,
"an attempt to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction
never imagined or dreamed of.
5 35
Those escalating expressions of astonishment and indignation
were rooted in a pre-Fourteenth Amendment view of the federal
courts' role, in the outmoded assumption that their primary purpose
was to protect noncitizens and aliens, not a state's own citizens.536
Revealingly, Hans's antiquated assumption about the role of the
530. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,10 (1890).
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 10-11.
534. Id. at 15.
535. Id. The extremity of the Court's rhetoric could be taken to suggest that the
Justices recognized that such an "anomalous result" was, in fact, quite plausibly called for
by the Civil War amendments.
536. This is not to suggest that the older view denied the federal courts any other roles,
but only that the settlement of disputes involving diverse citizens and aliens-most
commonly involving state-created, private-law rights-was seen through most of the
nineteenth century as a major function. See Purcell, supra note 103, at 691-93. Among
the other roles the federal courts played was the enforcer of federal law, especially laws
involving crimes and taxation, and the protector of federal officials acting in their official
capacities. Frequently, the national courts enforced federal law through their diversity
jurisdiction. See Woolhandler, supra note 150, at 89-92. Many rules and "rights" that
have come to be governed by federal law since the late nineteenth century were in earlier
periods issues of "state" law. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 473, at 224-25 (discussing the
federal absorption of state law in the controversy over polygamy). Finally, the statement
in the text is not meant to suggest that views about the role of the federal courts did not
change during the nineteenth century. They, of course, did change in a variety of ways.
The point in the text is that as late as the 1890s, the older view still resonated among the
Justices and proved useful-perhaps essential-in helping them in Hans to find a way
around the language of the Eleventh Amendment.
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federal courts was consistent with the Court's efforts during the 1890s
to subordinate federal question jurisdiction to diversity jurisdiction,
contracting the former while expanding the latter.537 At the time of
Hans and into the 1890s, in other words, the Court still tended to
conceive of the lower federal courts as instruments designed primarily
to protect "outsiders" acting beyond their states or nations against the
dangers of local prejudice and discriminatory policies established by
other states. 38
Far more importantly, in the 1890s-once the post-
Reconstruction settlement had been firmly locked in place and issues
of government economic regulation came pushing to the fore-that
pre-Civil War assumption about the role of the federal courts quickly
began to crumble. Striking evidence of its disintegration in the
aftermath of Hans emerged from two pathbreaking cases announced
within the decade, Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,539 decided in
1894, and Smyth v. Ames,54 handed down four years later. The two
cases revealed the profound and rapid way in which the Court began
in the years after Hans to reconceive the role of the lower courts, the
nature of the federal judicial power, and the meaning and significance
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Reagan, the Court voided as unreasonable railroad rates
imposed by the Texas Railroad Commission and upheld an injunction
barring the state from enforcing the rates.541 Reagan thus constituted
a critical step in establishing what became the doctrine of substantive
due process. The Court asserted its authority to judge the fairness
and reasonableness of state-established rates, and it defined that
authority as inherently within "[t]he province of the courts." '542
Most significantly for present purposes, Reagan revealed a Court
in jurisprudential transition. Looking to the future, the decision
illustrated the Court's willingness to set the Eleventh Amendment
aside when policy demanded. First, Reagan avoided the amendment
on a potentially sweeping theory. The suit filed against the state's
attorney general and its railroad commission, it explained, was not a
suit against the state because the state itself had "in a pecuniary sense
537. See supra text accompanying notes 120-30.
538. PURCELL, supra note 107, at 266-91. On the broad importance of diversity
jurisdiction in the nineteenth century, see generally Collins, supra note 130; Woolhandler,
supra note 150, at 84-108.
539. 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
540. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
541. Reagan, 154 U.S. at 412-13.
542. Id. at 397.
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no interest at all" in the suit.5 43 The state's interest was nothing more
than its interest in conducting governmental affairs. "There is a
sense, doubtless, in which it may be said that the State is interested in
the question, but only a governmental sense," the Court explained. 44
"It is interested in the well-being of its citizens, in the just and equal
enforcement of all its laws . . . . ,145 That interest-the essential
interest in carrying on the governmental affairs of the state-was
insufficient to make the state a proper or necessary party to a suit
designed to enjoin the state's officials from conducting
"governmental" affairs. Hence, the interest was insufficient to
implicate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Consequently,
the federal courts could ignore the amendment and enjoin a state's
officers from taking any unconstitutional action even though their
action was taken pursuant to law, on the state's behalf, and in the
conduct of "governmental" affairs. Second, Reagan ignored Ayers
46
and its holding that the initiation of legal enforcement proceedings by
state officials was not by itself a legal wrong sufficient to warrant the
intervention of federal equity.547 By 1894 the Court was prepared to
affirm an injunction that prohibited state officials merely from
instituting suit to recover penalties due under the state's authorizing
statute. 48 Third, Reagan illustrated the Court's ability to conjure
state "consent" to federal jurisdiction when it seemed useful. The
statute at issue provided that judicial challenges to the commission's
rates should be brought "in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis
County, Texas. 5 49 The statutory language seemed to specify a state
court. Moreover, a further provision of the statute, mandating that
any action under the provision "shall have precedence over all other
causes on the docket""55 at both the trial and appellate levels, seemed
to confirm that conclusion, for states could not so dictate concerning
the jurisdiction and docket of the federal trial and appellate courts.
Reagan nonetheless construed the provision as the state's "consent"
to suit in a local federal court. The United States court for the
Western District of Texas, it announced, "is 'a court of competent
543. Id. at 390. "Not a dollar will be taken from the treasury of the State, no pecuniary




546. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
547. Id. at 500.
548. Reagan, 154 U.S at 367, 369-70, 413.




jurisdiction in Travis County' " and "comes, therefore, within the very
terms of the act." '551 Thus, Reagan made clear that there were a
variety of ways to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment when federal
judicial action seemed necessary.
While Reagan looked toward the future in minimizing the
Eleventh Amendment and in expanding federal judicial authority
over state actions, it nonetheless also remained rooted in the past,
constrained and perplexed by older assumptions. First, in identifying
the nature of the controlling substantive law, Reagan remained
uncertain. It suggested, in fact, three different possibilities: the Due
Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and some inherent
common-law judicial power to evaluate the "reasonableness" of rates
charged by common carriers.552 At no point did it clearly decide
among them. Second, confirming the Court's uncertainty about the
source and nature of the controlling substantive law, Reagan
repeatedly spoke as if the case were in federal court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction. It did not, in any event, identify the case as one
raising a federal question for jurisdictional purposes. 3 Third, and
perhaps most telling, the Court repeatedly stressed the importance of
the fact that plaintiff was a noncitizen of Texas: Unlike a state's
citizens, the Justices believed, noncitizens of a state had an
unquestioned right to use the federal courts:
For it may be laid down, as a general proposition that,
whenever a citizen of a State can go into the courts of a State
to defend his property against the illegal acts of its officers, a
citizen of another State may invoke the jurisdiction of the
Federal courts to maintain a like defence. A State cannot tie
up a citizen of another State, having property rights within its
territory invaded by unauthorized acts of its own officers, to
suits for redress in its own courts.554
Four pages later Reagan reiterated the point.
551. Id. at 392 (quoting the Texas Railroad Commission Act).
552. Id. at 398 (citing Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway v. Minnesota, 134 U.S.
418, 458 (1890) and suggesting a due process basis). The Court referred to the
"constitutional right" of "equal protection," id. at 399; and it claimed that "it has always
been recognized" that "the courts had jurisdiction to inquire" into the reasonableness of
the rates charged by common carriers, id. at 397. See Collins, supra note 130, at 1292-93.
553. The Court's opinion retained a studied vagueness. It stated at one point, for
example, that the lower court had jurisdiction "whether we rest upon the provisions of the
[state] statute or upon the general jurisdiction of the court existing by virtue of the statutes
of Congress, under the sanction of the Constitution of the United States." Reagan, 154
U.S. at 393.
554. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
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So that if in any case, there should be any mistaken action
on the part of a State, or its commission, injurious to the
rights of a railroad corporation, any citizen of another State,
interested directly therein, can find in the Federal court all
the relief which a court of equity is justified in giving.5
Finally, announcing its holding, the Court declared that it was "within
the competency of the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Western District of Texas, at the instance of the plaintiff, a citizen of
another State, to enter upon an inquiry as to the reasonableness and
justice of the rates." '556 Thus, the fact that plaintiff was a noncitizen
was of compelling importance to the Reagan Court. It not only gave
the lower court jurisdiction but also brought the case within what the
Court still considered the core purpose of the federal courts,
providing protection for noncitizens operating in interstate
commerce.
Within a bare four years, both the Court and its doctrines had
evolved substantially.5 7  In upholding another federal injunction
against unreasonable railroad rates, Smyth v. Ames embodied the
transformation. As in Reagan, the Court looked to the future by
disposing of the state's Eleventh Amendment objection. By 1898,
however, it was able to do so quickly and easily-a perfunctory
pronouncement sufficed. "It is the settled doctrine of this court that a
suit against individuals for the purpose of preventing them as officers
of a State from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment to the injury
of the rights of the plaintiff," the Court declared, "is not a suit against
the State within the meaning of that Amendment.""55 Unlike Reagan,
however, Smyth no longer seemed tied to the past. The change was
apparent in its treatment of both substantive law and plaintiff's
citizenship. On the question of substantive law, the Court was
prepared by 1898 to identify the nature of the controlling substantive
law clearly and at length. Invoking both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, Smyth held explicitly that the Fourteenth
Amendment controlled the case.559 The opinion explained that the
amendment protected corporations as well as individuals, that it
prohibited states from imposing unreasonable rates, and that it
555. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
556. Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
557. See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 40-46; Collins, supra note 130, at 1310-20.
558. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898).
559. Id. at 522-27.
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mandated a full "judicial inquiry" into such regulatory issues. 6 ° The
Court's new understanding of the nature of the controlling
substantive law transformed its understanding of the significance of
plaintiff's citizenship. Smyth ruled that the lower court had
jurisdiction not only on the ground of diversity but also "upon the
further ground" that the suit challenged the state statute as
''repugnant to the rights secured to the plaintiffs by the Constitution
of the United States" and hence "may be regarded as arising under
that instrument." '561 Given the fact that plaintiff's claim was based on
the Constitution and, consequently, that general federal question
jurisdiction existed, in other words, diversity jurisdiction was
superfluous and the citizenship of the parties irrelevant. The role of
the federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment, Smyth
recognized and announced, was to enforce the Constitution
regardless of citizenship. Whether the state acted against its own
citizens or against citizens of other states no longer made a difference.
Citizenship and diversity jurisdiction were irrelevant when plaintiff
raised a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, in the brief four years from Reagan to Smyth the Court's
conception of the role of the federal courts had shifted markedly.
From a focus on their older core role protecting noncitizens, the
Court began recognizing and articulating their new role as protectors
of federal rights irrespective of citizenship. To the Court that decided
Reagan, it was still understandable that Hans could express
astonishment at the idea that a citizen could sue his or her own state.
To the Court that decided Smyth, it was already understandable that
it should make no difference-in a suit brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment-whether a state through its officials was sued by one of
its own citizens or by a citizen of another state. The Court had come
to see the problem anew, the controlling law anew, and the very role
and purpose of the federal courts anew.562
The change in the Court's assumptions and jurisprudence
became increasingly apparent in subsequent cases when it addressed
the relationship between the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments.
During the years when the Court helped structure the post-
560. Id. at 526. The Court identified and explained the controlling constitutional law in
an extended discussion. Id. at 522-27.
561. Id. at 518.
562. Only two years after Smyth, the Court began the process of turning the lower
courts away from traditional common law tort and contract actions and toward federal
question suits involving government regulatory actions. See PURCELL, supra note 107, at
262-91.
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Reconstruction settlement, it had construed the Eleventh
Amendment liberally and sympathetically and the Fourteenth-
particularly in the context of black rights-narrowly and
begrudgingly. "To secure the manifest purposes of the constitutional
exemption guaranteed by the 11th Amendment," Ayers had
announced in 1887, "requires that it should be interpreted not
literally and too narrowly, but fairly, and with such breadth and
largeness as effectually to accomplish the substance of its purpose." '563
Conversely, the Fourteenth Amendment was to be read strictly and
literally. The federal courts could not enforce it without legislation,
Ex parte Virginia declared, because in the amendment "[i]t is not said
the judicial power of the general government shall extend to
enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities
guaranteed." 5" Ayers and Virginia stated principles well suited to
legitimize the post-Reconstruction settlement and justify the failure
of the federal courts to provide remedies for constitutional violations.
As the Court moved beyond the task of resolving the problems
of race and repudiation to address the problems of industrialism and
government regulation, however, it found that it had to invert its
interpretative principles. As Reagan and Smyth illustrated, the
Eleventh Amendment was waning as the Fourteenth Amendment
waxed. The idea that the former had "breadth and largeness" began
to wither, and the Court's commitment to its "manifest purposes"
quickly faded. Conversely, the idea that the latter was
"comprehensive" began to spread, and the Court began-outside the
context of race-to embrace enthusiastically the Amendment's
guarantees of nationally protected liberty and property.
In 1903, Prout v. Starr65 captured the change. "It would, indeed,
be most unfortunate," the Court there declared in its new voice, if the
Eleventh Amendment "were to be interpreted as nullifying" either
the constitutional powers of Congress or the constitutional limitations
on the states.566 Such a double nullification would result, it continued,
"if the judicial power of the United States could not be invoked to
protect citizens affected by the passage of state laws disregarding
563. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505-06 (1887). A decade later, without using quotes or
even referring to Ayers, the Court reaffirmed the same principle in virtually identical
words. "To secure the manifest purposes of the constitutional exemption guaranteed by
the Eleventh Amendment," it declared in Fitts v. McGhee, "requires that it should be
interpreted not literally and too narrowly, but fairly, and with such breadth and largeness
as effectually to accomplish the substance of its purpose." 172 U.S. 516, 528 (1899).
564. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880).
565. 188 U.S. 537 (1903).
566. Id. at 543.
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these constitutional limitations." '567 Prout declared that the Eleventh
Amendment could not be used to so limit the federal judicial power
and, further, that it could most certainly not be used to limit that
power when Fourteenth Amendment rights were at issue. "Much less
can the Eleventh Amendment be successfully pleaded as an invincible
barrier to judicial inquiry whether the salutary provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment have been disregarded by state
enactments." '568 Most directly to the point, Prout made it undeniably
clear that the federal judicial power under the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended "to protect citizens." '569
The culminating moment came on March 23, 1908, when the
Court handed down its paired decisions in Ex parte Young'7° and
General Oil Co. v. Crain.57  The former accomplished several
interrelated doctrinal results. First, Young dispensed with the
requirement that state officials had to threaten or commit some
independent legal wrong before they could be enjoined. The decision
authorized federal injunctions against state officials for merely
threatening to enforce statutes claimed to be unconstitutional,
severely qualifying if not overruling Ayers. Second, Young created a
federal cause of action for injunctive relief against state officials
directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. It dismissed as irrelevant
the fact that there was no diversity of citizenship, and it dispensed
with any need for statutory authorization for a cause of action.
Rejecting the language of Ex parte Virginia which had left
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment to Congress,57 the Court
held that the federal courts were authorized to enforce the
amendment-even in the absence of statutory authorization-by
creating judicial remedies against state officials. Finally, by creating a
cause of action under federal law, Young broadened federal
jurisdiction by hewing a wide bypass around the well-pleaded
complaint rule. It enabled those who wished to challenge the
constitutionality of state actions to plead a federal claim and thereby
invoke federal question jurisdiction. Thus, it allowed them to initiate
567. Id. (emphasis added). Interestingly, in its comments about the powers of
Congress, the Court hinted that the express terms of the Eleventh Amendment-barring




570. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
571. 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
572. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-48 (1880); see also supra text accompanying
note 564.
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preemptive proceedings against state officials in federal court,
thereby controlling the timing and especially the forum where citizens
could bring their challenges to state actions.573
If Young was pivotal as a formulation of constitutional doctrine,
Crain was eloquent as a display of judicial mood. There, Tennessee
argued that the Eleventh Amendment precluded federal jurisdiction
over the actions of a state official and, further, that the amendment
might prevent the United States Supreme Court from reviewing
challenges to such actions that had been brought in the state's own
courts. Responding bluntly, the Court dispensed with its customary
delicacy and rejected the argument out of hand for a practical and
compelling reason. If the state's position were accepted, it warned,
"it must be evident that an easy way is open to prevent the
enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution." '574 The Court
was explicitly pointing to the possibility of state duplicity and bad
faith. Without review by the federal judiciary, Crain asserted, "the
Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be
nullified as to much of its operation." '575 That result would be
intolerable, and it could not be allowed.
Crain thus made it crystal clear that sometime between Ayers
and Hans at the end of one era and Reagan and Smyth at the
beginning of another, the Court had begun to reconceive the role of
the federal courts and radically readjust the balance between the
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments. It had become
wholeheartedly committed to the principle that the exercise of federal
judicial power over state actions was a paramount necessity and that
enforcing the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment was the
highest duty of the federal courts. Further, it had also become
committed to the principle that the Amendment protected "citizens"
and authorized federal judicial relief against unconstitutional actions
by officials of the citizen's state. Crain demonstrated the Court's
commitment to Fourteenth Amendment protections, its suspicion of
the states and their courts, and its determination to oversee and
573. See PURCELL, supra note 107, at 42-44. From its inception Young has been the
target of severe and wide-ranging criticism as well as the object of glowing praise.
Attitudes toward it have varied largely as a result of the changing political orientation of
the federal courts and the practical impact of their jurisdiction. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978) (describing how the popularity of Young and the
federal injunctions it allowed waxed and waned); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The
Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995) (criticizing Young for creating
the fiction that plaintiffs could sue the government by suing a government official).




constrain their economic regulatory actions. "And it will not do to
say that the argument is drawn from extremes," it insisted with
obvious passion.57 6  "Constitutional provisions are based on the
possibility of extremes." '577
The transformation in the relationship between the Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendments was completed and celebrated five years
later in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,578 the
Court's culminating paean to the Fourteenth Amendment and to the
federal judiciary as its "primary" enforcer. Home Telephone reversed
the constitutional values asserted in Ayers, giving the Eleventh
Amendment scarcely a nod and underscoring the "completeness" and
"comprehensive inclusiveness" of the Fourteenth."9 The Fourteenth
Amendment reached not only the actions of all state officials but of
all municipal or local government officials as well. It reached not
only actions that were authorized by state law but those that were
unauthorized as well, even actions that were clearly unlawful under a
state's own law. The Fourteenth Amendment, Home Telephone
proclaimed sweepingly, "embraces every manifestation of state
power.""58  Indeed, it cut the Gordian Knot of constitutional
jurisdiction that the Court had tied in its earlier efforts to legitimate
the post-Reconstruction settlement: It ruled bluntly that actions by
state officials constituted "state action" for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes but did not constitute "state action" for Eleventh
Amendment purposes. Expressly reversing the constitutional
language about the judicial power set forth in Ex parte Virginia,
Home Telephone announced that the federal courts were to see that
the Fourteenth Amendment was enforced whenever and wherever it
might be applicable. They "are charged under the Constitution" with
that "duty," the Court proclaimed, and they-not the state courts-
were properly the "primary source for applying and enforcing the
576. Id.
577. Id. at 226-27; see PURCELL, supra note 107, at 272-91.
578. 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
579. Id. at 288.
580. Id. at 295. The Court held that the
provisions of the Amendment as conclusively fixed by previous decisions are
generic in their terms, are addressed, of course, to the States, but also to every
person, whether natural or juridical who is the repository of state power. By this
construction the reach of the Amendment is shown to be coextensive with any
exercise by a State of power, in whatever form exerted.
Id. at 286-87.
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Constitution of the United States in all cases covered by the
Fourteenth Amendment." '581
Thus, by the second decade of the twentieth century the Court
had reversed its treatment of the relationship between the Eleventh
and Fourteenth Amendments. A broad Eleventh Amendment and a
narrow Fourteenth Amendment-Hans and the Civil Rights Cases-
had blended nicely to underwrite and institutionalize the post-
Reconstruction settlement. Times and issues, however, had changed.
As the plight of the freed persons was submerged from view and the
complex challenges of industrialism advanced to the fore, a new
balance was required, one that drastically shrank the Eleventh
Amendment while raising the Fourteenth to a position of dominance.
As Young and its cohort remolded the scope of the two amendments,
however, the Court left the state action requirement of the Civil
Rights Cases in place. That doctrine-necessary to guarantee the
racial bargain that sealed the post-Reconstruction settlement-
proved to be ideally shaped, for it insulated the southern system of
white supremacy while welcoming the Court's new Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence that checked economic regulation. The
new administrative and legislative challenges of the industrial age,
after all, involved precisely the kind of formal government behavior
that clearly and obviously constituted "state action." Thus, the turn-
of-the-century transition retained the doctrine of the Civil Rights
Cases in its full vigor. Hans, however, needed to be deflated,
reshaped, and severely limited. By 1913, after Young, Crain, and
Home Telephone, that remodeling had been fully accomplished.
Indeed, from the new vantage point of Young, Crain, and Home
Telephone, Hans's backward orientation was once more manifest and
even embarrassing. In its final paragraph Hans had soared to the
height of constitutional principles as they had reigned at the
beginning of 1890:
The legislative department of a State represents its polity
and its will; and is called upon by the highest demands of
natural and political law to preserve justice and judgment,
and to hold inviolate the public obligations. Any departure
from this rule, except for reasons most cogent (of which the
legislature, and not the courts, is the judge,) never fails in the
end to incur the odium of the world, and to bring lasting
injury upon the State itself. But to deprive the legislature of
the power of judging what the honor and safety of the State
581. Id. at 284-85.
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may require, even at the expense of a temporary failure to
discharge the public debts, would be attended with greater
evils than such failure can cause. 82
The statement echoed the legal and political world of the Slaughter-
House Cases and Munn v. Illinois,583 the constitutional world of the
1870s and early 1880s.
That world, of course, had begun to disintegrate long before
Young, Crain, and Home Telephone. It had, in fact, barely lasted to
1890 itself. Only a fleeting three weeks after Hans came down, the
Court announced its landmark decision in Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota 84 initiating the new era of Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process. There, the Court had declared
that the "question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for
transportation by a railroad company, involving, as it does, the
element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as
regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial
investigation." '585 Whether "reasons most cogent" were sufficient to
justify government action, in other words, had-a mere twenty-one
days after Hans proclaimed the opposite-turned out to be a
"judicial" question after all. Moreover, and again contrary to Hans's
three-week-old declaration, it turned out to be a question over which
the judiciary, and not the legislature, was to be the final judge. 86 On
this fundamental issue, too, Hans manifested its roots in a rapidly
expiring age that did not survive the century's end.
If ever a case was the ad hoc creature of a distinctive time, it is
Hans. If ever a case was quickly trimmed, pruned, cut away, and
nearly chopped off at its roots by the subsequent age, it is Hans. If
ever a case had roots that were themselves rotten, it, too, is Hans.
582. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (emphasis added).
583. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). On the passing of the older constitutional world, see WILLIAM
J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1996) (describing the nineteenth-century constitutional world of the
predominance of the state and local government and their extensive regulation of
economic and social behavior).
584. 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
585. Id. at 458. The decision came down on March 24, 1890, while Hans had come
down on March 3.
586. In 1893 the Court again contradicted its sweeping pronouncement of principle in
Hans, declaring that the amount of compensation due private parties affected by
government regulation was also "a judicial and not a legislative question." Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893).
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CONCLUSION: A PLACE FOR HISTORIANS' HISTORY
In retrospect, Frederick Jackson Turner seems to have been
right, even if for the wrong reasons. The decades around 1890 did
mark a pivotal transition in American history. During those years
Hans meshed with Ayers, Jumel, Plessy, the Civil Rights Cases, and
Louisville, New Orleans to help structure and legitimize a
fundamental and well-understood politico-constitutional settlement.
That settlement helped resolve, to the satisfaction of most white
Americans for the next half century and more, the question of
southern independence and the complex issues that slavery and its
abolition had thrust to the center of American life. Hans was a
monument to the end of an era, and its primary significance was-
literally as well as figuratively-to settle accounts from the past.
Indeed, with respect to the law of the Eleventh Amendment, the
modern age began quite apart from, though almost
contemporaneously with, Hans. That new age produced an
increasingly vigorous reaffirmation of the right of the federal
judiciary-notwithstanding Hans and the Eleventh Amendment-to
scrutinize the actions of states and their officials.5 7 After Hans, in
fact, the dawning age of modern industrial America led to a new
jurisprudence of the federal judicial power, a jurisprudence that
quickly led from Chicago, Milwaukee to Reagan and Smyth and then
on to Young, Crain, and Home Telephone. It led to a jurisprudence
that constrained the Eleventh Amendment and accepted the fact that
the Civil War amendments had altered the structure of American
government.588  Ultimately, those new principles of federal
jurisdiction-reshaped to the needs and values of a new mid-
twentieth-century age-helped inspire a powerful and long-delayed
movement for racial justice that, more than a century after the Civil
War, wiped away many of the remnants of the post-Reconstruction
settlement.589
587. E.g., Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 9-19 (1891) (upholding federal
injunction against state officials); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530-31 (1890)
(holding that counties did not come within the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
588. That jurisprudence, of course, had its own long, evolving, complex, and politically
contested history. See generally PURCELL, supra note 107 (reviewing the history and
expansion of federal judicial power from the late nineteenth century to the modern era).
589. The origins of the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-twentieth century were, of
course, complex, and the courts played only a limited, if nevertheless quite important, role.
Compare, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement,
80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) (asserting that the civil rights movement and end of legalized
segregation was the result of social and political change, not judicial decisions), with FISS,
supra note 573 (describing Brown and federal courts as critical to civil rights movement).
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The Civil War amendments and the various Reconstruction
measures that followed had posed a wide range of complex and
fundamental problems for the Court. The fact that the nation was
undergoing a profound transformation in its political dynamics, racial
attitudes, social conflicts, economic relations, and ethnic and religious
composition only compounded the difficulties that the Justices faced.
Small wonder that their decisions were so sensitively attuned to social
changes,590 and small wonder that they reshaped the contours of
federal jurisdiction in ways that they thought would best serve the
nation's changing values and needs.
The Rehnquist Court has followed the same course, serving the
nation's changing values and needs according to its lights. Its
majority Justices seized upon Hans and inflated its significance
because it was useful in their efforts to check federal power, preserve
the institutional autonomy of the states, and limit a wide range of
disfavored federal statutes and rights. The Rehnquist Court's policies
and choices may be wise; they are unquestionably well-intentioned.
Its policies and choices, however, should be placed openly on their
own foundations and justified publicly on their own merits. They
should not, in any event, stand on Hans.591
An historical analysis of Hans's origins shows that the decision
lacks authority as a constitutional precedent for three interrelated
reasons. First, despite its covering rhetoric, it was the product of
neither constitutional principle nor the intent of the framers but of
judicial instrumentalism, a result of the Court's shifting and pragmatic
efforts to shape the jurisdiction of the federal courts to serve its
evolving ideas of desirable national policy. It represented not the
intent of the 1790s but the compromise of the 1890s. Second, the
purposes the Court designed Hans to serve-powerful and, perhaps
at the time, beyond the power of the judiciary to deny-were base
and ignoble. The nation has long since rejected them. Third, Hans
was not only outdated from its birth but misconceived in its essence.
As a matter of legal doctrine, it reflected conceptions that were
590. See, e.g., Benedict, supra note 88 (analyzing the decisions of the Court in the 1870s
and 1880s with regard to social and political change); Eric Foner, Reconstruction Revisited,
10 REVS. AM. HIST. 82 (1982) (discussing the political and social effects of the
Reconstruction Era on both blacks and whites throughout the nation).
591. In Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed that the Court had long and
consistently followed Hans. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 n.7 (1996). As this
Article suggests, and as a review of its prior decisions shows, Hans has been avoided more
often than followed, criticized more often than defended, and, prior to the Rehnquist
Court, narrowed more often than broadened. It is not Hans that has directed the Court
but the policy inclinations, conscious or not, of its majority Justices.
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outmoded when it was announced or became so soon thereafter.
Most important, as a matter of constitutional principle, it embodied
assumptions that conflicted with the mandate of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Those reasons suggest that Hans itself should be discarded. 592
Indeed, four of the five Justices who have labored to expand Hans
should be disposed to agree with that argument. Only three years ago
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined
Justice Clarence Thomas's opinion in Mitchell v. Helms.593 There, the
four called for a substantial change in the Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, in part because the historical origins of that
jurisprudence lay in late-nineteenth-century anti-Catholicism. The
Court's doctrine developed "at a time of pervasive hostility to the
Catholic Church and to Catholics in general," the four explained. 94 It
originated in "hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools," and it
was "an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for 'Catholic.' ,595 Thus,
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence had "a shameful
pedigree, '  a discredited origin that undermined its legitimacy.
"This doctrine, born of bigotry," the four Justices concluded bluntly,
"should be buried now. '597
That reasoning applies a fortiori to Hans. By any reasonable
standard antiblack racism and racial oppression in America have
been far more cruel, brutal, widespread, continuing, exclusionary, and
utterly destructive to us all than has anti-Catholicism.598
592. The point is that Hans itself lacks any claim to generative authority, not that some
limited version of state sovereign immunity might not be desirable. More broadly, the
point is that Hans's ignoble origins helped induce the Court to invent an amorphous and
elastic paratextual rationale and that the decisions of the Rehnquist Court have
demonstrated the dangerous, unpredictable, and illimitable possibilities that such an
exceptionally malleable rationale can be made to serve. Hans has proved a charter of
judicial subjectivism.
593. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
594. Id. at 828.
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. Id. at 829. In support of its point, the opinion cited only one scholarly article. Id.
at 828. While the general principle the four Justices advanced seems sound, a far more
comprehensive and compelling record should be required before it can be wisely and
properly applied. Compare, e.g., Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The
Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 (2002) (arguing that the
Establishment Clause was designed to protect liberty of conscience, but not the equality of
religious minorities).
598. There are, of course, critical differences between the problems presented by the
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and those presented by its Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, especially the constitutional jurisprudence that has relied on
Hans. In neither area should arguments about "historical origins," by themselves, be
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As the product of long-since abandoned doctrines and a mere
device of expedience, Hans carries no authority of principled
reasoning or "original intent." As an instrument of the post-
Reconstruction settlement, a henchman of racism and racial
oppression, it carries no authority of the nation's political or moral
values. As an implicit rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
carries no authority of constitutional right or principle. There seems
no reason to consider Hans authority for anything.
determinative of normative "legal" issues. Indeed, as a matter of "law," Hans lacks
authority because it was rooted in and shaped by pre-Civil War concepts that were
repudiated by the three post-Civil War amendments and subsequently abandoned by the
Supreme Court. An understanding of Hans's "historical origins" is necessary to
understand why the Court acted as it did in deciding the case and why it was prepared to
turn its back on both traditional Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and on the Civil War
amendments. Compare Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 483 (framing the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in political terms and suggesting its political origins),
with GORDON, supra note 473 (analyzing the Court's use of history in its decision in a
landmark Establishment Clause case as it applied to the Mormon practice of polygamy).
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